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Résumé / Abstract
Le déploiement d’équipements informatiques à large échelle, sur les multiples infrastructures
interconnectées de l’Internet, a eu un impact considérable sur la complexité de la tâche de gestion.
L’informatique autonome permet de faire face à cet enjeu en spécifiant des objectifs de haut
niveau et en déléguant autant que possible les activités de gestion aux réseaux et systèmes eux-
mêmes. Cependant, lorsque des changements sont opérés par les administrateurs ou directement
par les équipements autonomes, des configurations vulnérables peuvent être involontairement
introduites, même si celles-ci sont correctes d’un point de vue opérationnel. Ces vulnérabilités
offrent un point d’entrée pour des attaques de sécurité. Les environnements autonomes doivent
être capables de se protéger pour éviter leur compromission et la perte de leur autonomie. À cet
égard, les mécanismes de gestion des vulnérabilités sont essentiels pour assurer une configuration
sûre de ces environnements.
Cette thèse porte sur la conception et le développement de nouvelles méthodes et techniques
pour la gestion des vulnérabilités dans les réseaux et systèmes autonomes, afin de leur permettre
de détecter, d’évaluer et de corriger leurs propres expositions aux failles de sécurité. Nous présen-
terons tout d’abord un état de l’art sur l’informatique autonome et la gestion de vulnérabilités, en
mettant en relief les défis importants qui doivent être relevés dans ce cadre. Nous décrirons ensuite
notre approche d’intégration du processus de gestion des vulnérabilités dans ces environnements,
et en détaillerons les différentes facettes, notamment : extension de l’approche dans le cas de
vulnérabilités distribuées, prise en compte du facteur temps en considérant une historisation des
paramètres de configuration, et application en environnements contraints en utilisant des tech-
niques probabilistes. Nous présenterons également les prototypes et les résultats expérimentaux
qui ont permis d’évaluer ces différentes contributions.
Mots clés: sécurité, gestion de réseaux, informatique autonome, gestion de vulnérabilités.
Over the last years, the massive deployment of computing devices over disparate intercon-
nected infrastructures has dramatically increased the complexity of network management. Au-
tonomic computing has emerged as a novel paradigm to cope with this challenging reality. By
specifying high-level objectives, autonomic computing aims at delegating management activi-
ties to the networks themselves. However, when changes are performed by administrators and
self-governed entities, vulnerable configurations may be unknowingly introduced. Vulnerabili-
ties constitute the main entry point for security attacks. Hence, self-governed entities unable to
protect themselves will eventually get compromised and consequently, they will lose their own
autonomic nature. In that context, vulnerability management mechanisms are vital to ensure
safe configurations, and with them, the survivability of any autonomic environment.
This thesis targets the design and development of novel autonomous mechanisms for dealing
with vulnerabilities, in order to increase the security of autonomic networks and systems. We
first present a comprehensive state of the art in autonomic computing and vulnerability mana-
gement, and point out important challenges that should be faced in order to fully integrate the
vulnerability management process into the autonomic management plane. Afterwards, we present
our contributions which include autonomic assessment strategies for device-based vulnerabilities
and extensions in several dimensions, namely, distributed vulnerabilities (spatial), past hidden
vulnerable states (temporal), and mobile security assessment (technological). In addition, we
present vulnerability remediation approaches able to autonomously bring networks and systems
into secure states. The scientific approaches presented in this thesis have been largely validated
by an extensive set of experiments which are also discussed in this manuscript.
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1.1 The context
Over the last years, the massive deployment of computer devices over interconnected hete-
rogeneous infrastructures has dramatically changed the perspective of network management. In
particular, the Internet has played a fundamental role providing a platform for thousands of
mixed technologies which currently constitute our globalized digital world. Nowadays, almost
any network including the Internet itself, is expanding as a response to many factors. As end-
users become more connected with computing technologies, or maybe technology becomes more
friendly with end-users, a growing demand for useful digital advances goes along with the pro-
cess. These new requirements appear in different forms, which directly impact in the mechanisms
and resources used to meet them. In the other way around, technology can be also observed as
a proactive stream, which shapes end-users’ behavior to some extent. This symbiosis between
technology and end-users makes a vehicle for their evolution.
This evolution however, is not without dangers. Constructive approaches tend to test the
boundaries of current technologies. Since networks became the key platform for exchanging in-
formation and providing all kind of services on top of them, their management rapidly shifted
into higher levels of complexity. These scenarios in turn are dynamic, which challenges their
limits even more. A simple phone call over the Internet, understood as a service, may involve
dozens of underlying running software, with different configurations, over disparate hardware,
speaking distinct protocols, and geographically distributed all around the world. This might be
only one service, however, we should imagine hundreds of different services, probably interac-
ting between them and with the end-user, which in addition may have distinct requirements
at different moments. It is clear that to cope with this complex landscape, smart and scalable
management approaches are required to align the desired network behavior.
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In that context, the autonomic computing approach has been conceived as a response to this
problem. What if specific administration tasks to adapt our networks to each concrete service
are not needed anymore ? What if we can express what we need from networks, and just tell the
underlying infrastructure to manage it for us ? From a high-level viewpoint, these sentences may
provide the intuition and spirit of autonomic computing. Indeed, autonomic computing aims at
freeing administrators from the burden of heavy and error-prone management tasks. The main
idea is to specify what networks have to do by means of high-level objectives, and delegate
the responsibility of accomplishing these specific goals to the networks themselves. Under this
perspective, self-governed networks and systems can positively tackle the management of the
overwhelming technological development we are witnessing today. However, in order to make
this approach work, security is essential. The ability of being autonomous implies self-protection.
If this requirement is not met, autonomous entities might get compromised, not only affecting
their own behavior but the surrounding environment as well. For this reason, the ability of
autonomic networks and systems to manage vulnerabilities and handle their own
exposure is a critical factor for their survivability. This matter constitutes the heart of
our work. This thesis aims at providing novel autonomous mechanisms for dealing
with vulnerabilities, in order to increase the security of self-governed networks and
systems.
1.2 The problem
In computer security, vulnerabilities are flaws or weaknesses in the design, implementation,
or configuration of a system that may allow an attacker to exploit them in order to bypass the
security policies of such system. Vulnerabilities constitute the key entry point for breaking into
computer systems and gaining unauthorized access to assets within these systems. Therefore,
the ability to manage vulnerabilities is crucial for any computer system. Autonomic networks
and systems are not an exception, although their autonomous nature challenges the vulnerability
management process at higher levels. As a matter of fact, related tasks usually performed by
human administrators over regular systems, must now be performed by self-governed entities on
their own. The vulnerability management process basically involves the detection and remediation
of vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, conceiving autonomic networks and systems featuring this process
poses hard challenges. How can we provide autonomic environments with mechanisms
for increasing their vulnerability awareness ? What methods should be employed
for identifying security weaknesses in an autonomous manner ? How should they
proceed to mitigate and eradicate detected vulnerabilities while maintaining the
system operative and safe ? These and other questions constitute the issues that this thesis
aims at dealing with.
Autonomic computing has opened new horizons for addressing problems where traditional
methods seem to fail. Particularly, mechanisms able to properly scale with evolving dynamic
networks and capable of reasonably tackling their increasing management complexity are simply,
essential. Autonomic computing perfectly fits with these requirements. However, if autonomic
infrastructures do not develop mechanisms and techniques to protect themselves from security
threats, their real power and utility will eventually come apart. The focus of this thesis is to
contribute in this direction, by providing a state of the art in autonomic computing and vulnera-
bility management, and filling out missing scientific issues required to harden the foundations and
security of autonomic computing. In the next section, we present the structure of this manuscript,
detailing each main part of the document and their purpose.
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1.3 Organization of the document
This manuscript is organized in three main parts (Parts I, II and III). Figure 1.1 illustrates the
structure of the document. First, we present the state of the art in autonomic computing and vul-
nerability management, and the connection between both worlds (Chapters 2 and 3). The second
part presents the contributions of this thesis, which are classified in two main categories according
to the vulnerability management process, namely, vulnerability assessment (Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7)
and vulnerability remediation (Chapter 8). The third part of this document presents three im-
plementation prototypes that we have developed as proof of concepts derived from our research
work (Chapter 9). The manuscript ends with general conclusions about our investigation and
describes promising perspectives of this research work (Chapter 10). The three main parts of the
document are detailed in the next subsections.
Figure 1.1 – Organization of the document
1.3.1 Part I: State of the art
The first part of this document (Part I) describes the state of the art related to autonomic
computing and vulnerability management. This part aims at positioning the autonomic compu-
ting paradigm in the context of large scale network management, and presenting current methods
and techniques used nowadays for dealing with security vulnerabilities. Particularly, Chapter 2
briefly presents the evolution of networks during the last decades, and highlights the role of au-
tonomic computing on this evolution. In that context, we identify security issues in autonomics
that require special attention, specifically those related to vulnerability management. Chapter 3
presents our research work about current mechanisms and scientific approaches for managing
vulnerabilities, and discusses how they can contribute to enhance the security of autonomic en-
vironments. Indeed, we identify benefits and limitations of these approaches, and put forward
research challenges and open issues that must be addressed in order to achieve real autonomy
on self-governed networks and systems.
1.3.2 Part II: Contributions
The second part of this manuscript (Part II) presents the contributions of this thesis. Accor-
ding to the vulnerability management process, we classify our contributions in two main catego-
ries, vulnerability assessment and vulnerability remediation. Figure 1.2 depicts our research work
organized into different chapters where dashed lines illustrate the main reading flow across them.
The first contribution, presented in Chapter 4, consists of a device-based approach for autono-
mic vulnerability assessment. From here, three dimensions represented with solid lines extend
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Figure 1.2 – Organization of contributions
the vulnerability assessment activity to novel scenarios considering spatial, temporal, and tech-
nological perspectives. Chapter 5 extends the concept of device-based localized vulnerabilities
to composed vulnerabilities distributed across the network. We denominate this spatial exten-
sion, distributed vulnerabilities. Chapter 6 involves the second dimension which considers time.
Indeed, this approach allows to increase the present security of computer devices by analyzing
hidden vulnerable states in the past. Chapter 7 captures the technological dimension, where we
have investigated novel approaches for assessing vulnerabilities in constrained environments such
as mobile networks. All these chapters, from 4 to 7, fall into the vulnerability assessment category.
Chapter 8 closes the vulnerability management process by considering vulnerability remediation
activities. Contributions related to remediation activities are divided in two parts, namely, reme-
diation of device-based vulnerabilities, and distributed ones, both located in Chapter 8. In the
next subsections, we provide an overview of each chapter describing the contributions involved
on them.
• Autonomous vulnerability awareness
Changes that are operated by autonomic networks and systems may generate vulnerabilities
and increase their exposure to security attacks. Our objective is to enable autonomic networks
to take advantage of the knowledge provided by vulnerability descriptions in order to maintain
safe configurations. In that context, our first contribution presented in Chapter 4, introduces an
autonomous approach for assessing device-based vulnerabilities. To this end, we have integrated
vulnerability descriptions into the management plane of autonomic systems. We have particularly
chosen the Cisco IOS platform as a proof of concept [86]. By automatically translating these
security advisories into policy rules that are interpretable by an autonomic configuration system,
autonomic agents distributed across the network become able to assess their own exposure.
We have used the OVAL language [117] as a means for specifying vulnerability descriptions, and
Cfengine [38] as the autonomic component of our solution. This approach provides an autonomous
mechanism for increasing the vulnerability awareness of self-governed environments.
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• Distributed vulnerabilities
Vulnerability assessment is traditionally performed over individual network devices, indepen-
dently of each other. Sometimes however, two or more devices combined together may produce a
vulnerable network state that host-based approaches are not able to detect. We refer to these se-
curity weaknesses as distributed vulnerabilities, which constitute our extension within the spatial
dimension. Distributed vulnerabilities must be assessed with a consolidated view of the network
in order to detect vulnerable states that may simultaneously involve two or more network de-
vices. Chapter 5 presents our approach for describing and assessing distributed vulnerabilities
in autonomic environments. We emphasize a mathematical construction for formally specifying
distributed vulnerabilities as well as a machine-readable language for describing them. We also
present an autonomous framework for assessing distributed vulnerabilities that exploits the know-
ledge provided by such descriptions. Therefore, our strategy permits to increase the vulnerability
awareness of both individual devices and the network as a whole.
• Past hidden vulnerable states
Vulnerability assessment activities usually analyze new security advisories only over current
running systems. However, a system compromised in the past by a vulnerability unknown at
that moment may still constitute a potential security threat in the present. Indeed, a backdoor
installed by an attacker for instance, may remain in the system even though the original vul-
nerability has been eradicated. Accordingly, past unknown system exposures are required to be
taken into account. Chapter 6 presents our approach for increasing the overall security of compu-
ting systems by identifying past hidden vulnerable states, which constitutes our extension in the
temporal dimension. In that context, we propose a modeling for detecting unknown past system
exposures as well as an OVAL-based distributed framework for autonomously gathering network
devices information and automatically analyzing their past security exposure.
• Mobile security assessment
The development of mobile technologies and services has contributed to the large-scale de-
ployment of smartphones and tablets. These environments are exposed to a wide range of security
attacks and may contain critical information about users such as contact directories and phone
calls. Assessing configuration vulnerabilities is a key challenge for maintaining their security, but
this activity should be performed in a lightweight manner in order to minimize the impact on
their scarce resources. Chapter 7 presents two complimentary approaches for assessing configu-
ration vulnerabilities in mobile devices, which constitute our extension within the technological
dimension. The first approach considers a self-assessment strategy which allows mobile devices
to assess their own exposure. In order to reduce the workload on the mobile side even more,
we also propose a probabilistic cost-efficient strategy integrated into a client-server architecture.
Both approaches target the Android platform [11] as a proof of concept, though these approaches
could be adapted to other mobile platforms as well.
• Remediation of configuration vulnerabilities
Vulnerability assessment constitutes a key activity within the vulnerability management pro-
cess. However, once a vulnerability has been detected, remediation activities to eradicate such
security weakness are essential. Indeed, the management of known vulnerabilities plays a cru-
cial role for ensuring safe configurations and preventing security attacks. However, this activity
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should not generate new vulnerable states. Chapter 8 presents two remediation approaches targe-
ted on device-based and distributed vulnerabilities respectively. Our first approach formalizes the
remediation decision process of device-based vulnerabilities as a SAT problem. In that context,
we present an autonomous framework that is able to assess OVAL vulnerability descriptions and
perform corrective actions by using XCCDF-based descriptions [167] of future machine states and
the NETCONF protocol [63]. The second approach targets distributed vulnerabilities. There, we
propose an autonomous strategy where network elements collaborate to remediate the vulnera-
bilities they are involved in.
1.3.3 Part III: Implementation
In order to evaluate the feasibility and scalability of the proposed approaches, we have de-
veloped different implementation prototypes that serve as the computable infrastructure for our
experiments. Chapter 9 describes three implementation prototypes targeting autonomous device-
based vulnerability awareness, past hidden vulnerable states, and mobile security assessment. Our
first prototype, called Ovalyzer, is an OVAL to Cfengine translation system, which permits the
integration of OVAL vulnerability descriptions into the autonomic management plane. Ovalyzer
generates Cfengine policy rules that represent these security advisories. Then, generated Cfen-
gine policies are consumed by autonomic agents deployed in the network, thus becoming able to
assess their own security exposure. Our second implementation prototype aims at dealing with
past unknown security exposures. Reusing the idea behind Ovalyzer, this prototype is able to
autonomously generate XML-based snapshots of the state of the systems under surveillance, by
following Cfengine policy rules. These images are then efficiently stored in an SVN-based reposi-
tory. When new vulnerability descriptions become available, an exposure analyzer automatically
assess stored images in order to identify past unknown security exposures. Our third prototype,
called Ovaldroid, targets vulnerability assessment activities on the Android platform. Indeed,
we have implemented both approaches presented in Chapter 8. First, we present a lightweight
self-assessment service able to monitor an external provider for new vulnerability definitions and
assess its own security exposure. Afterwards, we present our probabilistic extension where the
assessment activities are controlled and performed by an external server, thus reducing even more
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2.1 Introduction
The growing development of networks and the multiplication of the services offered over them
have dramatically increased the complexity of network management. The paradigm of autonomic
computing has been introduced to address this complexity through the design of networks and
services which are responsible for their own management. While high-level objectives are provided
by network administrators, management operations are delegated to the networks themselves.
This alleviates the administrative burden required for maintaining large-scale expanding networks
as well as dozens of heterogeneous services. In this chapter, we first present a holistic perspective
of evolving aspects that boost large-scale network management. We also discuss why the paradigm
of autonomic computing may deal with these management issues. Following, we illustrate the
main architectural characteristics of autonomics and put forward essential security concerns that
need to be addressed. Finally, we explain why vulnerability management constitutes a critical
activity to ensure real autonomy, and provide an overview of the approach taken in this thesis
to achieve this goal.
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2.2 Large-scale network management
In the broad sense of the concept, technology has been used by men for thousands of years.
Defined as the creation, manipulation, and knowledge of tools and methods for solving problems,
achieving goals, and controlling the environment that surround us [149], technology constitutes
a cornerstone in the evolution of human kind. The inherent nature of technology projects a de-
pendency relationship with human beings. While the desire of exploration, discovery, automation
and innovation has made technology evolve to encompass human needs and goals, the impact
of technology on people’s culture and life has also become a form of feedback that aligns its
direction. The era of information technology, where we are living now, is not an exception to
this cyclical effect. Within this revolution, computer technologies have played a fundamental
role, not only for end users, but also for orthogonal scientific and industry domains that at the
end will eventually impact on human beings in some way or another. From small resource-less
wired computers in the early 1980’s to ubiquitous communication devices and smart apartments
in the 2010s, the evolution of computing technologies has turned into a mesh of systems and
devices where everything gets interconnected. In that context, the management of these large-
scale, convoluted and heterogeneous networks becomes extremely challenging. The aim of this
section is to show why autonomic computing is important to address the management of current
and future networks. To that end, we analyze two aspects that directly impact on the evolution
of computer networks: technological advances and the behavior of end-users. The objective is
to provide an overview of current network trends and what we should expect, and motivate the
development of autonomic solutions to success in the design and management of future networks.
2.2.1 Computer networks and the Internet
Computer networking has its origins in the early 1960s. Aiming at interconnecting and sha-
ring computing resources, several research projects using a wide variety of protocols were de-
veloped at that time. The ARPANET project, led by the Advanced Research Projects Agency
(ARPA) within the U.S. Department of Defense, was one of them [15, 83]. The first deployment
of the network ARPANET was performed in the late 1960s. Involving four nodes at four dif-
ferent American universities (University of California, Los Angeles ; Stanford Research Institute ;
University of California, Santa Barbara ; University of Utah), ARPANET became the first opera-
tional packet-switching network in the world. But it was not until the 1970s that this and other
governmental and academic networks became interconnected using a common program called
the Internet Transmission Control Program [127]. The specification of this program was the first
document to coin the term Internet as a shorthand for internetworking. The fundamentals of this
program gave rise to a new networking model released in the early 1980s called the Internet Pro-
tocol suite, currently maintained by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) [84]. This set
of communication protocols, commonly known as TCP/IP because of its two leading protocols,
the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [129] and the Internet Protocol (IP) [128], would lay
the architectural foundations of what we know today as the Internet.
The Internet is nowadays a global and decentralized system of interconnected computer net-
works. The Internet Protocol suite provides standards that allow computers within these net-
works to communicate with each other. This capability has provided a world-wide infrastructure
over which thousands of systems and services have been built, reaching millions of users every
day. The World Wide Web (WWW), whose standards are maintained by the World Wide Web
Consortium (W3C), constitutes a representative example [156]. Current computer networks as
well as the Internet itself also feature an interesting characteristic, it is an expanding technology.
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Figure 2.1 – Large-scale networking evolution
Dozens of scientific domains contribute to some extent in the development of current and future
networks. Some of them are focused on architectural and management issues, others deal with
challenging problems that occur on top of networked infrastructures. As an example, enabling
the interconnection of different devices may be classified as a networking problem. On the other
hand, extracting accurate results for a specific search over thousands of gigabytes of informa-
tion may be more connected to Big Data, Semantics or Data Mining techniques [77]. However,
the interconnection of different techniques coming from disparate domains to solve computing
problems is currently more and more common.
In the context of large-scale network management, it is important to have a holistic perspec-
tive of how current technologies are affecting and shaping the structure of today networks and
therefore, the Internet. Even though this is not an exhaustive enumeration of current scientific
research domains, we consider two prominent, yet very abstract, lines that can describe the forces
that may mold future networks. These are: technological advances that provide new hardware
and software systems with more and different capabilities, and end-users behavior, which guides
to some extent, the final purpose of new technology and hence, how it should be constructed
to meet people’s needs and expectations. This vision is illustrated in Figure 2.1, where several
interconnected research fields have arisen after the introduction of IP networks in the 1980s. The
management of expanding and dynamic networks, where on top, diverse approaches and tech-
niques are built to provide new services and applications, is becoming more and more complex
everyday. Transversely, we have identified the autonomic computing paradigm as a perspective
that goes beyond the resolution of network management problems as explained later in this
chapter. Figure 2.1 aims at positioning network management trends under the influence of two
evolving paths, the advances in computer technologies and the users behavior over services built
on top of these technologies. Both aspects are discussed in the following subsections.
2.2.2 Technological evolution
Over the last decade, novel methods in engineering and electronics, non-expensive construc-
tion materials, and enhanced methodologies for large-scale production have arisen, triggering a
massive flood of disparate powerful hardware with different abilities. This aspect has made room
for new different technologies to emerge. With cheaper and more powerful hardware, the idea
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of virtualizing hardware platforms and general computing resources became popular [131]. The
use of virtualization techniques has augmented the amount of network resources, real or virtua-
lized, increasing the complexity of network management. With the incorporation of high-speed
communication lines, cloud computing has gone one step further [31]. Cloud computing offers ser-
vices whose processing is transparently performed combining resources distributed all around the
globe. The decoupling of services from underlying resources has opened new horizons for emerging
technologies such as Software-Defined Networks (SDN) [140, 64]. SDN allows administrators to
manage computer networks independently from the real devices that actually implement low
level network functionalities [22]. Complementary, Network Functions Virtualization (NFS) has
come up with a novel perspective that leverage technology virtualization to consolidate disparate
network devices into a single standard high-performance network platform [65]. These efforts aim
at simplifying network management, to which autonomic computing can highly contribute.
The rapid evolution of the hardware industry has also promoted the increasing use of mobile
devices such as smartphones and tablets. Indeed, it is expected that the number of mobile-
connected devices will exceed the number of people on Earth by the end of 2013 [42]. With
thousands of applications and services, mobile end-users expect seamless service provisioning
from the cloud and clean communications on the move. This issue becomes a challenging problem
for network operators when the reality tends to fast expanding mobile networks. Even though
mobile devices spread fast, they still lack of powerful computation resources. In light of this, a new
research domain denominated mobile cloud computing is emerging, which aims at making mobile
devices resource-full in terms of computational power, memory, storage, energy, and context-
awareness. This issue makes their management even more complex.
But mobile networks are not actually the only technological field with power-less devices.
Low-Power and Lossy Networks (LLN) is a classification of networking environments with re-
source constrained devices [93], which includes Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) [14]. WSNs are
dynamic networks constituted by powerless sensors and short wireless signal range, e.g. tempera-
ture and home automation, which collaborate each other to route messages to their destination.
However, energy or range limitations might break all communication links passing through them,
posing hard management problems including routing, security and interoperability issues. In ad-
dition, WSNs use the ISM (industrial, scientific and medical) radio bands to transmit packets
across the network [90]. But ISM is also used by other technologies, and therefore, the throughput
of communication links can be degraded due to sensors usually have to wait for available chan-
nels to send their packets. To overcome this and many other issues, a novel research area called
Cognitive Radio Networks (CRN) is arising [90]. CNRs feature autonomic strategies, making a
smart use of the radio-frequency spectrum for opportunistically transmitting information.
All these technologies coexist within an environment that requires to be properly managed.
Indeed, the Internet constitutes a target infrastructure where all these technologies can be inte-
grated. With the advent of IPv6, the unique identification of any network device in the world
becomes possible [125]. This has given room to a new way of understanding the Internet named
the Internet of Things (IoT) [18, 23]. IoT describes the concept of a global network where he-
terogeneous and ubiquitous devices, from standard computers to cars and appliance on-board
wireless sensors, become interconnected through high-speed communication channels. The revo-
lutionary vision of an Internet integrated by any type of object providing smart services to others
over a dense mesh of communication links, is for several scientists, the Internet of the future.
In brief, computer technologies evolve fast and constitute very complex internetworked envi-
ronments. To make their management sustainable, systems involved in these convoluted networks
must expose higher levels of autonomy, as reported in [16, 143]. To that end, autonomic computing
provides strong foundations to tackle the management complexity of current and future networks.
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2.2.3 End-users behavior
With the overwhelming avalanche of new devices and technologies, the trend to the Internet
of Things seems indeed natural. However, there exist other influential factors that cannot be
ignored, for instance, people’s behavior with respect to the use of these technologies. As illustra-
ted in Figure 2.1, people also determinate to some extent, in which way technology can be used,
or whether its purpose makes sense. Social networks constitute an outstanding example of tech-
nologies that have greatly influenced people’s behavior and vice versa [95], like Facebook [67] and
LinkedIn [98]. During the last decade, it has been observed that social interactions mostly involve
exchange and sharing of information and media content. The mechanisms that provide access
to this content have dramatically evolved since then. Media aggregators such as YouTube [165],
and photo sharing sites such as Picasa [121] and Flickr [70], are some examples.
Even though these web-based technologies are used on a daily basis, they are not the only
means for accessing content. Dedicated infrastructures designed to share digital material have
also arisen such as Peer-2-Peer (P2P) overlays (e.g. BitTorrent [28], eMule [60]), and Content
Distribution Networks (CDN) (e.g. Akamai [7], Limelight [97]). The overwhelming consumption
of media content over the Internet is currently so strong that several academics and industry
entities have proposed radical approaches to deal with the burden of information exchange across
the global network. Information-Centric Networking (ICN) is a new paradigm that provides
a clean architectural approach to address these new relevant requirements [164, 3]. The main
argument is that the Internet, as originally conceived, has been designed to exchange data packets
between identified machines. However, end users do not really care about who provides the
information (node endpoints), they just want to access the exact content they are looking for,
no matter where it is stored. This vision drives to radical changes on the architectural design of
the Internet itself, orienting its organization to named content, and using in-network caching for
storing popular content so close users can retrieve the same information faster. Content-Centric
Networks (CCN) is a well-known approach inside the ICN paradigm [139, 36]. The main goal
is to provide a network infrastructure service that is better suited to today’s use, particularly
content distribution and mobility, and more resilient to disruptions and failures [3].
These novel information-based network models appear as a response to the inability of current
networks to face end-users requirements. Therefore, a potential lecture of this phenomenon is
that the community is trying to recreate or adapt more than thirty years of IP-based technologies
to support current needs, which is indeed natural, but also extremely hard. This issue shows why
flexible technologies are important. In that context, the adaptive nature of autonomic approaches
may better fit current and future end-users behavior, providing more flexibility and scalability.
In summary, we have illustrated in this and the previous section, two different evolving paths
that can have a strong impact on the future Internet. The objective is not to make an exhaustive
analysis of each current edge technology, but to provide an insight of what is happening within
current networks and the Internet, as well as disparate technologies running on top of them. In
order to support their natural evolution, new perspectives to manage these evolving networks in
a smart and controlled manner, constitutes a crucial problem. These perspectives must provide
novel ways to deal with network management complexity. With this issue in mind, we have
observed that no matter what technology or trend is considered, a common feature remains
suitable to these challenges, autonomy. In order to tackle the overwhelming demand of end
users as well as the fast large-scale deployment of heterogeneous network devices, autonomous
mechanisms for managing these networks are essential to achieve scalability and reliability. In the
next section, we present an overview of autonomic computing and detail architectural aspects as
well as internal design issues.
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2.3 Autonomic computing overview
The autonomic computing paradigm was born as a response to cope with the evident arising
complexity of managing computing systems [91, 57]. In 2001, IBM [80] communicated a mani-
festo where it was explained that the management methods used at that moment, including
software and hardware installation, configuration, integration, and maintenance, were not sui-
table to scale with the future landscape that was coming. In that context, a radical new way to
deal with computer and network management was proposed, autonomic computing. The vision
of autonomic computing is strongly inspired on the autonomous nervous system. Everyday, we,
as human beings, perform several tasks conscientiously that to some extent, are the result of
following some high-level objective within our lives. We eat when we are hungry, we sleep when
we are tired, we take decisions expecting to succeed in our goals, and so many complex tasks as
we can imagine. However, there are some other tasks, which are as much important as eating
or sleeping, that are unconsciously and automatically done by our own bodies. Indeed, every
time we breath, we do not do it conscientiously, we do not think about it. However, it is still
a vital function that actually follows a high-level human law, being alive. In the same manner,
the autonomous nervous system also governs our heart rate and body temperature, thus freeing
our conscious brain from the burden of dealing with these and many other low-level, yet vital,
functions [91]. In that context, autonomic computing aims at providing an infrastructure where
networks can be managed by establishing high level-objectives. The underlying networking com-
ponents will then perform in accordance to these rules and the changing environment, without
explicit human intervention. This perspective aims at providing strong foundations for develo-
ping scalable and flexible infrastructures able to support a demanding and changing technological
reality [133], [79].
2.3.1 Key concepts of autonomics
The first step towards the construction of autonomic solutions is in fact to understand what
autonomic actually is. In other words, we should be able to distinguish between autonomic
solutions and those that are just automatic. In 2009, NASA published a book where it is explained
how autonomic systems are applied to NASA intelligent spacecraft operations and exploration
systems [153]. There, the differences between automation, autonomy and autonomicity are very
well discussed. Both automation and autonomy refer to the ability of executing a complete process
without human intervention. The main difference is that while an automated solution sticks to
the step-by-step process it was built for, an autonomous solution may involve a decision process
under certain circumstances that affects the way tasks are executed, in order to accomplish its
goals or final purpose. Such circumstances are usually related to the environment perceived by
the autonomous agent. In other words, automated solutions replace step-by-step processes done
by humans. Autonomic solutions on the other hand, aim at emulating human behavior during the
process, by reasoning and taking decisions for the successful operation of the system. According
to the dictionary definitions used in [144], autonomous and autonomic solutions means almost
the same, except for a very slight property, spontaneity. While autonomy means self-governance
and self-direction, independent and not controlled by external forces ; autonomic means self-
management, that occurs automatically and involuntarily, just as the autonomic nervous system
does. For the sake of clarity and simplicity, we will use in this thesis both terms, autonomous and
autonomic, without distinction except where explicitly noted, considering the following definition.
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Figure 2.2 – Stages towards autonomic computing [82]
Definition 1 (Autonomic system). An autonomic system is a self-governed entity, able to ma-
nage itself without any type of external control, and to perform required tasks without human
intervention in order to accomplish the goals it was created for. While the purpose of the auto-
nomic system is defined by high-level objectives, the achievement of this purpose is delegated to
the system itself. The internal activities performed by the autonomic system may include envi-
ronment perception, analysis, reasoning, decision making, planning and execution of actions that
must ensure the successful operation of the system.
As an effort to classify existing management solutions and their positioning with respect to
the autonomic vision, IBM established what they called the evolutionary path to autonomic
computing [82]. This path is represented by five levels as illustrated in Figure 2.2. The first le-
vel depicts the basic approach where network elements are independently managed by system
administrators. Following, the managed level integrates the information collected from disparate
network systems into one consolidated view. At the predictive level, new technologies are incor-
porated for correlating information, predicting optimal configurations and providing advices to
system administrators. The ability to automatically take actions based on the available infor-
mation constitutes the adaptive level. Finally, the autonomic level is achieved when the system
is governed by business policies and objectives. These objectives define the purpose of the au-
tonomic system that will be inherently pursuit by its logical implementation and supported by
its internal know-how as well as its ability to sense the environment. The fact of being gover-
ned by policies or high-level objectives is what makes the key difference between autonomic and
automated solutions.
Autonomic solutions are usually composed of smaller components called autonomic entities.
Autonomic entities are designed to serve a specific purpose such as monitoring a network device
or providing routing services. These entities can then be combined to construct more complex
autonomic solutions. In order to organize their self-governing nature, autonomic systems involve
a set of functional areas called self-* properties, defined as follows [105]:
– self-configuration, providing mechanisms and techniques for automatically configuring
components and services,
– self-optimization, covering methods for monitoring and adapting parameters in order to
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achieve an optimal operation according to the laws that govern the system,
– self-healing, for automatically detecting, diagnosing and repairing localized software and
hardware problems, and
– self-protection, supporting activities for identifying and defending the system against
potential threats.
These areas permit to classify the mechanisms used for regulating the behavior of autonomic
entities. This aspect is discussed in the following subsection.
2.3.2 Behavioral and architectural models
From a high-level perspective, autonomic entities work under closed control loops that govern
their behavior. In control theory, a closed control loop refers to a feedback mechanism that
controls the dynamic behavior of a system based on the sensed environment as well as its own
state (feedback) [17]. As shown in Figure 2.3, the resource manager interface provides means
for monitoring and controlling the managed element (hardware, software, others). While its
sensor enables the autonomic manager to obtain data from the resource, the effector allows it
to perform operations on the resource. The autonomic manager is composed of a cycle of four
activities that determines the behavior of the specific autonomic entity. This cycle or control
loop includes monitoring its current state, analyzing the available information, planning future
actions, and executing generated plans compliant to specified high-level goals [81]. In addition,
the autonomic manager also exposes a management interface, in the same way the managed
element does. This interface allows other autonomic managers to use its services and provides
composition capabilities on distributed infrastructures.
It is important to highlight that a wide range of software and systems could embody, to
some extent, autonomic solutions. To achieve this, the involved elements should be adapted to
interact with the environment by means of sensors and effectors, as illustrated in Figure 2.3. In
addition, they should work guided by rules and policies intended to achieve a specific purpose.
Under a behavioral perspective, the autonomic manager will continuously monitor the managed
elements and will perform an analysis of the perceived state. This information is then used to
plan and execute changes required to align the state of the managed elements with the specified
high-level objectives. This process describes the internal and finest working level of an autonomic
Figure 2.3 – Autonomic management lifecycle [81]
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Figure 2.4 – Autonomic computing architecture [81]
system. However, the management interfaces exposed by these self-governed components, permit
to combine them and to obtain easy solutions for complex problems. Indeed, the ability to
integrate autonomic solutions into broader autonomic systems provides support for accompanying
evolving technological landscapes [105].
The basic architecture of the autonomic computing approach proposes a layered organization
as illustrated in Figure 2.4. Starting from the bottom, layer 1 contains managed resources over
the IT infrastructure. These resources can be hardware devices such as servers, routers and
access points, services and software components. Their management interfaces provide means
for accessing and controlling the managed resources. Layer 2 describes autonomic managers
for, but not limited to, the four aforementioned categories of self-management denominated
self-* properties, i.e., self-configuration, self-optimization, self-healing and self-protection. Each
autonomic manager within layer 2 is in charge of controlling a specific group of resources. To
do so, these managers involve control loops for each self-* property, which control the state and
behavior of the underlying devices. In order to line up the general directives of the autonomic
system, it is required an autonomic component able to organize the overall activity of each specific
self-* property across the whole system. Layer 3 contains autonomic managers that orchestrate
other autonomic managers incorporating control loops that have the broadest view of the overall
IT infrastructure. For instance, the self-configuration orchestrator will control the autonomic
managers underneath related to self-configuration. This provides a consistent outlook of the
system for each self-* property. The self-* orchestrator component is in charge of controlling
every specific orchestrator, which is essential to achieve consistency with respect to the laws
that govern the autonomic system. The top layer illustrates a manual manager that provides
a common system management interface for the IT professional using an integrated solution
console. The various manual and autonomic manager layers can obtain and share knowledge via
knowledge sources.
19
Chapter 2. Network management and autonomic computing
Self-* properties are intended to autonomously solve high-level requirements, however, their
implementation is complex and poses hard challenges. Along with administration tasks done
by humans, changes performed by autonomic entities may inadvertently generate vulnerable
states when following high-level objectives. Even though these changes can operationally improve
the environment, insecure configurations may be produced increasing the exposure to security
threats. Therefore, enabling autonomic networks and systems to manage vulnerabilities and
maintain safe configurations constitutes a major challenge. This topic is discussed in the next
section.
2.4 Security issues in autonomics
Autonomic systems must act on their own, taking any necessary decision to obey the rules
that govern their behavior and to achieve their goals. As such, these systems must deal with
security aspects, ensuring a proper functionality and guaranteeing their results. As explained
before, autonomic systems are governed by high-level policies. Therefore, a major problem in
autonomics relies on the successful operation of the system while also respecting all the rules
that control the system. In that context, rules or policies can sometimes enter into a conflict.
As an example, we can state the question: what happens when a service X has been identified
as vulnerable to some kind of attack, but other rule says that service X must be always active ?
If we do not have a countermeasure for this vulnerability, should we deactivate service X and
violate the other rule to ensure security ? Should we leave service X activated so as to respect
the other rule ? These are transversal requirements that pose consistency issues. At some point,
solving these issues autonomously might not even be possible, and they should be addressed
by human administrators. We could ask: are operational aspects more important than security
ones ? The answer to this question might be found, perhaps, in the objectives and purpose of
the specific autonomic system. Nevertheless, this is not a design problem of autonomics itself.
This is a problem that human beings face everyday. Autonomic entities must be adaptive, with
respect to the environment and to their own performance. When new knowledge contradicts
information they already have, autonomic systems must be able to deal with this inconsistency
problem and ensure appropriate functionality. They must learn and make decisions to accomplish
their objectives. This problem may actually happen at any level of an autonomic architecture.
Therefore, it is important to keep this problem in mind when designing an autonomic component.
During the last years, several efforts have been made to provide standard autonomic fra-
meworks over which autonomic solutions can be built. The European UniverSelf project is an
example to which we have contributed [154]. The UniverSelf project provides an infrastructure
called Unified Management Framework (UMF), composed of three main blocks, governance, co-
ordination and knowledge, which controls the overall behavior of the system. In addition, it
offers well structured means for developing autonomic components to be executed over this in-
frastructure. These components are called Network Empowerment Mechanisms (NEMs). In the
context of this thesis, we have contributed with a NEM for empowering vulnerability manage-
ment features in UMF. Consistency issues regarding high-level policies are managed by the UMF
framework. This thesis is oriented to deal with vulnerabilities in an autonomous manner. We
do not deal with consistency problems at other operational levels of self-governed environments.
However, we aim at providing consistent solutions so as to decrease, or at least to not increase,
the burden of dealing with broader consistency problems. Our objective is to provide autonomous
and consistent mechanisms for assessing and remediating vulnerabilities, in order to ensure safe
configurations within autonomic environments as explained in the following subsection.
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Figure 2.5 – Positioning of vulnerability management with respect to self-management activities
2.4.1 Vulnerability management in autonomic environments
In order to explain our approach, it is important to first understand what a vulnerability ac-
tually is. All along this work, the concept of vulnerability in computing security will be described
by considering the following definition.
Definition 2 (Vulnerability). A vulnerability can be understood as a flaw or weakness in system
security procedures, design, implementation, or internal controls that could be exercised (acci-
dentally triggered or intentionally exploited) and result in a security breach or a violation of the
system’s security policy [108], [85].
Under this perspective, vulnerability management is a cross-cutting concern strongly related
but not limited to self-configuration and self-protection activities of autonomic networks. This
process is depicted in Figure 2.5 where a control loop enables the assessment and remediation of
potential vulnerable states generated by both administrators tasks and self-management activi-
ties, thus securing the environment. The main idea is that actions and changes performed in the
system are constantly monitored and analyzed looking for vulnerabilities. When vulnerable states
are detected, corrective actions are performed until the environment is secured. The vulnerabi-
lity management control loop remains active during the whole lifetime period of the autonomic
environment under surveillance. In that context, the establishment of a secure process for dealing
with vulnerabilities requires the specification of a policy defining the desired system state, and a
well-known secure initial state to identify vulnerabilities and policy compliance [162]. The main
activities performed during the lifecycle of the vulnerability management process can be mapped
to the same activity line present in autonomic components. Figure 2.6 describes the general life-
cycle of an autonomic component where the main activities done for dealing with vulnerabilities
have been mapped to the task loop performed during the autonomic manager lifecycle [81]. As it
can be observed, vulnerability identification activities take place in the monitoring phase where
tasks for assessing and analyzing vulnerable states are performed (I) taking advantage of the
available security knowledge. When a security problem is found, it is classified (II) and changes
for correcting the situation must be performed. Therefore, vulnerability counter-measures are
planned based on several factors such as importance, risks and impact. Finally, a change plan is
generated and remediation tasks are executed (III) in order to maintain safe configurations and to
be compliant with the current policy. Figure 2.6 illustrates the overall approach taken in this the-
sis for integrating vulnerability management activities into the autonomic plane. Actual existing
methods and techniques for dealing with vulnerabilities within autonomic and non-autonomic
systems are widely discussed in Chapter 3.
Autonomic computing provides strong theoretical and practical foundations to face the large-
scale network deployment that we are observing today. However, it is essential to incorporate
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Figure 2.6 – Mapping of the vulnerability management activity into the autonomic lifecycle
security mechanisms into autonomic environments in order to get practical and working solutions.
As happens in the real world, autonomic elements coexist within dynamic environments, interac-
ting with other autonomic and non-autonomic elements. Nevertheless, there are also continuous
threats that may compromise autonomic elements safety. If an autonomic element is compromi-
sed, its functions and abilities become untrustworthy and eventually disabled ; thus autonomic
elements that use services of the former become compromised as well. This inevitably leads to
distrust and failure of the autonomic environment. Autonomic systems must be able to manage
their own state and perform required activities to achieve secure configurations. Autonomic ele-
ments unable to support this capability will age with time, becoming more vulnerable, insecure
and useless. Real automation can be possible only if autonomic networks and systems fully in-
tegrate vulnerability management mechanisms for ensuring safe configurations. In that context,
this thesis aims at contributing to the security of autonomic computing, with a particular focus
on the management of configuration vulnerabilities.
2.5 Synthesis
In this chapter, we have presented a broad outlook of issues that are shaping the structure of
today’s networks and the Internet. The overwhelming advent of new technologies featuring more
power, ubiquity and usability in disparate contexts, requires novel techniques and methodologies
for managing the underlying networks that support them. The technological landscape changes
fast and users collaborate to mold its future as well. Therefore, it is important to leverage clean
and adaptive approaches to face this evolving reality. Autonomic computing provides robust
foundations that may encompass this evolution and can help to address several current network
management challenges. However, autonomic systems must ensure safe configurations if we want
to trust autonomic solutions. In that context, the aim of this thesis is to provide novel autonomous
mechanisms for dealing with vulnerabilities, in order to increase the security of self-governed
networks and systems. In the next chapter, we present an in-depth investigation of current
existing methods and techniques for dealing with vulnerabilities, discussing their benefits and
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3.1 Introduction
Managing large-scale networks is a complex task and by nature, humans make errors when
configuring them. In addition, changes performed by autonomic entities may increase their own
security exposure. Because of this, vulnerable configurations are likely within such environments
and they may potentially lead to a wide spectrum of negative and unwanted issues such as
instability, unavailability, confidentiality problems, and many more. In that context, managing
vulnerabilities becomes a crucial and challenging activity. Autonomic computing must integrate
vulnerability management mechanisms so as to ensure safe configurations. In this chapter, we
present a detailed outlook of the vulnerability management process as well as direct and or-
thogonal research efforts that may potentially contribute to the integration of this process into
autonomic environments.
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3.2 The vulnerability management process
In the same way bank robbers prepare their strikes identifying weak points to take advantage
of, attackers seek for weaknesses that can exploit to gain access to computer systems. These
weaknesses range from end-users (e.g. we could apply social techniques on someone to obtain
critical information such as passwords), to computer vulnerabilities and network security policies.
This thesis however, is focused on the management of computer vulnerabilities. To formally define
this concept, let us recall the concept of vulnerability given in Definition 2. A vulnerability can
be understood as a flaw or weakness in system security procedures, design, implementation, or
internal controls that could be exercised (accidentally triggered or intentionally exploited) and
result in a security breach or a violation of the system’s security policy [108], [85]. With this
concept in mind, we consider the following definition for vulnerability management.
Definition 3 (Vulnerability management). In computer security, vulnerability management re-
fers to a continuous process which involves the (I) identification, (II) classification, and (III) re-
mediation and mitigation of vulnerabilities [71].
The activities involved in the vulnerability management process previously mentioned are in
fact very general. They could be broken down into more granular tasks, however, they describe
well the main challenging areas within the vulnerability management process. In this thesis, we
are mainly focused on the identification and remediation activities. In this section, we first pro-
vide a brief historical review that puts in context the importance of vulnerability management.
Afterwards, we present a classification of research areas that contribute to vulnerability assess-
ment, which accompanied by remediation activities, completes the vulnerability management
process.
3.2.1 A brief history of vulnerability management
The process of managing vulnerabilities has been exercised since long time ago in different
fields. Military for instance, considers a vulnerability as the inability to withstand an adverse
circumstance produced by a hostile environment. Therefore, security procedures are defined to
state how to proceed in these situations, thus constituting part of a vulnerability management
program [20]. In information technology, vulnerabilities have existed from the beginning. As an
example, in 1903 the Marconi wireless telegraph was reported to contain a flaw that allowed an
attacker to intercept any message sent by the device thus leading to unauthorized information
disclosure [114]. In 1962, the Multics CTSS operating system running on IBM 7094 was reported
to have a flaw allowing an unauthorized user to disclose the password of every user on the system.
Reports of identified vulnerabilities have continued coming up since the 60’s until our days. With
the incursion of computing systems into human activities, the diversification of programs and
services have set up more and more vulnerabilities compromising the security of such systems.
These undesired effects made it clear the need of developing security programs able to deal with
such security issues. In 1972, a computer security technology planning study was created by
the U.S. Air Force Systems Command (AFSC). The objective of this program was to specify
directives for securing the use and development of computing systems [108]. Since those days,
managing vulnerabilities became an essential activity for any organization involving the use of
computers or telecommunication equipments. Nowadays, several technologies that will be later
detailed, are widely used for supporting this process such as the Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures system (CVE) [46] for enumerating known vulnerabilities or the Security Content
Automation Protocol (SCAP) [21] for automating vulnerability management activities.
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Figure 3.1 – Vulnerability assessment - D3 classification
3.2.2 On the organization of vulnerability management activities
During our research work, we have investigated different methods and techniques contributing
to vulnerability management in autonomic environments. However, we have realised that the
identification of vulnerabilities itself constitutes a complex activity that requires to be organized
so as to be properly executed. Such a setup should clearly consider the final target of this
activity, machines. Therefore, machine-readable mechanisms able to automate tasks involved
in the autonomic process are essential. In light of this, we decompose vulnerability assessment
activities by considering what we call a D3 (D cube) classification as illustrated in Figure 3.1,
D3 standing for Discovery, Description and Detection.
The D3 classification provides a basis, divided into three axes, for organizing the foundations
of vulnerability assessment which constitutes the first step for the vulnerability management
process to be embedded into autonomic environments. Autonomic entities must be provided
with knowledge about current vulnerabilities, either with mechanisms for discovering threats by
themselves or with machine-readable specifications about security alerts. Regardless of the me-
chanism chosen, vulnerability discovery techniques (axis 1) must be analyzed in order to unveil
unknown vulnerabilities, and to explore and understand the constantly evolving threatening envi-
ronment. Taking advantage of these mechanisms, new knowledge becomes available for increasing
the vulnerability awareness of self-governed environments. Such consciousness must be formally
specified in order to be understood by computing devices, thus standard languages and protocols
must be provided for describing and exchanging security advisories (axis 2). Such security know-
ledge increases the capability of autonomic networks and systems for detecting vulnerabilities in
the surrounding environment (axis 3) and provides a strong support for taking decisions when
performing self-management activities.
Vulnerability assessment activities increase the awareness of autonomic environments that
along with remediation activities complete the vulnerability management process. In order to
cover the automation of the vulnerability assessment process, we propose the classification de-
picted in Figure 3.2 where we divide the activity into three main areas following the D3 approach.
First, we present current approaches for discovering unknown vulnerabilities connecting their ap-
plicability over autonomic environments. Then, we detail description languages able to represent
security advisories about known vulnerabilities. Afterwards, we describe techniques that take
advantage of such knowledge for performing security analysis. A section covering remediation
activities is provided at the end of this chapter, completing the vulnerability management loop.
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Figure 3.2 – Automated vulnerability assessment classification
3.3 Discovering Vulnerabilities
Discovering vulnerabilities is a fundamental activity which indeed gives meaning to the vul-
nerability management process itself. With no known vulnerabilities, the process would not make
sense in the first place. Therefore, the ability to unveil threats present on the environment be-
comes an essential requirement. Because the whole set of potential vulnerabilities on each system
is typically unknown, techniques for learning and discovering vulnerabilities must be developed.
Under this perspective, it is also important to consider how such security information actually
becomes available for protecting autonomic networks and systems. Indeed, there is a bigger
ecosystem that not only involves vulnerabilities and security defects, but also people and their
motivations [29]. New vulnerability information usually follows complex paths before users get
benefits from it [72]. This security ecosystem is frequently governed by economical laws where
buyers and sellers of new security findings establish complex vulnerability markets. It is not the
target to discuss here how vulnerability information is traded in both white and black markets,
however it is important to keep in mind that computer security is not only about technologies
but also about people’s behavior and motivations. In this section, we focus on mechanisms and
means for discovering unknown vulnerabilities. This topic has been barely addressed within the
field of autonomic networks, therefore the objective is to explore different approaches that can
be potentially integrated into self-governed systems. Usually, almost every solution designed for
standard systems can be embedded to some extent into autonomic closed loops. The ease of
such integration depends on the nature of these approaches. However, we can normally think or
design autonomic elements with sensors capable of consuming the required input, that will feed
the existing solution, and adapting the performed actions to be wrapped by autonomic effectors.
While automating the operation of these solutions might be, in some cases, quite straightfor-
ward ; making them self-adaptive to the surrounding environment as well as to work under a
policy-based perspective (autonomous), constitutes an open and highly challenging problem. In
light of this, a subset of prominent perspectives has been selected to provide an overview of
available strategies for unveiling security issues. Our research includes some of the most studied
fields including testing methods, network forensics techniques and case-based reasoning.
3.3.1 Exploiting testing methods
Exploiting testing methods provides a powerful approach to unknown vulnerability detection.
Software applications are commonly designed with a set of specific goals in mind in order to
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provide effective solutions to the stated requirements. While developers pursue efficient functional
constructions, testers perform tasks for identifying correctness, completeness, quality and security
of developed computer software. Several approaches under the tester point of view are used when
software tests are designed [120]. White-box testing allows testers to have access to internal
structures, algorithms and the code itself of the software being tested, e.g. static analysis, code
review. Black-box testing on the other hand does not provide information about the internal
implementation and the software is seen as an input-output black box, e.g. dynamic analysis,
performance tests. Grey-box testing combines the previous approaches by considering knowledge
about the software internals but executes the tests at a black-box level, e.g. internal database
testing. Under a self-governing perspective, autonomic elements could be analyzed using these
techniques in order to identify abnormal behavior. This first step would provide useful information
to the underlying government mechanism about unsafe components. Even though traditional
testing techniques unveil an important amount of software problems, it is unfortunately common
for testers to focus on functionality correctness and to omit strong security tests. At the time
of software construction and testing, normal input tests are frequently more numerous than
anomalous input tests. Because of this, several unknown vulnerabilities remain hidden behind
untested input data. Fuzzing techniques are intended to find these kind of software bugs.
The fuzzing approach complements traditional testing to discover combinations of code and
data by exploiting the power of randomness, protocol knowledge, and attack heuristics. Instead of
using normal input data, fuzzing methods generate unexpected or malformed inputs for feeding
the target software. Software behavior is then assessed in order to identify potential vulnera-
bility hotspots. A wide view of current fuzzing techniques is presented in [53] where different
approaches are explored, highlighting fuzzing contributions to vulnerability detection. Since ap-
plication’s input space is in most cases impossible to enumerate, fuzzing techniques use two main
approaches: data generation and data mutation (randomly modifying well-formed inputs). Ho-
wever, traditional fuzzing tools present some randomness related drawbacks when working with
applications that perform various types of integrity checks (e.g. checksum). Checksum mecha-
nisms reject an important part of the generated input set at initial execution stages, decreasing
the fuzzer effectiveness and code coverage. The work presented in [159] identifies the stated pro-
blems and presents an approach to overcome early malformed input rejection due to checksum
failures. The work reported in [50] introduces a fuzzing-based methodology called configuration
fuzzing where the configuration of the running application is randomly modified at certain execu-
tion points in order to check for vulnerabilities that only arise in certain conditions. Considering
the fact that autonomic systems are ruled by high-level policies, the same mechanism could be
used for specifying properties and the expected behavior of a piece of software. This would allow
testing solutions to be embedded into self-governing entities in order to analyze their operation
by checking the current state against the defined policies. As a first step, this process could
inform administrators about abnormal or unexpected behavior. It could also be taken one step
further by automatically generating reports about the current system configuration for future
use, looking for available solutions, configuring changes, and applying patches.
3.3.2 Using network forensics
Techniques based on network forensics can also be used for discovering unknown vulnerabi-
lities. Network forensics is known as the process of archiving all network traffic and analyzing
subsets as necessary [44]. This activity generally involves traffic reconstruction to assess network
activity, providing useful information for further network-related events analysis. Network foren-
sics belongs to a wider computing field called digital forensics. Digital forensics is defined as the
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Figure 3.3 – Forensic investigation process [54]
use of scientifically derived and proven methods towards the preservation, collection, validation,
identification, analysis, interpretation, documentation and presentation of digital evidence deri-
ved from digital sources for the purpose of facilitating or furthering the reconstruction of events
found to be criminal, or helping to anticipate unauthorized actions shown to be disruptive to
planned operations [54]. Figure 3.3 shows the stages involved in a forensic investigation.
Digital forensics benefits go beyond criminal prosecution. Several contributions to computer
security have been born within this field and they are widely used over different scenarios [44, 2].
Even though they are mostly targeted on traditional networked environments and not self-
governing systems, these works provide a strong basis for being integrated into autonomic net-
works. Digital forensics provides a deep understanding of discovering mechanisms about the
anatomy of an attack, how to gather pieces of evidence and put them together in order to deter-
mine how an attack took place on the system, when it was committed, who are the perpetrators
and where they come from. Because of this, its robust technical background on data collection
and analysis establishes a solid framework for performing computer system investigations, thus
providing support to vulnerability management activities. The work presented in [2] provides an
overview of digital forensics methodologies, computer and network vulnerabilities and security
measures, and forensics tracking mechanisms to detect and deter intruders.
Forensic tools are extremely important on forensic scenarios. Effectiveness, efficiency, repro-
ducibility, evidence consistency and integrity, traceability, security, are some of several factors
that have to be considered when designing a forensic tool. Depending on the type of environment
where the tool will be used, the previous features are required for a successful activity execu-
tion. Fundamental concepts related to network forensics and important features that a network
forensic analysis tool (NFAT) should implement are presented in [44], namely, NFAT place and
purpose, data capture, traffic analysis, and NFAT interaction and discovery services it should
provide. Such concepts also support decentralized approaches where various forensic tools can
collaborate in order to analyze the whole network. Evidence collection is a highly active study
field as it constitutes an essential stage within digital forensic investigations. Results of this stage
feed the analysis stage. The work proposed in [160] presents a network evidence graph-based ap-
proach which facilitates evidence presentation and automated reasoning. Such approaches may
highly contribute to the integration and positioning of forensic actuators into autonomic envi-
ronments aiming at identifying, analyzing and providing reports about suspicious or abnormal
behavior, and therefore highly contributing to the first dimension of the D3 approach.
3.3.3 Taking advantage of experience
Past experience in dealing with vulnerabilities strengthens the ability to face new security
problems. Under this perspective, performing case-based reasoning also provides interesting and
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useful outlooks for detecting unknown vulnerabilities. Case-based reasoning (CBR) is a problem
solving methodology which exploits past experience. Past experience is maintained in the form
of problem-solution pairs, also called cases. On the arrival of new problems, solutions of simi-
lar past problems are used after appropriate adaptation. The work presented on [92] applies
the CBR approach for enabling self-configuration capabilities in autonomic systems. This ap-
proach can be applied on unknown situations, where some kind of nearness concept may be
used in order to classify how similar the new problem is to the problems already known. Using
different algorithms, solutions for known similar problems can be modified to achieve the solu-
tion of the new problem. Indeed, an approach for dealing with fault management issues using
CBR has been proposed in [151]. The authors outline a distributed case-based reasoning system
over a self-organizing platform capable of assisting operators in finding solutions for faults. Such
approaches can provide strong support for developing autonomic solutions based on previous
experience. Such experience can be thought as part of the know-how that autonomic systems use
to operate themselves. Moreover, considering self-configuration as a response for repairing vulne-
rable configurations, case-based reasoning strategies can provide expertise and feed a database
of known vulnerabilities, which is the heart of the next sections.
System improvements usually provide new or better technological capabilities, however, they
also carry new space for security concerns as well. Discovering unknown vulnerability consti-
tutes an important security feature of self-governing systems. A wide spectrum of methods and
techniques may be used to achieve this point. This section has covered some of the most impor-
tant and promising areas for discovering software flaws and configuration misuse, from fuzzing
methods (proactive) to forensics techniques (reactive). Even though there exist autonomic ap-
proaches for unveiling vulnerable configurations, our research work indicates that most of the
prominent contributions are not oriented to self-governed environments. Taking advantage of
such approaches remains as a challenging activity. Autonomic environments should incorporate
these capabilities in order to become adaptive with the changing environment being able to un-
veil potential unknown security threats. In addition, we consider that no matter what technique
is used for discovering vulnerabilities, describing vulnerabilities in a standardized and machine-
readable manner is essential for integrating such approaches into the autonomic management
plane. This topic constitutes the central point of the next section.
3.4 Describing Vulnerabilities
By the time a vulnerability is discovered, a time span will occur before system administrators
are noticed about its existence. Another time will pass before a corrective solution exists and
yet another will pass until all systems are patched. Attacker’s activity usually takes place during
this period of time, that can last from a few hours to several months or years. Because of this,
it is important to develop a robust background as well as mechanisms and techniques in order
to establish consistent and uniform means for describing vulnerabilities, analyzing and detecting
them, and exchanging related information. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures or CVE
system [46] has been introduced by the MITRE Corporation [104] as an effort for standardizing
the enumeration of known information security vulnerabilities. The CVE dictionary, widely used
today, allows the community to be aware of current existing threats and exposures by providing
unique identifiers to each known security alert as well as descriptions written in natural language.
This is extremely useful for increasing the security awareness of autonomic systems. However,
the CVE standard only provides means for informing about their existence but not for their
assessment. Describing the anatomy of known vulnerabilities and the techniques developed to this
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end are fundamental as they provide essential means for dealing with vulnerability management.
This knowledge can highly increase the know-how of self-governing systems providing strong
support for developing and integrating autonomic security solutions.
During the last years, several approaches on vulnerability analysis have been taken. Vulne-
rability signatures have been widely used by intrusion prevention systems (IPS) and intrusion
detection systems (IDS). They are intended to describe the characteristics of the input that lead
the execution of a specific program to a vulnerable point and the state that such program must
hold for the vulnerability to be exploited [32]. Vulnerability signatures are mostly used for ana-
lyzing traffic looking for specific patterns and detecting potential attacks. The work proposed
in [32] contributes to the second dimension of the D3 approach by automatically generating high
coverage vulnerability-based signatures. However, there are no fully developed up-to-date stan-
dards available for their representation and the generation as well as their coverage still remains
an open problem. In addition to this issue, IDSs also lack of fully mature standards for exchanging
alerts. The Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF) is a data model to represent
information exported by intrusion detection systems proposed by the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF), but its status is currently experimental and it will not change [126]. Much of the
work done in vulnerability analysis has defined the assessment infrastructure using its own vul-
nerability specification language arising compatibility and interoperability problems. Languages
such as VulnXML [135] and the Application Vulnerability Description Language (ADVL) [19]
have been developed as an attempt to mitigate these problems and to promote the exchange of
security information among applications and security entities. However, these languages are only
focused on web applications covering a subset of the existing vulnerabilities in current computer
systems.
In order to cope with the problems described previously, the Open Vulnerability and As-
sessment Language (OVAL), supported by MITRE Corporation, standardizes how to assess and
report upon the machine state of computer systems [117]. OVAL is an XML-based language and
therefore, it inherits all XML features like platform independence, interoperability, transporta-
bility and readability. The OVAL specification is supported by XML schemas which serve as
both the framework and vocabulary for the language. These schemas specify what content is
valid within an OVAL document and what is not. OVAL is organized in three main XML Sche-
mas, namely, (i) the OVAL Definition Schema that expresses a specific machine state ; (ii) the
OVAL Characteristics Schema that stores configuration information gathered from a system ;
and (iii) the OVAL Results Schema that presents the output from a comparison of an OVAL
Definition against an OVAL System Characteristics instance. Valid XML instances typically re-
present specific machine states such as vulnerable states, configuration settings and patch states.
Usually, a vulnerability is considered as a logical combination of conditions that if observed on
a target system, the security problem described by such vulnerability is present on the system.
The OVAL language follows the same idea by considering a vulnerability description as an OVAL
definition. An OVAL definition specifies a criteria that logically combines a set of OVAL tests.
Each OVAL test in turn represents the process by which a specific condition or property is as-
sessed on the target system. Each OVAL test examines an OVAL object looking for a specific
OVAL state. Components found in the system matching the OVAL object description are called
OVAL items. These items are compared against the specified OVAL state in order to build the
OVAL test result. The overall result for the criteria specified in the OVAL definition will be built
using the results of each referenced OVAL test.
We now put forward an illustrative OVAL example of a vulnerability description for the
Cisco Internetwork Operating System (IOS) [86]. This example aims at providing an overview of
OVAL’s main building blocks. It is based on a real vulnerability specification but it was simplified
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1 . <?xml ve r s i on="1.0" encoding="UTF 8"?>
2 . <ova l_de f i n i t i on s xs i : s chemaLocat ion="http://oval .mitre . org/XMLSchema/oval definitions 5 oval 
definitions schema. xsd http://oval .mitre . org/XMLSchema/oval definitions 5#ios ios definitions 
schema. xsd http://oval .mitre . org/XMLSchema/oval common 5 oval common schema. xsd" xmlns="http://
oval .mitre . org/XMLSchema/oval definitions 5" xmlns :x s i="http://www.w3. org/2001/XMLSchema 
instance" xmlns :ova l="http://oval .mitre . org/XMLSchema/oval common 5" xmlns:oval def="http://oval
.mitre . org/XMLSchema/oval definitions 5">
3. <generator>
4 . <oval:product_name>The OVAL Repos i tory</oval:product_name>
5 . <oval : schema_vers ion>5.7</ oval : schema_vers ion>
6 . <oval : t imestamp>2010 06 18T15:02:46 .614 04 :00</ oval : t imestamp>
7 . </ generator>
8 . <d e f i n i t i o n s>
9 . <d e f i n i t i o n id="oval:org .mitre . oval:def:6086" ve r s i on="2" c l a s s="vulnerability">
10 . <metadata>
11 . <t i t l e>Cisco IOS SIP Denial o f S e rv i c e Vu ln e r ab i l i t y</ t i t l e>
12 . <a f f e c t e d fami ly="ios">
13 . <plat form>Cisco IOS</plat form>
14 . </ a f f e c t e d>
15 . <r e f e r e n c e source="CVE" re f_id="CVE 2008 3800" r e f_ur l="http://cve .mitre . org/cgi bin/
cvename. cgi?name=CVE 2008 3800"/>
16 . <de s c r i p t i o n> Vulnerable SIP implementation . . . </ d e s c r i p t i o n>
17 . <ova l_repos i to ry>
18 . <dates> . . . . </ dates>
19 . <s ta tu s> . . . . </ s ta tu s>
20 . </ ova l_repos i to ry>
21 . </metadata>
22 . <c r i t e r i a operator="AND">
23 . <c r i t e r i o n comment="IOS vulnerable versions" t e s t_re f="oval:org .mitre . oval:tst:9025"/>
24 . <c r i t e r i o n comment="SIP Test using runnning config . result contains: 5060" t e s t_re f="
oval:org .mitre . oval:tst:24211"/>
25 . </ c r i t e r i a>
26 . </ d e f i n i t i o n>
27 . </ d e f i n i t i o n s>
Listing 3.1 – Cisco IOS vulnerability example (part 1)
to show how a basic OVAL definition looks like. An OVAL definition is typically written in one
XML file but here we divide it in two parts just for didactic purposes. The first part illustrated
in Listing 3.1 contains the OVAL definition that represents our vulnerability description. A
definition is the key structure in OVAL. It is analogous to the logical sentence or proposition:
if a computer’s state matches the configuration parameters laid out in the criteria, then that
computer exhibits the state described. Within this example, the vulnerability definition with
id oval:org.mitre.oval:def:6086 (lines 9-26) states that the referred vulnerability is present on
the system if both following conditions hold: (i) the IOS version belongs to a set of affected IOS
versions (line 23), and (ii) VoIP is configured (line 24). The second part of our example illustrated
in Listing 3.2 defines the rest of required components referred on the first part, namely, OVAL
tests (lines 28-37), OVAL objects (lines 38-43) and OVAL states (lines 44-52). An OVAL Test is
used by one or more definitions to compare an object(s) against a defined state. An OVAL Object
describes a unique set of items to look for on a system. This unique set of items can then be used
by an OVAL Test and compared against an OVAL State. An OVAL State is a collection of one
or more characteristics pertaining to a specific object type. The OVAL State is used by an OVAL
Test to determine if a unique set of items identified on a system meet certain characteristics. The
first condition is analyzed by the first test with id oval:org.mitre.oval:tst:9025 (lines 29-32). This
version test refers to one OVAL object (line 39) and one OVAL state (lines 45-47). It will be true
if and only if the specified object match the specified state. The pattern match expression allows
to specify a family of IOS versions using a regular expression (line 46). The second condition
is analyzed by the second test with id oval:org.mitre.oval:tst:24211 (lines 33-36). This line test
refers to one OVAL object (lines 40-42) and one OVAL state (lines 48-51). It will be true if and
only if the sub-command show running-config result contains the port number 5060 (line 50).
The OVAL language currently constitutes a de facto standard for describing vulnerabilities as
well as good practices. Autonomic environments should take advantage of this capability in order
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28 . <t e s t s>
29 . <vers ion55_tes t id="oval:org .mitre . oval:tst:9025" ve r s i on="1" comment="IOS vulnerable
versions" check_existence="at_least_one_exists" check="at least one" xmlns="http://oval .mitre . org
/XMLSchema/oval definitions 5#ios">
30 . <ob j e c t ob j ec t_re f="oval:org .mitre . oval:obj:6804"/>
31 . <s t a t e s ta t e_re f="oval:org .mitre . oval:ste:4432"/>
32 . </ vers ion55_tes t>
33 . <l i n e_t e s t id="oval:org .mitre . oval:tst:24211" ve r s i on="1" comment="SIP Test using ip socket .
config contains: 5060 .may generate few fa l se positive" check_existence="at_least_one_exists"
check="at least one" xmlns="http://oval .mitre . org/XMLSchema/oval definitions 5#ios">
34 . <ob j e c t ob j ec t_re f="oval:org .mitre . oval:obj:6385"/>
35 . <s t a t e s ta t e_re f="oval:org .mitre . oval:ste:6946"/>
36 . </ l i n e_t e s t>
37 . </ t e s t s>
38 . <ob j e c t s>
39 . <vers ion55_object id="oval:org .mitre . oval:obj:6804" ve r s i on="1" xmlns="http://oval .mitre . org/
XMLSchema/oval definitions 5#ios"/>
40 . <l ine_ob j e c t id="oval:org .mitre . oval:obj:6385" ve r s i on="1" xmlns="http://oval .mitre . org/
XMLSchema/oval definitions 5#ios">
41 . <show_subcommand>show running c on f i g</show_subcommand>
42 . </ l ine_ob j e c t>
43 . </ ob j e c t s>
44 . <s t a t e s>
45 . <vers ion55_state id="oval:org .mitre . oval:ste:4432" ve r s i on="1" xmlns="http://oval .mitre . org/
XMLSchema/oval definitions 5#ios">
46 . <ver s i on_st r ing operat ion="pattern match">12\ .3\(\d+\w⇤\)XF(\d . ⇤ | $ )</ ve r s i on_st r ing>
47 . </ vers ion55_state>
48 . <l i n e_s ta t e id="oval:org .mitre . oval:ste:6946" ve r s i on="1" xmlns="http://oval .mitre . org/
XMLSchema/oval definitions 5#ios">
49 . <show_subcommand>show running c on f i g</show_subcommand>
50 . <con f i g_ l in e operat ion="pattern match">\s +5060($|\ s+)</ con f i g_ l i n e>
51 . </ l i n e_s ta t e>
52 . </ s t a t e s>
53 . </ ova l_de f i n i t i on s>
Listing 3.2 – Cisco IOS vulnerability example (part 2)
to augment their vulnerability awareness. Within our contributions, we have heavily exploited
the benefits of the OVAL language as detailed later in Part II. During the last years, several
related languages have evolved around the OVAL language. The National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) [108] has supported the development of the Security Content Automa-
tion Protocol (SCAP) [21]. The SCAP protocol is a suite of specifications that standardize the
format and nomenclature by which security software communicate information about publicly
known software flaws and security configurations. These advisories are annotated with common
identifiers and embedded in XML. SCAP also utilizes software flaw and security configuration
standard reference data, also known as SCAP content. This reference data is provided by the
National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [111], which is managed by NIST and supported by the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) [55]. Other public vulnerability databases exist as well,
such as the Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) [114]. However, the vulnerability des-
criptions provided by them are usually understandable by humans and not by machines, thus
difficulting an automated consumption of this security knowledge.
SCAP can be used for several purposes, including automating vulnerability checking, tech-
nical control compliance activities, and security measurement. The integration of SCAP into
self-governing environments constitutes a major challenge, however its automation-targeted na-
ture can highly benefit future autonomics development. The SCAP protocol includes the OVAL
language and complements it with enumeration languages such as the Common Platform Enume-
ration (CPE), a nomenclature and dictionary of hardware, operating systems, and applications
[45] ; the Common Configuration Enumeration (CCE), a nomenclature and dictionary of se-
curity software configurations [35] ; and CVE for enumerating security-related software flaws.
SCAP also considers the eXtensible Configuration Checklist Description Format (XCCDF) for
authoring security benchmarks and reporting checklist evaluation results [167], and the Common
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Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) for measuring and scoring the relative severity of soft-
ware flaw vulnerabilities [47]. The specifications involved in the SCAP protocol not only allow
us to specify vulnerabilities (with OVAL), but also to bring a system into compliance through
the remediation of identified vulnerabilities or misconfigurations (with XCCDF). These features
perfectly fit requirements for expressing which actions autonomic systems should perform when
vulnerable states are detected.
These specifications highly contribute to security automation and to the vulnerability mana-
gement activity. Other works have been done as well, such as the one proposed in [158] where
an ontology-based approach for dealing with vulnerability management activities called OVM is
presented. However, its connection with autonomic technologies is not addressed, nor the scalabi-
lity or actual impact on real networks. Moreover, OVM only considers vulnerability management
activities from a high-level perspective, focusing on the process rather than fine-grained concepts
that allow vulnerabilities to be described. Languages such as OVAL are crucial for representing
security knowledge that in turn involves technical details. The OVAL language has been further
detailed as a means for performing the assessment activity. Standardization efforts are essential
for exchanging this knowledge and it requires a strong support of the community. Autonomic
networks and systems should be able to manage these security advisories and capitalize the
knowledge provided by vulnerability descriptions repositories in order to increase their vulnera-
bility awareness. Moreover, autonomic elements should be able to provide appropriate sensing
and actuation mechanisms, as depicted in Figure 2.3, in order to be autonomously assessed and
eventually corrected. In this section we have investigated different mechanisms for describing vul-
nerabilities and exchanging related information which provide a strong solid for achieving this
goal. Next section is dedicated to explore existing methods and techniques used for detecting
computer system vulnerabilities.
3.5 Detecting vulnerabilities
Once a vulnerability is known and described, mechanisms used for detecting it constitute
a central concern on autonomic networks and systems. Self-governed environments should be
able to incorporate and take advantage of security advisories provided by different sources when
vulnerability assessment activities are performed. In this section we will discuss different methods
and systems for assessing both device and network vulnerabilities. These methods contribute to
the third dimension of the D3 approach. We will also present several approaches for correlating
security information and analyzing potential attacks and security policies violations.
3.5.1 Analyzing device vulnerabilities
The assessment of local vulnerabilities on a device requires the investigation of specific states
and conditions that may allow an attacker to compromise the system. While black-box techniques,
such as network scanning discussed in subsection 3.5.2, can provide useful security information
without requiring specific tools in the device under analysis, grey-box techniques can highly en-
hance the obtained information by accessing the device itself and inspecting its internal state and
particular configurations. Assessing vulnerabilities using the OVAL language can be understood
as a grey-box approach since it not only allows to specify vulnerability descriptions but also
standardizes the three main steps of the assessment process, namely, representing configuration
information of systems for testing ; analyzing the system for the presence of the specified machine
state (vulnerability, configuration, patch state, etc.) ; and reporting the results of the assessment.
Figure 3.4 describes the main steps of the OVAL process [117]. At step 1, security advisories are
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Figure 3.4 – OVAL-based vulnerability assessment [117]
published and encoded as OVAL definitions at step 2. These definitions are then interpreted at
step 3 to gather all the required information in order to perform the analysis at step 4. Once the
OVAL analysis is done, a report is generated at step 5 identifying if the specific machine states
described at step 2 are present or not on the target system. The integration of such process into
the management plane of self-governing environments provides a strong basis for autonomously
assessing the exposure of autonomic elements. This is one of the cornerstone of this thesis. It
is important to notice that OVAL is a specification language and it allows to describe content ;
real analysis is performed by OVAL interpreters. However, interpreter’s activity is guided by the
underlying OVAL language structure, thus we can think of OVAL as a language for specifying,
analyzing and reporting vulnerabilities. Moreover, because OVAL allows to describe specific ma-
chine states, semantics can be used in several ways, i.e., states that can not hold (vulnerabilities),
states that should hold (best practices).
Several OVAL-based systems have been developed since the OVAL language was released.
The work proposed in [94] presents the design and implementation of a vulnerability assessment
tool based on the OVAL language to detect weak points in Linux System. The proposed approach
has more readability, reliability, scalability and simplicity than traditional tools. Although this
work was published in 2004, it clearly highlights OVAL’s potentiality. Others up-to-date OVAL-
based tools exist as well. Ovaldi [118] is a free OVAL interpreter maintained by MITRE intended
to provide a reference implementation for evaluating OVAL definitions. Current releases of the
interpreter cover a wide, but not complete, part of OVAL’s specification. This incomplete co-
verage arises difficulties to extrapolate its usage within other fields such as forensic scenarios.
Although Ovaldi is a robust tool, its main development language (C) is platform-dependent, thus
increasing maintenance efforts for each OVAL supported platform. Moreover, its internal design
and continuous official releases make it quite difficult to use as a base start point for customi-
zed or extended OVAL-based tools. The work proposed in [26] presents XOvaldi, a live forensic,
multi-platform and extensible OVAL-based system for digital evidence collection. XOvaldi has
been purely written in Java [88] and its plugin-based architecture, as well as its automatic mo-
del adaptation, provide easy means for naturally evolving with dynamic forensics scenarios. As
explained later in Part III, we have heavily used XOvaldi, and also extended it, for conduc-
ting various experiments in this thesis. The effort invested in the development of OVAL-based
assessment systems provides a strong background for automating the detection of known vulne-
rabilities. These systems can be then combined and integrated into autonomic environments in
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order to enhance their ability for detecting security threats.
Autonomic networks must be capable of adapting according to specific policies or security
issues. Because of this, analyzing network vulnerabilities positions strong challenges that autono-
mic entities should be able to solve. Network vulnerability analysis, also known as vulnerability
scanning, involves activities to determine vulnerabilities and security holes exploitable within
the target network. In order to perform this analysis, data collection and examination has to be
done over members of the network and correlation techniques must be applied to analyze the
target network as a whole.
3.5.2 Analyzing network vulnerabilities
The ability of identifying host-based and distributed vulnerabilities constitutes the first step
for the vulnerability management process to be completely embedded into the management
plane of autonomic networks and systems. Network scanning constitutes one of the most used
techniques for discovering devices in a network. This process allows to identify active hosts either
for security assessment or for performing different kinds of attacks. The enumeration of a network
provides useful information such as users, groups and running services on each network member.
Port scanners are usually used within this process for analyzing each device in order to detect
which ports are open and which services are listening on them. Probes against these ports and
the behavior presented by the target device may allow port scanners to infer useful information
about the software running on each port such as the type of application and its version.
The kind of response emitted by the device under analysis indicates whether the port is in
use, and if so, it can be further explored for detecting weaknesses. Fingerprinting for instance, is
a technique used for interpreting the responses of an operating system by sending to it different
combinations of data and analyzing its responses against a fingerprint database [101]. Finger-
prints are usually generated by the application of a hash function over a specific piece of data
where the obtained hash value uniquely identifies the input data. Behavior patterns for well and
bad-formed messages are correlated with the observed responses in order to obtain a match of
known systems and applications, and related vulnerabilities. Currently, several network scanners
exist for assessing vulnerabilities on a target network such as Nessus [106], OpenVAS [113] or
SAINT [132]. Some of them use the functionalities provided by powerful port scanners such as
Nmap [109]. However, these tools do not provide standard means for describing and exchanging
the vulnerabilities they are able to assess. Languages such as OVAL are highly required. In addi-
tion, none of them have currently shown trends or means for being embedded into self-governed
environments.
Regardless of the mechanisms used for individually assessing devices, grey-box techniques
such as agent-based vulnerability assessment or black box techniques such as network scanning,
it is essential to develop approaches capable of analyzing the network and its relations as a
whole. Steps taken by an intruder usually respond to some favorable conditions present on the
system. By modeling these capabilities and actions to take, inference can be performed. Reasoning
engines are widely used in this field to achieve automated approaches. As an example, the work
presented in [116] and enhanced in [115, 130] introduces a logic-based network security analyzer
called MulVAL. MulVAL is a framework and reasoning system that conducts multi-host, multi-
stage vulnerability analysis on a network. MulVAL uses the OVAL language to analyze each host
on the network. The reasoning engine consists of a collection of Datalog rules [52] that captures
the operating system behavior and the interaction of various components in the network. After
gathering all required information from the environment, the analysis performed by MulVAL has
two main parts. First, all possible multi-steps accesses and inferred privileges on each user are
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computed. Then, results are compared against the stated global policy. If the analysis results
show a user with some kind of privilege that is not present on the global policy, a security
breach has been found. Due to autonomic networks are by nature governed by policies, such
approach and the methodology used are particularly appropriated to be embedded into policy-
driven environments such as autonomic networks and systems.
3.5.3 Correlating vulnerabilities with threats and attack graphs
The mechanisms used for detecting vulnerabilities in autonomic networks provide an extre-
mely useful overview of the potential security problems that might be exploited on a target
network. However, this information can be yet enhanced by correlating security threats found
in the assessment phase, as shown in Figure 2.3, and analyzing how the activity of an attacker
could take advantage of them. Attack modeling languages such as ACML [119] allows to express
the capability gained by an attacker at each step of the intrusion process. This approach allows
to link network events and detect multi-steps attacks. This can be very useful in the context of
autonomic environments as it could support the analysis of scenarios where an autonomic ele-
ment is compromised, and the impact over those elements connected to it and the relationships
between them, e.g. service provisioning requirements. Previous work done in [150] considers the
idea of a requires-provide model where each gained privilege by an attacker opens new intrusion
capabilities. This concept is extremely important when analyzing attack sequences and provides
robust foundations for attack graphs approaches.
A deep review on attack graphs is presented in [99] where several contributions on this topic
are analyzed. The authors make clear the achievements and limitations of attack graphs by
discussing fundamental construction concepts as well as their use in network security approaches.
In this thesis, we do not deal with attack graphs and multi-step attacks. However, insightful
research work on network security assessment and remediation techniques using attack graphs
has been previously reported in [142], [10]. Bayesian attack graphs have been also used for
assisting administrators on mitigation plans [122]. Our approach is indeed complementary. While
a vulnerability represents a potential security problem that could be exploited by an attacker
in order to compromise the system, an attack graph describes the actual activity and steps
performed by an attacker in order to achieve a desired goal. In other words, a vulnerability
is focused on the system by identifying insecure states, and an attack graph is focused on the
behavior of the attacker that takes advantage of these security weaknesses.
Recently, the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) language [33]
has been proposed by MITRE for describing attack patterns. CAPEC involves a collection of
common methods for exploiting software systems, including network attack patterns. The CA-
PEC schema also enables the use of the Cyber Observable eXpression (CybOX) language [48] as
a means for describing cyber observables that exist for various steps and portions of the attack
pattern. Such cyber observables refer to events or stateful measures that can be observed in the
operational domain. CybOX also uses the Malware Attribute Enumeration and Characterization
language (MAEC) [102] for characterizing the behavior of malware, and the Common Event
Expression (CEE) [37] for unifying the representation and classification of events found in the
lifecycle of systems and networks. Currently, MITRE is also considering automated mechanisms
for converting MAEC and CybOX content into OVAL checks in order to detect malware artifacts
and other host-based cyber observables. These initiatives are still in an early stage though they
are quite promising as their contributions might harden the security of autonomic environments.
While some authors focus on attacks anatomy using attack graphs, other authors also pro-
pose metrics for quantifying attack potentiality which depends on several factors. For instance,
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the work presented in [137] proposes a framework for measuring the vulnerability of individual
hosts based on current and historical operational data for vulnerabilities and attacks. Metrics
are particularly important within autonomic environments as they can be used for autonomously
parametrizing the behavior of the entire system. Such measurements can be successfully inte-
grated into the closed loop that depicts the lifecycle of self-governed elements in order to feed
and control their behavior. The work proposed in [1] presents a method for calculating a policy
security metric which can be used to evaluate how good a policy is, as well as compare policies
and assess policy changes. Such approach provides support not only for assessing the dynamics
of individual policy-based self-governed systems, but also for evaluating the overall behavior of
autonomic environments in which vulnerabilities play a critical role.
Assessing vulnerabilities constitutes a crucial activity that enables autonomic networks and
systems to identify threats that potentially may compromise their security. This ability is in turn
complemented by approaches capable of correlating exploitable network weaknesses in order to
identify potential successful attacks. The integration of such mechanisms within the management
plane of autonomic environments provides a powerful basis for assessing their own exposure. In
this section we have presented methods for detecting device and network vulnerabilities, and we
have discussed different approaches for correlating security information and inferring potential
attacks. However, in order to ensure safe configurations in autonomic environments, remediation
activities to eradicate these weaknesses are essential. This is the topic of the next section.
3.6 Remediating vulnerabilities
When a system is found to be vulnerable, remediation actions must be executed in order
to bring the system into a secure state. However, these actions must also encompass general
system’s operational policies. Indeed, every management activity, whatever its impact on the
system is, should care about respecting the overall governing rules. In autonomics, the ability to
orchestrate different management aspects under a common and single vision constitutes a hard
and challenging problem. We have realised that even with optimal solutions for autonomously
managing different aspects of self-governing environments, a common layer where all these com-
ponents might interact, is essential for achieving real and functional autonomic systems. Indeed,
this is one of the main goals proposed by the UniverSelf project [154]. In that context, the use
of standard languages and mechanisms that leverage interoperability becomes an important re-
quirement of autonomic approaches and solutions. As explained before, we do not deal with rule
consistency problems at other operational levels of self-governed environments ; we are focused on
autonomous solutions for vulnerability management. Nevertheless, the contributions presented
in this thesis make a vast use of standard languages and technologies. This vision not only fosters
the use of existing solutions but also makes available new scientific contributions that might feed
and support future ones.
Considering a common, consistent and coherent governing framework, able to speak the
same language among different constituting autonomic components, is essential to achieve real
autonomic computing. This kind of frameworks provide support to line up general policies under
a holistic perspective. Therefore, when changes are performed, global mechanisms in charge of
controlling affected autonomic elements, can be safely applied. Commonly, vulnerabilities can
take the form of software flaws or misconfiguration errors, and they can be usually corrected by
means of different methods such as applying software patches, adjusting configuration settings or
removing the affected software [103]. However, when corrective actions are performed, changes
are introduced in the environment, thus change management mechanisms must be taken into
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account. Risk assessment methods are also important, as they provide a strong basis for analyzing
the impact of remediation activities within the vulnerability treatment process. It is crucial to
ensure safe changes not only from an operational viewpoint but from a security perspective
too. Within this section, we point out related work about change management on networks and
systems considering vulnerability treatments, and we also cover different approaches contributing
to the risk assessment activity.
3.6.1 Change management
Change management already constitutes a challenging activity when performed by human
administrators, the automation of such process is even more complex. Decisions are usually based
on factors that depend on the nature of the system, laws that rule the behavior and purpose
of the system. While some entities will prioritize functionality over security, others might follow
the other way around. But most importantly, no matter what the chosen action is, performed
changes should be effective as to the objective they were designed for, and consistent with the
rules that govern the system. The latter is not always easy to achieve thus mechanisms for solving
conflicts and techniques for reducing the impact of these changes must be taken into account as
well. While several works have been focused on vulnerability management such as [158], just a
few works address this topic into autonomic environments, mainly focused on the vulnerability
assessment activity [40]. Orthogonal works have been proposed in the area of change manage-
ment. They contribute to ensure the correctness of configuration operations and their positive
impact over services, but they do not consider security aspects with respect to vulnerable confi-
gurations. Therefore, vulnerability management activities and change management techniques
become interconnected. Network changes must be evaluated in order to ensure safe modifications
and at the same time, vulnerable states must be remediated by performing controlled changes
in the environment.
A large variety of techniques have been proposed to deal with changes in networks and
systems. Information Technology Service Management (ITSM) is a fundamental work field for
institutions and corporations ; intended to expose mechanisms for dealing with changes within an
organization, trying to minimize the impact and, at the same time, maximize the utility provided
by them [87]. The work proposed in [56] allows to determine if a given process transformation
is likely to improve business performance based on process associated complexity metrics. Some
approaches consider future changes already at system design such as design rationale, which in-
volves an explicit documentation of the reasons behind the decisions taken, as used in [148]. The
work reported in [41] presents a very interesting approach for predicting the effects of changes
based on dynamic modeling dependency techniques. The work presented in [8, 9] targets the
ability to validate configuration changes and their application on runtime, which increases the
correctness and safety of reconfiguration activities within self-managed environments. This kind
of works are very important because they provide a key support for the change management pro-
cess, particularly for taking decisions about effective change implementations. Even though their
analysis are usually focused on the operational impact rather than security concerns, they high-
light key challenges that must be taken into account when vulnerability management activities
are performed.
As an effort to automate the management of computer systems, different protocols have been
also proposed in the past. As already mentioned, the SCAP protocol involves several specifica-
tions to automate security management mechanisms. Particularly, by using the XCCDF language,
a system can be brought into compliance through the remediation of identified vulnerabilities
or misconfigurations. In addition, the CVSS language can be used for rating IT vulnerabilities,
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thus contributing to the classification and impact analysis of security weaknesses. In order to
deal with network management operations and changes, IETF has developed NETCONF [63], a
network configuration protocol that provides mechanisms to install, manipulate and delete the
configuration of network devices. The NETCONF protocol specification is a standard, though
its deployment, as well as complete vendors implementations, seem to be still in an early stage.
Nevertheless, very interesting works have already been presented showing evaluations of its ma-
turity as well as diverse technical aspects [152], [157]. The integration of change management
techniques into the vulnerability management plane may positively contribute to the overall
security of current and future computer systems. In that context, risk and impact assessment
techniques are also required for ensuring coherent automated security processes.
3.6.2 Risk and impact assessment
Usually, the security risk level of a system is based on three main combined factors, namely,
the potentiality of a threat in conjunction with the exposure of that system to such threat, and the
impact that a successful attack related to this threat may have in that system [49]. The exposure
of a system in turn is directly related to the vulnerabilities present in such system. Therefore,
managing vulnerabilities that might be exercised by a given threat constitutes a critical activity
for quantifying the system exposure and hence, the risk level of autonomic networks and systems.
Assessing change associated risks provides a key support for change management, as they are
used take decisions about effective change implementations. Sometimes however, these decisions
are not one hundred percent clear, therefore, measurable mechanisms are required to perform
appropriate cost-benefit analysis. The work presented in [136] describes a method for evaluating
the risk exposure associated with a change, which can be used to organize and take business-
level decisions about required changes. Other works use past experience to analyze the impact
of new changes [161]. Interconnected operational risks are considered in [138], which are used to
schedule service changes with the lowest expected impact on the business.
As the autonomic nervous system, autonomic systems and networks must be able to perform
diagnosis on the environment they are working on. Nevertheless, in practice, it is almost impos-
sible to be aware of each security and exploitable hole for each system. Vulnerability detection
provides large amounts of information that allow systems to be aware of threats, but autonomic
systems need to see the big picture, not only as a snapshot but also considering past experience,
in order to identify risk factors and perform progressive adaptation to achieve secure states. The
work presented in [5] and [4] proposes a security metric-based framework that identifies and
quantifies objectively security risk factors, including existing vulnerabilities, historical trend of
vulnerabilities of remotely accessible services, prediction of potential vulnerabilities for any gene-
ral network service and their estimated severity and finally propagation of an attack within the
network. From an autonomic point of view, automated techniques to assess change associated
risks like those presented here, are extremely important in order to achieve full autonomy.
Vulnerability management is an essential activity to ensure safe configurations within au-
tonomic environments. When these systems are found to be vulnerable, remediation activities
must be performed in order to erradicate these security weaknesses. In that context, changes are
introduced in the environment and therefore, they must me properly managed. In this section,
we have presented different change management techniques, as well as various mechanisms for
assessing and evaluating the impact and the effectiveness of these changes. During our research,
we have also observed that various problems still need to be addressed in order to integrate vul-
nerability management activities into autonomic environments. In the next section, we resume
our findings and highlight different research axes that require to be further investigated.
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Figure 3.5 – Scientific maturity of vulnerability management activities with respect to autono-
mic networks
3.7 Research challenges
During the realization of our investigation, we have detected several challenges that must be
addressed in order to be able to really integrate the autonomic computing approach into daily
computer systems and networks. In that context, Figure 3.5 summarizes the scientific maturity
of the vulnerability management process with respect to autonomic environments highlighting
properties and issues that should be further investigated. As depicted in the first column, tradi-
tional methods for discovering unknown vulnerabilities count with a strong foundation, though
decentralized as well as automated approaches require further investigation. Autonomic methods
for addressing this capability have been barely or even at all discussed. Autonomic computing
should incorporate these capabilities in order to unveil potential existing threats. As to descri-
bing known vulnerabilities, shown in the second column, several scientific contributions have been
done, mostly from a device perspective. However, automatic generation as well as autonomic me-
chanisms for describing security problems are still in an early stage thus requiring research efforts
in order to harden the foundations and maturity of such activity. Autonomic environments should
capitalize such security knowledge in order to analyze themselves and assess their own exposure.
A variety of methods have been proposed for detecting vulnerabilities in non-autonomic envi-
ronments as shown in the third column of Figure 3.5. However, decentralized mechanisms exist
in a minor degree, and automated and autonomic approaches have been weakly discussed. Once
security problems are detected, they need to be classified according to their impact and risk,
and remediated through the application of appropriate treatments. Vulnerability classification
and treatment mechanisms, fourth and fifth columns of Figure 3.5 respectively, have only been
partially addressed in the past for non-autonomic environments and mostly from a centralized
perspective. Automated and autonomic approaches for dealing with these activities remain an
open problem.
In light of this, we have observed several lacks mostly located on the automation and auto-
nomicity properties of Figure 3.5 that should be further investigated. We highlight here three
transversal research axes that are important to leverage the maturity and robustness of these
properties.
• Integration of vulnerability models into the management plane of networks and
services. This integration requires automated means for exchanging vulnerability descrip-
tions in a standardized manner as well as detecting them. Vulnerability detection can be
performed by dynamically translating vulnerability descriptions into configuration policy
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rules interpretable by autonomic configuration systems. In addition, such perspective can
be enriched with automated vulnerability discovery mechanisms. This feature can enable
the alignment of network components to desired and secure states. However, mechanisms
for dealing with rules conflicts and policy consistency must be in place as well.
• Investigation of collaborative methods and techniques for performing vulnera-
bility management activities in a decentralized manner, with multiple vulnera-
bility description datasources. Autonomic elements need automated mechanisms for
healing security holes. Control mechanisms and algorithms for classifying vulnerabilities
and executing vulnerability treatments (apriori or aposteriori configuration operations) in
an optimal manner must be analyzed. The SCAP protocol and particularly, the XCCDF
language, in combination with the NETCONF protocol, can be extremely useful to achieve
this point.
• Formalized approaches for supporting the two previous themes are highly re-
quired. Robust data collection mechanisms, mature system assessment techniques and effi-
cient environment discovery methods constitute cornerstones within the integration of the
vulnerability management process into self-governed environments. Autonomic networks
and systems can take advantage of disparate computing fields such as digital forensics for
threat discovery, machine learning for adaptation, or statistical models for prediction. Me-
thods for managing and planning changes as well as techniques for assessing their impact
are essential within the vulnerability management process. Reasoning systems capable of
capitalizing security knowledge can provide new horizons for dealing with dynamic envi-
ronments, not only from an operational viewpoint but from a security perspective too.
3.8 Synthesis
The management of computer systems and networks is becoming more and more complex
over time. Conventional approaches do not scale well with respect to this evolving landscape, thus
leading to new management problems. The autonomic paradigm aims at releasing administrators
from low-level details by considering self-management approaches that work on a high-level, goal-
oriented basis. This scenario allows to specify how things work while functional details are solved
by the underlying autonomic system. Autonomics provides a scalable new perspective for dealing
with the management of growing heterogeneous networks. However, both administrators and
self-governed entities may introduce vulnerable states when perform their operations. Therefore,
vulnerability management constitutes an essential activity in order to ensure safe configurations
within autonomic environments. In this chapter, we have performed a deep review of current
vulnerability management mechanisms. We have classified the vulnerability assessment process
in three dimensions: discovery, description and detection (D3 approach) ; which serves as an
organizational framework for discussing different existing assessment methods and techniques.
We have also discussed mechanisms that contribute to the remediation of vulnerabilities, thus
closing the vulnerability management cycle. We state that real autonomic solutions can only
be achieved if mechanisms for dealing with vulnerabilities are fully integrated into
the management plane of autonomic networks and systems. However, there still exist
several challenging problems that must be addressed in order to achieve this goal. The aim of
this thesis is to contribute in that direction.
Considering these research challenges, we aim at dealing with the integration of vulnerabi-
lity and remediation descriptions into the management plane of autonomic environments. These
descriptions, understood as policies, enable autonomic entities to manage their own security
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exposure. In the following chapters, we present our research work which includes autonomic
assessment strategies for device-based vulnerabilities and extensions in several dimensions, na-
mely, distributed vulnerabilities (spatial), past hidden vulnerable states (temporal), and mobile
security assessment (technological). In addition, our general approach also considers remedia-
tion activities able to bring networks and systems into secure states. In that context, we have
conducted research in remediation approaches for device-based and distributed vulnerabilities.
In particular, collaborative approaches, which constitute another axis identified as a research
challenge, are also considered within distributed scenarios. In addition, our approaches are sup-
ported by mathematical models over which other scientific contributions can be built upon.
Finally, the contributions presented in this thesis have been evaluated through an extensive set
of experiments which are widely discussed all along this document.
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4.1 Introduction
Autonomic networks and systems are responsible for their own management. However, changes
that are performed by administrators and self-governed entities may generate vulnerabilities and
increase the exposure to security attacks. Therefore, vulnerability management is a crucial acti-
vity for ensuring safe configurations and reducing the exposure of such autonomic systems. While
strong standardization efforts have been done for describing vulnerabilities, in particular with
the OVAL language, there is no full integration of vulnerability management mechanisms within
the framework of autonomic networks and systems. Such integration constitutes the target of our
work. We consider that autonomic environments should dynamically capitalize the knowledge
provided by vulnerability descriptions repositories in order to increase their security, stability
and sustainability.
In this chapter, we present an autonomic approach for supporting vulnerability awareness
in self-governing networks and systems using the OVAL language and the Cfengine tool [38].
Cfengine is an autonomic maintenance system that provides support for automating the mana-
gement of large-scale environments based on high-level policies. Even though we are focused on
the Cfengine tool, currently used in millions of managed devices, our general approach could be
applied to other policy-based configuration tools such as Puppet [124] or Chef [39]. Our strategy
consists in integrating OVAL vulnerability descriptions into the management plane, in order to
enable autonomic systems to detect and prevent configuration vulnerabilities. For that purpose,
the OVAL vulnerability descriptions are dynamically translated into policy rules directly inter-
pretable by Cfengine. Therefore, Cfengine agents become able to autonomously assess their own
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security exposure. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents a
review of OVAL vulnerability descriptions and discusses its integration into autonomic environ-
ments. Section 4.3 describes the underlying architecture for increasing vulnerability awareness
within autonomic networks and systems, and depicts the formalism for supporting the trans-
lation of vulnerability descriptions into Cfengine policy rules. Section 4.4 shows an extensive
set of experiments performed over the Cisco IOS platform and the obtained results. Section 4.5
concludes this chapter presenting conclusions and further work.
4.2 Integration of OVAL vulnerability descriptions
Nowadays, the OVAL language is mostly used by vendors and leading security organizations
in order to publish security related information that warns about current threats and system
vulnerabilities. OVAL repositories offer a wide range of security advisories that can be used
for avoiding vulnerable states as well as augmenting networks and systems security considering
best practices recommendations. Previously in Definition 2, we have provided the conceptual
meaning of a vulnerability in computing systems. From a technical perspective, a vulnerability
can be also considered as a combination of conditions that if observed on a target system, the
security problem described by such vulnerability is present on that system. Each condition in
turn can be understood as the state that should be observed on a specific object. When the
object under analysis exhibits the specified state, the condition is said to be true on that system.
In that context, the manner in which OVAL represents a vulnerability can be directly mapped
to the usual way a vulnerability is understood, as shown in Figure 4.1.
Within the OVAL language, a specific vulnerability is described using an OVAL definition.
An OVAL definition specifies a criteria that logically combines a set of OVAL tests. Each OVAL
test in turn represents the process by which a specific condition or property is assessed on the
target system. Each OVAL test examines an OVAL object looking for a specific state, thus an
OVAL test will be true if the referred OVAL object matches the specified OVAL state. The
overall result for the criteria specified in the OVAL definition will be built using the results of
each referenced OVAL test.
As an example, let us consider an hypothetical situation, illustrated in Figure 4.2, where a
vulnerability for the Cisco IOS has just been disclosed. For this vulnerability to be present, two
conditions must hold simultaneously: (I) the version of the platform must be 12.4 and (II) the
Figure 4.1 – Vulnerability conception mapping
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Figure 4.2 – OVAL example over Cisco IOS
service ip finger must be enabled (thus N would be 2 in Figure 4.1). Such vulnerability can be
expressed within an OVAL document by defining an OVAL definition that arranges two OVAL
tests as a logical conjunction. One test is in charge of assessing the system version and the other
one must check the service status. The OVAL objects used in these tests will be an object that
represents the version of the system and other object that represents the running configuration,
respectively. Finally, the OVAL states, one for the version and one for the service, will express
the states expected to be observed on each object for the tests to be true and hence, defining the
truth or falsehood of the OVAL definition. In this particular example, it is expected to observe
the value 12.4 as the version of the system, and the running configuration file must have a line
starting with the directive ip finger. If these two properties are observed, then the vulnerability
is present on the target system.
Once an OVAL document has been specified, the regular approach to perform its assessment
over a target system can be resumed in three main steps. As shown in Figure 4.2, step 1 consists
in interpreting the document that specifies the objects and tests to be evaluated. At step 2,
the target system is analyzed looking for present vulnerabilities. As a remainder, the OVAL
analysis, as previously described in Section 3.5.1, involves two parts, namely, the collection of
required OVAL objects to be analyzed, and the comparison of collected OVAL items against
the specified OVAL states. Finally, a report is produced at step 3 indicating the results of the
assessment process. Our approach aims at making from this approach an autonomous process.
To do so, we automate the exploitation of OVAL descriptions warning about current threats and
system vulnerabilities, and translate them into Cfengine policy rules. In this manner, current
and future security advisories can be integrated and assessed by autonomous Cfengine agents
deployed across the network. The global architecture of the proposed approach is detailed in the
next section.
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4.3 OVAL-aware self-configuration
In autonomics, the self-configuration property refers to the ability of networks and systems
for automatically configuring themselves in order to obey high-level policies, typically linked to
business-level objectives. When autonomic networks and systems perform changes in order to be
compliant with the specified policies, collateral effects can be introduced in an involuntary man-
ner. Such unexpected effects can vary from internal malfunction to the exposure of vulnerable
states, thus vulnerability management mechanisms are deeply required to ensure safe configura-
tions and to reduce the probability of potential attacks and failures of the involved self-managed
entities. In this section we present our approach for supporting vulnerability awareness in au-
tonomic networks and systems. The objective is to integrate vulnerability descriptions provided
by OVAL repositories into the autonomic management plane, particularly in the context of the
Cfengine autonomic maintenance tool.
4.3.1 Overall architecture
Our work proposes the integration of vulnerability descriptions by providing an infrastructure
where OVAL vulnerabilities descriptions can be translated into policy rules interpretable by
Cfengine. Due to the automation provided by Cfengine for managing large-scale environments,
the OVAL process can be integrated into Cfengine devices when maintenance operations are
performed. The overall objective is to provide autonomic maintenance mechanisms for several
platforms using Cfengine as illustrated in Figure 4.3, and taking into account the existing and
future security related knowledge specified in the OVAL language.
The proposed architecture illustrated in Figure 4.3 involves an OVAL repository where the
descriptions of known vulnerabilities are stored. Such descriptions are intended to be translated
and introduced within a distributed Cfengine configuration. To do so, a translation module is
placed between the OVAL repository and the Cfengine server. This module, explained in detail
in the next section, consumes available OVAL vulnerability descriptions from the repository
and produces Cfengine policy rules that allow Cfengine agents to be aware of these security
weaknesses. The Cfengine architecture is based on a client-server model. The server keeps these
Figure 4.3 – High-level architecture
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generated policies on its own and autonomous agents will pull these new policies from the server
when convenient. In this manner, generated policies are deployed by the Cfengine server into
its several Cfengine agents (points in the cloud). These autonomous agents are in charge of
managing the devices present in the target network, in order to detect and prevent vulnerable
configurations when self-management activities are performed. When a vulnerability is found on
a specific monitored device, Cfengine agents are capable of generating specific alerts and shall be
able to perform correction operations. In the next section, we detail and formalize the translation
process performed to convert OVAL-based advisories into Cfengine policy rules.
4.3.2 OVAL to Cfengine translation formalization
The translation module, identified in Figure 4.3, has as a main goal the generation of Cfengine
rules that accurately represent the OVAL advisories present in the OVAL repository. However,
we consider that the OVAL language should be seen from a logical perspective, as a first-order
language. In our model, we understand the OVAL language as a means for predicating on the
underlying system. From a logical point of view, its discourse universe is composed of each testable
system component for each supported platform. Each OVAL object defines a family of items to
be tested on the target system. For example, an OVAL process object with name "httpd" can
define a set of several processes with that name, where each one of them is an identified OVAL
item and will be tested independently. The overall result will be computed according to the
parameters specified in the OVAL test. Because each collected OVAL item is what is actually
tested within the OVAL process, the discourse universe of the OVAL language refers to such
OVAL items and not to the OVAL objects that represent them.
<de f i n i t i o n s >
<d e f i n i t i o n id="oval : org .mitre . oval : def :PHI" . . . >
<c r i t e r i a >
<c r i t e r i o n comment="single formula ALPHA" t e s t_re f="oval : org .mitre . oval : tst :ALPHA"/>
</c r i t e r i a >
</de f i n i t i o n >
</d e f i n i t i o n s >
<te s t s >
<f i l e_ t e s t id="oval : org .mitre . oval : tst :ALPHA">
<obje c t ob j ec t_re f="oval : org .mitre . oval : obj :MyOBJ"/>
<s ta t e s ta t e_re f="oval : org .mitre . oval : ste :MySTE"/>
</f i l e_ t e s t >
</te s t s >
<objec t s >
<f i l e_ob j e c t id="oval : org .mitre . oval : obj :MyOBJ" . . . >
<path operat ion="equals">/etc /httpd/ conf/</path>
<f i l ename operat ion="equals">httpd . conf </f i lename>
</f i l e_ob j e c t >
</objec t s >
<sta t e s >
<f i l e_ s t a t e id="oval : org .mitre . oval : ste :MySTE" . . . >
<user_id operat ion="equals">root </user_id>
</f i l e_ s t a t e >
</s ta t e s >
Figure 4.4 – Basic predicate within OVAL
Under this perspective, we consider a predicate as the very essential construction within the
OVAL language. The most simple case can be seen as the evaluation of an OVAL item gathered
from the system against a specified OVAL state. Mathematically, checking such item is the
same as verifying whether the specified item belongs to a defined mathematical relationship. We
believe that such formalization has potential within autonomic environments and that might be
successfully exploited by reasoning engines such as done in [116] over standard networks. The
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example presented in Figure 4.4 depicts how the OVAL language can be used for expressing a
predicate over the httpd.conf configuration file, assessing that its owner is the user root. There,
the configuration file is represented by an OVAL object of type file_object. In it, two attributes
specify the target object, the path and its filename. Finally, the predicate is completed with the
specification of the OVAL state, expressing that the user id of this file must be equal to root.
As mentioned before, the main core activity within the OVAL language is about predicating
over the underlying system, i.e. identify the system items (individuals of our discourse universe)
and checking if they match specific states (check if retrieved individuals belong to specific ma-
thematical relationships). The properties of the system under analysis can be seen as predicates
where atomic formulas – OVAL tests – can be compounded to build more complex expressions –
OVAL definitions –. Within the OVAL language, definitions typically search for a combination
of specific characteristics that can reveal security holes on the underlying system. Figure 4.5 pre-
sents a summarized mapping between OVAL main constructors, their corresponding components
within a first-order logic and the respective Cfengine building blocks.
Mapping
First-order logic OVAL Cfengine
Arrangement of compound OVAL document Cfengine main
logical formulas configuration file
Compound logical OVAL Cfengine input
formulas definitions files
Atomic predicates OVAL tests Cfengine methods
Family of individuals in OVAL objects Cfengine
the discourse universe prepared modules
Mathematical OVAL states Cfengine control
relationships variables
Figure 4.5 – First-order logic, OVAL and Cfengine mapping
The following list describes the main building blocks of the OVAL language and the corres-
ponding Cfengine constructs used to represent them.
⇧ OVAL documents. Within an OVAL document, several definitions can be found within
the XML tag <definitions>. This set of definitions can be arranged on a high level Cfen-
gine configuration file including each one of the referred definitions. The inclusion can be
made using the import directive within the Cfengine language. Hence, for each OVAL defi-
nition present within the OVAL document, an import sentence will be present on the main
Cfengine configuration file.
⇧ OVAL definitions. Each OVAL definition can be defined in a separate Cfengine confi-
guration file that will be imported by the main Cfengine configuration file. Imported files
are typically located on the Cfengine input folder, hence one file per OVAL definition will
be located there. Within each one of these files, the involved tests are referred, and their
results are computed to represent the same logical structure specified on the original OVAL
definition.
Because OVAL tests involve objects from the system that will be assessed against specific
states, each Cfengine file corresponding to one OVAL definition file will involve mechanisms
to collect the required objects. Collection can be made using Cfengine prepared modules that
are launched before any policy control sequence is executed. Once the required information
is available, the specified tests can be executed. Following the Cfengine philosophy, each
test is mapped to a Cfengine method that is called when needed from any Cfengine input.
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⇧ OVAL tests. Cfengine methods are usually located in the modules folder, hence, for each
OVAL test, a file will exist on this place that represents it. The parameters of this Cfengine
method represent the data needed to effectively compute the test result ; this is, the item
information to be tested and depending on the taken approach, the expected states.
⇧ OVAL objects. As previously explained, system objects to be evaluated can be gathered
using Cfengine prepared modules. Calls to these modules are placed on the corresponding
Cfengine input file. Collected information will be later used by the involved tests.
⇧ OVAL states. States are used by tests in order to verify whether gathered objects match
specific properties. States definitions can be specified on the Cfengine method file using
Cfengine control variables, or they can be specified on the Cfengine input file and provided
as parameters to the corresponding method.
Within our approach, Cfengine classes are particularly important as they are the main
constructs for expressing results of predicates over the system. For instance, when a collected item
is compared against a defined OVAL state, compliance truth or falsehood will be represented by
a Cfengine class. If this item has to be compared against several OVAL states, several Cfengine
classes will be defined. The overall result for this assessment will also be a Cfengine class based
on each one of the previous classes. On the other hand, a test result will be also represented by
Data: an OVAL document
Result: Cfengine policy rules
1 mainFile  create <Cfengine main configuration file>;
2 foreach def 2 OVAL definitions do
3 defF ile  create <Cfengine input file> for def ;
4 add import sentence at mainFile;
5 foreach test referred by def do
6 on defF ile do {
7 obj  OVAL object referred by test;
8 add prepared module call at ”control section” for gathering obj;
9 foreach ste referred by test do
10 add ste control variables at ”control section”;
11 end
12 add test call method at ”methods section” specifying objects and states;
13 }
14 methodF ile  create <Cfengine method file> for test;
15 on methodF ile do {
16 add method name and parameters at ”control section”;
17 add obj variable at ”control section”;
18 foreach atomic predicate on the specified obj do
19 add result as a Cfengine class at ”classes section”;
20 end
21 combine classes for defining final method result class;
22 }
23 end
24 add logical test criteria at ”alerts section” on defF ile;
25 end
Algorithm 4.1: Translation algorithm
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a Cfengine class, hence, an OVAL definition result will be based on the Cfengine classes defined
for each one of the referred tests. Considering the mapping introduced before, we present in
Algorithm 4.1 the proposed approach for translating OVAL documents into Cfengine policies.
This algorithm has been fully developed and integrated into an implementation prototype called
Ovalyzer which is described in Chapter 9.
The algorithm takes as input an OVAL document that will be represented by the main
configuration file within the Cfengine policy. Each OVAL definition in turn will have its own
policy file that will be imported from the main Cfengine configuration file. Each OVAL test is
translated as a Cfengine method that is invoked from the file that represents the OVAL definition.
OVAL objects are represented by Cfengine prepared modules while OVAL states are specified
using Cfengine control variables. Results for OVAL tests and OVAL definitions are specified
using Cfengine classes that in turn are combined using the same logical structure described in
the OVAL definitions. Further details on Cfengine grammar as well as technical Cfengine related
information can be found at [30].
Since the OVAL language allows to express specific system states, OVAL definitions can be
used in several ways ; particularly for defining states that should not happen (e.g. configuration
vulnerabilities) or states that should happen (e.g. recommendations and good practices). Under
this perspective, OVAL definitions that model configuration vulnerabilities should generate an
alert on the translated Cfengine policy when they are true. On the other hand, OVAL definitions
that model recommendations and good practices should generate an alert when they are false.
The autonomicity provided by Cfengine combined with the automated translation of security
advisories accommodates an autonomic support for increasing the vulnerability awareness of
these systems. In this approach however, only alerts are considered, and they should be taken
into account by a human administrator. The integration of remediation actions has not be done
yet though it could be performed as discussed in Chapter 8. In the next section we present a set
of experiments performed over the Cisco IOS platform and the obtained results.
4.4 Experimental results
In this section we present a case study based on the IOS Operating System for Cisco devices.
We consider an emulated environment where we show how the proposed framework can be used
for augmenting the awareness of known vulnerabilities on Cisco routers. We have developed a
Java-based implementation prototype called Ovalyzer in charge of translating OVAL security
advisories into Cfengine policy rules. Ovalyzer’s technical specification is described in Chapter 9,
which includes an example of an OVAL vulnerability description and its corresponding Cfengine
generated code. Ovalyzer has been executed on an emulated environment in order to evaluate
several factors such as functionality, performance and characteristics of the generated Cfengine
code. Cisco devices have been emulated using Dynamips / Dynagen [58] running the operating
system IOS version 12.4(4)T1. The Expect [66] tool provided by NIST [108] has been also used for
automating the communication between Cfengine and Cisco devices. We present in this section
the results obtained from the performed experiments.
4.4.1 IOS coverage and execution time
The official OVAL repository has 134 vulnerability definitions for the IOS platform, by the
moment of writing this document. These definitions are based on three types of OVAL tests,
namely, line_test (L), version55_test (V55 ) and version_test (V ). Ovalyzer, as explained later
in this manuscript, has been designed using a plugin-based architecture. In that context, one
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Figure 4.6 – IOS plugins coverage
plugin per type of OVAL test is needed in order to provide the required translation capabilities.
For this case study, three plugins have been written, namely, CfengineIosLine.jar, CfengineIos-
Version.jar and CfengineIosVersion55.jar. Such plugins together provide a coverage of 100% of
OVAL definitions for the IOS platform. Figure 4.6 depicts how the addition and combination of
the required plugins increase the translation capabilities.
It can be also observed that each plugin does not provide a large coverage by itself. For
instance, line_test only covers 1.49% of the available IOS definitions. This is because typically
vulnerability definitions use more that one test for specifying the required conditions to be met
on the target system. When combined, plugins shall cover a wider range of OVAL definitions.
Different platforms may require a larger family of components to analyze, thus requiring more
types of tests and hence, more plugins. In the case of the IOS platform, only three plugins were
required for translating the 100% of available definitions in the OVAL repository.
Since such translation shall be made in an automatic manner, several tests for evaluating
Ovalyzer’s performance have been done. We have particularly focused on the time required for
generating Cfengine policy files over different sets of IOS vulnerability definitions. Figure 4.7
shows the observed timing values while varying the amount of translated OVAL definitions.
Figure 4.7 – IOS translation performance
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The experiment consists in executing Ovalyzer with a set of only one definition and measure
the generation time, then with a set of two definitions and measure the generation time, and so
on, until 134 definitions. Intuitively, one might expect a curve that monotonically grows with the
number of definitions to translate, however, the obtained results are quite far from what expected.
Within some executions for translating more than 100 definitions, the processing time is close
to those executions translating less than 20 definitions. On the other hand, executions with a
high translation time can be observed on a regular basis during the experiment. Because such
experiments are run within an emulated and non-dedicated environment, we hold the hypothesis
that this behavior is due to scheduling strategies of the operating system, not only with memory
processes but also with I/O resources. We believe that such behavior is interesting for two
reasons. First, involved equipment within autonomic networks may present similar scheduling
issues ; second, it gives a realistic overview of the expected behavior so autonomic strategies can
take such conduct into account. The graph also identifies the average and median time of the
executions performed, which respectively are of 9.5 and 6.1 seconds. Even when occasionally high
time values occur and hence more experiments must be done for explaining why, the extremes
seem to be bounded in the general case.
4.4.2 Size of generated Cfengine policies for Cisco IOS
As happens with the generation time, the number and size of generated files constitute an
important dimension for analysis as well. We have experimented with the generated policies in
the same way we did before, computing results for one definition, then two definitions and so
on, until 134 definitions. Figure 4.8 illustrates the amount and total size of the generated files
according to the number of definitions translated. For instance with 100 definitions, the translator
generates a fileset of 333 files with a total size of 775 KB.
Both, the number of files and the size of the generated fileset, describe a linear growth
when the number of IOS definitions is increased. This is in part due to the nature of the IOS
definitions themselves, because on average, each one of them uses a similar amount of tests and
resources. With other platforms this behavior may not be observed because if we consider two
definitions, one using several tests and objects and the other one, only one or two ; the former
will require several policy files – according to the way the translation is done – while the last
one will be represented by a smaller set of files. Considering the case study of the Cisco IOS
Figure 4.8 – IOS generation statistics
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platform, the generation behavior (depicted by the first derivative of the curves), is stable as
illustrated in the inner graph in Figure 4.8. Based on the experiments and results presented here,
an interesting future line of work would be to define a mathematical and well founded mechanism
for determining the size of a Cfengine policy fileset for any given set of OVAL definitions.
4.5 Synthesis
In this chapter, we have presented our approach for integrating vulnerability descriptions in
the management plane of autonomic networks and systems. Taking advantage of external know-
ledge sources such as OVAL repositories enables the ability of highly increasing vulnerability
awareness in such self-managed environments. Cfengine has been taken as the autonomic part of
this approach while the OVAL language is the resource that provides support for vulnerability
descriptions. A formalization of the translation between OVAL descriptions and Cfengine poli-
cies has also been done by considering the OVAL language as a first-order language. As a case
study we have chosen the IOS platform for Cisco devices, generating Cfengine policy rules ca-
pable of analyzing and detecting vulnerabilities over such platform, thus increasing vulnerability
awareness in an autonomic manner. In addition, several experiments have been performed whose
results successfully indicate the feasibility of the proposed approach in terms of functionality and
integration into the Cfengine autonomic maintenance tool. The implementation prototype used
within the experiments is fully described in Chapter 9.
Supporting vulnerability awareness constitutes the first step towards secure self-managed
infrastructures capable of detecting and remediating potential security breaches. Indeed, real
autonomy can only be possible if networks and systems are able to manage the required activities
for understanding the surrounding environment, ensuring safe configurations and performing
corrective actions when vulnerable states are found. The latter constitutes a hot and challenging
aspect which is deeply discussed in Chapter 8. However, assessing vulnerabilities over individual
network elements may not provide a global view of how vulnerable a network can be. Sometimes,
two or more devices may seem to be secure, but when combined, a security weakness might arise.
We call to this concept a distributed vulnerability, which is the heart of the next chapter.
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5.1 Introduction
As systems and technologies evolve, new space for vulnerabilities comes into scene. Auto-
nomic networks must integrate support mechanisms for preventing vulnerabilities. Nowadays,
networks are analyzed in order to detect vulnerabilities that may allow a malicious user to per-
form an attack. However, traditional mechanisms perform a global analysis by investigating each
network element individually. Indeed, our approach for increasing the vulnerability awareness of
self-governed environments previously presented in Chapter 4, considers independent analysis on
each network member. Even though such approaches can detect sets of vulnerabilities that may
allow an attacker to perform a multi-step attack, they do not provide the capability of detecting
vulnerabilities that simultaneously involve two or more devices under specific conditions. The
underlying problem relies in that each network device can individually present a secure state,
but when combined across the network, a global vulnerable state may be produced. In order to
cope with this problem, the following issues must be attended. Formal mechanisms for describing
distributed vulnerabilities are required. Moreover, using standard means for achieving such ob-
jective can promote the exchange of security knowledge among practitioners and organizations.
Such descriptions in turn must be integrated into the management plane of autonomic networks
and systems. Mechanisms for interpreting and assessing theses security advisories must be pro-
vided. In addition, optimized algorithms and strategies for collaboratively assessing the network
should be developed.
In this chapter, we present a framework for describing and assessing distributed vulnerabili-
ties in autonomic networks and systems. This approach complements the host-based perspective
57
Chapter 5. Extension to distributed vulnerabilities
presented in Chapter 4. We put forward mechanisms for specifying distributed vulnerable states
that are taken into account by the proposed framework thus increasing the vulnerability aware-
ness of such self-governed environments. We also perform an analytical and technical evaluation
of the proposed approach in order to analyze and show the feasibility of our solution. The re-
mainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents the proposed approach for
specifying distributed vulnerabilities in autonomic networks and systems. In this section, we
formalize the definition of distributed vulnerabilities and put forward a machine-readable lan-
guage called DOVAL for representing them. The architecture of the proposed framework as well
as algorithms and strategies for the assessment of distributed vulnerabilities are described in
Section 5.3. Section 5.4 provides an evaluation of our solution through a comprehensive set of
experiments and the obtained results. Section 5.5 concludes this chapter presenting conclusions
and further work.
5.2 Specification of distributed vulnerabilities
During our research on vulnerability assessment, a recurrent question used to come up about
the actual definition of a distributed vulnerability. Our findings indicate that its meaning is
currently being misused, and a revision on the conception of distributed vulnerabilities is re-
quired. In this section, we motivate and mathematically formalize the concept of distributed
vulnerabilities. In addition, we present DOVAL, a language for describing such vulnerabilities in
a machine-readable manner.
5.2.1 Motivation, definition, and mathematical modeling
The concept of a distributed vulnerability may usually be understood as a set of individual
vulnerabilities distributed in the network that potentially might allow a multi-step attack. A
multi-step attack actually describes a sequence of steps performed by an attacker in order to
achieve a desired goal. Within this sequence, the attacker may exploit known vulnerabilities at
each step, in the same or a different network device, in order to scale and move forward to the
final objective. We think that even though this vision of individually assessing vulnerabilities
provides a useful perspective to the topic in question, it does not offer a complete outlook of the
problem. Let us motivate this issue by considering the following example. The scenario described
in [166] and depicted in Figure 5.1 involves two related hosts, a SIP (Session Initiation Protocol)
server and a DNS (Domain Name System) server. Each one has specific properties, however, they
constitute together a potential exploitable network vulnerability.
Figure 5.1 – Distributed vulnerability scenario
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In this example, a denial of service (DoS) attack over the SIP server can be performed by
flooding it with unresolvable domain names that must be solved by a local DNS server. The local
DNS server in turn, is configured for requesting the resolution of unknown domains to external
servers, increasing the number of waiting requests and therefore the response time for each SIP
request. Under these configuration states, flooding a SIP server with such type of messages will
prevent it to respond to legitimate requests. It is important to highlight that both servers and the
relationship between them are required conditions for the distributed vulnerability to be present.
If the DNS server is not present or if it is not compliant with the required specific conditions,
the SIP server would immediately respond to a SIP client that its SIP request has failed. Even
in such a situation, thousands of SIP requests may collapse the SIP server anyway, though it is a
slightly different scenario that could be specified using standard OVAL definitions. On the other
hand, if there is no SIP server, it is quite clear that the distributed vulnerability has no place in
this environment. Considering the insight provided by the previous example, we characterize the
concept of a distributed vulnerability by proposing the following definition.
Definition 4 (Distributed vulnerability). A distributed vulnerability is a security weakness that
arises when specific conditions over two or more network devices occur simultaneously, providing
a potential exploitable entry point for security attacks in the network under analysis.
As a remark, it is important to distinguish the main difference between considering a set of
individual vulnerabilities over different network devices and the proposed definition. The main
difference is that in a distributed vulnerability, the required conditions to be observed over one
network device may not constitute a complete vulnerability description.
In order to formalize this conceptualization, we now present some required definitions to
mathematically specify a distributed vulnerability.
⇧ H = {h1, h2, . . . } denotes the set of devices or systems in the network (e.g. hosts, routers).
⇧ P = {p1, p2, . . . } denotes the set of device properties in the form of unary predicates
pi(h), h 2 H. Such predicates are used for both specifying required properties to be obser-
ved for a vulnerability to be present as well as properties the device already possesses.
⇧ S = {s1, s2, . . . } denotes the set of device states where a state si describes a set of properties
required to be observed over a network device (called role) as well as for describing existing
specific network devices states. The set S is inductively defined as follows:
i. if pi 2 P , then pi 2 S (i 2 N)
ii. if ↵,  2 S, then (↵ ⇧  ) 2 S ⇧ 2 {^,_}
iii. if ↵ 2 S, then (¬↵) 2 S.
⇧ R = {r1, r2, . . . } denotes the set of relationships between network devices such as reachabi-
lity and service provisioning. The relationships are modeled in the form of n-ary predicates
ri(hi, ..., hj) and they are used for representing existing relationships between network de-
vices as well as those relationships required to be observed for a distributed vulnerability
to be present.
Based on the previous definitions, a distributed vulnerability DV is defined as the compliant
projection of the pattern (PH , PR) over the network (H,R), illustrated in Figure 5.2, where the
constructs PH and PR are defined as follows:
⇧ PH = {s1, ..., sk} denotes the set of machine states or roles (sj 2 S) required to be observed
on specific network devices.
⇧ PR = {r1, ..., rv} denotes the set of relationships (ri 2 R) between those devices matching
the required roles.
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Figure 5.2 – Distributed vulnerability matching process
Under a logical perspective, a compliant projection of the pattern (PH , PR) over the network
(H,R) makes the following sentence to be true:
9(h1, ..., hn) (s1(h1) ^ ... ^ sn(hn) ^ r1(hi, ..., hj) ^ ... ^ rv(hk, ..., hl)) (5.1)
We specify the previous sentence in short by considering the predicate DV (H,R) that expresses
the evaluation of a distributed vulnerability DV based on the pattern (PH , PR) over a generic
network (H,R). It is important to notice that the model allows to specify a device-based vulne-
rability by just defining PH = {s1} and PR = {}, or a sequence of vulnerabilities spread across
the network by considering PH = {s1, ..., sk} and PR = {}.
In order to incorporate the ability to detect distributed vulnerabilities into autonomic envi-
ronments, a means for expressing these patterns is required. In that context, we have developed
DOVAL, an XML-based language built on top of OVAL for describing distributed vulnerabili-
ties. In the next section, we describe the main aspects of the DOVAL language as well as its
applicability over the motivational example previously presented.
5.2.2 DOVAL, a distributed vulnerability description language
We have designed the DOVAL language (Distributed OVAL) on top of OVAL as a means
for describing distributed vulnerabilities in a machine-readable manner. The OVAL perspective
can be seen as a host-based approach, capable of describing specific host states independently.
DOVAL leverages the OVAL language by providing mechanisms for describing vulnerabilities
that involve two or more network devices at the same time. While the universe of discourse in
the OVAL language is composed of digital components (e.g. processes, files), DOVAL extends it
by considering network devices as well. In addition, we extend the semantics of the language by
allowing to express relationships between objects in order to describe conditions involving several
devices simultaneously. In this manner, we can for instance specify that a network is vulnerable,
if a given traffic between specific processes and devices is allowed.
Within the DOVAL language, the required conditions over each involved device are described
using standard OVAL definitions. An OVAL definition is intended to describe a specific machine
state using a logical combination of tests that must be performed over a host. If such logical
combination is observed, then the specified state is present on that host (e.g. vulnerability, specific
configuration). As explained in the previous chapter, this combination can be understood from
a logical perspective as a first order formula where each test corresponds to an atomic unary
predicate over that system. DOVAL extends this concept by enabling the expression of predicates
that involve more than one device, thus allowing the specification of required relationships over
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The DOVAL language
DOVAL constructs Description First-order logic
DOVAL document Set of distributed Arrangement of
vulnerabilities compound logical
formulas
DOVAL definition Distributed Compound logical
vulnerability formula
DOVAL test Assessment of a Container of
condition between an atomic n-ary
several devices predicate
DOVAL object Devices with Family of
specific conditions individuals in
using OVAL the discourse
definitions universe




Figure 5.3 – DOVAL logical description
the network. Figure 5.3 depicts the main DOVAL constructs and provides a description of the
intended purpose of each main building block.
A DOVAL document is intended to meet the specification of several components required
to describe a set of distributed vulnerabilities. Each distributed vulnerability is specified by a
DOVAL definition, which provides the capability of expressing a logical formula that involves
several DOVAL tests. Each DOVAL test in turn constitutes the container of an n-ary predicate
over a set of network devices (hi, ..., hj) and it is in charge of putting together the required
devices and the states expected to be observed between them.
We consider a required network device as a device that meets certain conditions (sj) and that
is required to be present for the distributed vulnerability DV to be true in the network under
analysis (H,R). Required network devices (PH) are described by means of DOVAL objects. In
order to express DOVAL objects, we take advantage of the very final objective of the OVAL
language, this is to say, to express specific machine states. Thus, a DOVAL object is actually a
set of references to OVAL definitions, where each one describes a required specific machine state
(pi) on that device. Finally, the expected relationships over the network (PR) are expressed
using DOVAL states. A DOVAL state (ri) specifies properties between devices and the roles
each device has within such relationship, and can be seen as an actual predicate itself.
There exist several situations where neither individual host assessments nor inference chains
over individual exploitable vulnerabilities can expose potential security threats in a wide net-
work. Mechanisms for globally specifying and evaluating network distributed vulnerabilities are
essential. In order to illustrate the utilization of the DOVAL language for describing this kind of
situations, let us retake the example presented in Figure 5.1. The specification of such scenario
using the DOVAL language is presented in Listing 5.1.
A DOVAL definition with id "doval:fr.inria.doval:def:1" identifies which DOVAL tests must
be performed in order to detect the distributed vulnerability that such definition is intended to
describe. The DOVAL test with id "doval:fr.inria.doval:tst:4141" identifies the required devices
as DOVAL objects and the relationships between them by referencing DOVAL states. The re-
quired devices, namely a SIP server with no flooding protection (s1) and a local DNS server
with external unknown domain resolution (s2), are specified using two DOVAL objects, "do-
val:fr.inria.doval:dev:222" and "doval:fr.inria.doval:dev:256" respectively. Each DOVAL object
enforces the required properties over the device it describes by considering a set of OVAL de-
61
Chapter 5. Extension to distributed vulnerabilities
finitions, one for each needed condition. Each DOVAL state specifies the characteristics of the
relationship expected to be observed between both devices.
<?xml ve r s i on="1.0" encoding="UTF 8"?>
<doval_document>
<dova l_de f i n i t i on s>
<dova l_de f in i t i on id="doval: fr . inria . doval:def:1" c l a s s="distributed_vulnerability">
<metadata>
<t i t l e>SIP DoS attack us ing DNS f l o od i ng</ t i t l e>
<de s c r i p t i o n> . . .</ d e s c r i p t i o n>
<dova l_repos i tory> . . .</ dova l_repos i tory>
</metadata>
<c r i t e r i a>
<c r i t e r i o n comment=" . . . " t e s t_re f="doval: fr . inria . doval:tst:4141"/>
</ c r i t e r i a>
</ dova l_de f in i t i on>
</ dova l_de f i n i t i on s>
<t e s t s>
<doval_test id="doval: fr . inria . doval:tst:4141" comment="DOVAL test combining two spec i f i c tests ,
reachability and configuration . " check_existence="at_least_one_exists" check="at least one">
<obje c t dev ice_re f="doval: fr . inria . doval:dev:222"/>
<ob j e c t dev ice_re f="doval: fr . inria . doval:dev:256"/>
<s ta t e s ta t e_re f="doval: fr . inria . doval:ste:4444"/>
<s ta t e s ta t e_re f="doval: fr . inria . doval:ste:7777"/>
</doval_test>
</ t e s t s>
<ob j e c t s> <!   dev i c e s   >
<device_object id="doval: fr . inria . doval:dev:222"/>
<prop ova lde f_re f="oval:org .mitre . oval:def:1000"/> <!  SIP s e rv e r running  >
<prop ova lde f_re f="oval:org .mitre . oval:def:1001"/> <!  Port 5060 open  >
<prop ova lde f_re f="oval:org .mitre . oval:def:1002"/> <!  Secur i ty module not i n s t a l l e d  >
</device_object>
<device_object id="doval: fr . inria . doval:dev:256"/>
<prop ova lde f_re f="oval:org .mitre . oval:def:2000"/> <!  DNS se rv e r running  >
<prop ova lde f_re f="oval:org .mitre . oval:def:2001"/> <!  Port 53 open  >
<prop ova lde f_re f="oval:org .mitre . oval:def:2002"/> <!  Unknown domains so lved by ex t e rna l DNS
s e r v e r s  >
</device_object>
</ ob j e c t s>
<s t a t e s> <!   r e l a t i o n s h i p s   >
<l ink_sta te id="doval: fr . inria . doval:ste:4444"/> <!  Tra f f i c c ap ab i l i t y  >
<protoco l operat ion="equals"> udp </ pro toco l>
<src_port dev ice_re f="doval: fr . inria . doval:dev:222"
operat ion="pattern match"> .⇤ </ src_port>
<dst_port dev ice_re f="doval: fr . inria . doval:dev:256"
operat ion="equals"> 53 </dst_port>
</ l ink_sta te>
<se rv i c e_s ta t e id="doval: fr . inria . doval:ste:7777"/> <!  Se rv i c e c on f i g  >
<name operat ion="equals"> dns </name>
<consumer dev ice_re f="doval: fr . inria . doval:dev:222"/>
<prov ider dev ice_re f="doval: fr . inria . doval:dev:256"/>
</ se rv i c e_s ta t e>
</ s t a t e s>
</ dova l_de f i n i t i on s>
Listing 5.1 – DOVAL document
Within the current example, two relationships are required: (1) DNS traffic is allowed bet-
ween the SIP server and the DNS server (r1), specified by a DOVAL link_state with id "do-
val:fr.inria.doval:ste:4444", and (2) the SIP server has configured the DNS server as its DNS ser-
vice provider (r2), specified by a DOVAL service_state with id "doval:fr.inria.doval:ste:7777". In
order to assess such a specification, a deployable distributed infrastructure capable of enforcing
its evaluation and notification is required. This aspect is presented in the next section.
5.3 Assessing distributed vulnerabilities
The main objective of DOVAL is targeted on describing conditions involving several network
devices that if observed, the underlying network presents a vulnerable state that can be exploited
by an attacker. In order to detect such scenarios, DOVAL descriptions must be interpreted and
evaluated on the target network. We propose a framework based on Cfengine, a widely deployed
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configuration and administration system, capable of enforcing security policies for discovering
distributed vulnerabilities across the network.
5.3.1 Extended architecture overview
Due to the size and dynamics of current networks, the assessment and detection of vulnerable
distributed states is not a trivial task. We partition the problem into several steps, namely,
(1) generation of a minimized loop-free topology of the underlying network, (2) collection of
hosts and network information, and (3) assessment of DOVAL specifications over the gathered
data. Figure 5.4 illustrates the steps and the architecture of the proposed approach.
Figure 5.4 – Overall architecture
Within this architecture, distributed vulnerabilities are specified using the DOVAL language
and stored in a database. A Cfengine server is fed with such knowledge and translated as Cfen-
gine policy rules, in the same way we have done for host-based vulnerabilities as presented in
Chapter 4. Our approach considers a deployment of Cfengine agents across the network, where
each agent is in charge of controlling one network device. In order to evaluate the existence of a
distributed vulnerability, a spanning tree is built on top of the target network to minimize paths
and avoid network loops. The DOVAL specification is then transmitted across the tree and the
required information is gathered by performing an aggregation algorithm over the nodes. Each
Cfengine agent assesses the device it controls in order to discover which roles such device can
play within the distributed vulnerability specification. This information is returned back until
all the information is stored at the root node of the spanning tree. Finally, the specification of
the distributed vulnerability is projected over the information gathered from the network, and a
DOVAL report is generated informing about distributed vulnerable states across the network.
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5.3.2 Assessment strategies
Several strategies for assessing the required properties on each network device can be used.
Considering the number of potential combinations, an optimized algorithm for evaluating the
network is required. Within our approach, we consider the aggregation algorithm proposed in [30]
for building a tree-based overlay network with the information of each device in the network
under analysis. We now proceed to explain our strategy in a constructive manner considering
two situations. The first situation presents a simplified scenario where full connectivity between
each pair of nodes is in place and no further relationships between nodes are required. The second
situation puts forward a more realistic scenario that extends the first one by considering network
constraints such as reachability restrictions or service provisioning requirements.
When starting a DOVAL definition assessment, the set of required devices for the distributed
vulnerability to be present can be seen as an empty tuple t = ( 1, 2, ..., k). Each blank field
represents the placeholder for a required role characterized by PH = {s1, ..., sk} according to the
definitions given in Section 5.2.1. During the assessment across the spanning tree, tuple t will
be collaboratively fulfilled as each Cfengine agent will indicate which of these fields the device it
controls can play. At the end, several combinations can occur thus the final computation will be
performed over a set T = {t1, ..., tw}. Let DV be a distributed vulnerability where t = {s1, s2, s3}
specifies the set of roles required to be observed in the network. Figure 5.5 depicts the steps
taken during the algorithm execution for discovering the roles each network device is able to
play. At the initial step, a spanning tree covering every node in the network is considered. The
Figure 5.5 – Aggregation algorithm execution for role discovery
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tree is explored using a post-order traversal. At Step 1, the node h4 is assessed reporting that
it matches roles s1 and s3. Then, the node h2 fulfills its temporal role list and continues with
the node h5 as shown in Step 2. At Step 3, h2 is assessed in order to detect which roles it can
play and the role list for the sub-tree with root h2 is returned to the caller h1. The node h3 is
assessed at Step 4 identifying its ability to perform the role s2. At Step 5, the temporal role list
describes the roles that the nodes h2, h3, h4 and h5 are able to play. The assessment of the node
h1 will complete the role list indicating that role s1 can be performed by the nodes h4 and h5,
whereas the role s2 can be performed by h1, h3 and h5, and s3 by h1 and h4.
Usually, networks present complex topologies imposing reachability restrictions. We consider
such constraints in the second situation, where distributed vulnerabilities require the existence
of relationships among the involved network devices such as reachability or service provisioning.
Under a logical perspective, a distributed vulnerability involving n roles may require at most the
evaluation of n-ary predicates ri(h1, ..., hn) where each device hi covers one specific role si though
it could cover more than one at the same time. Such scenarios require not only to discover the
roles that each network device is able to play but also to assess the relationships between them. In
order to deal with these more realistic situations, we extend the previous algorithm by performing
a neighborhood discovery at each node and assessing the relationships each node supports with its
neighbors. The idea behind this approach is to reduce the participation of nodes that can endorse
an expected role but they do not satisfy the required relationships with other nodes. Considering
the example given in Section 5.2.1, the fact of finding a SIP server h1 and a DNS server h2 under
the required conditions does not mean that the distributed vulnerability is necessarily present.
For instance, if DNS traffic is not allowed between them, the predicate r1(h1, h2) does not hold ;
then such pair of network devices does not constitute a candidate combination for the distributed
vulnerability. In order to analyze the surrounding environment at each node, we take advantage
of Cfengine’s functionalities for performing a neighborhood discovery [30]. The process described
by Algorithm 5.1 depicts the steps performed by each Cfengine agent while assessing the roles
the device can play as well as the required relationships it supports with its neighbors.
Input: DOVAL document
Output: List of tuples specifying devices and relationships between them
1 foreach role s 2 DOVAL objects do
2 if currentNode n is compliant with role s then
3 N  SelectPartitionNeighbors;
4 foreach predicate r 2 DOVAL states do
5 if r requires role s then
6 w  getPredicateArity(r);
7 foreach sequence {h2, ...hw} ✓ N do
8 result  eval state r(n, h2, ..., hw);
9 if result is true then







Algorithm 5.1: Node roles and relationships assessment
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Within our approach, a DOVAL object describes the required properties (s) that must be ob-
served over a network device (h) that is part of a distributed vulnerability. Each device compliant
with such description is able to perform the object’s intended role. The proposed algorithm is exe-
cuted on each agent and analyzes every role (line 1) the device it controls can perform. For each
supported role (line 2), its neighbors are stored in the set N (line 3) and the required relationships
are assessed against them (line 4). Such relationships are described by means of DOVAL states
and they can be seen as predicates involving w network devices. Only those relationships involving
the current role s are assessed (line 5). Depending on the arity of the predicate (line 6), subsets
of w   1 network devices are built (line 7) and the relationship among them is assessed (line 8).
If such relationship holds, a tuple is added to the output list (line 10) indicating that the node n
is able to perform the role s, and that under that role, the relationship r (described by a DOVAL
state) holds when considering devices (h2, ..., hw) performing potential roles (s2, ..., sw) respec-
tively. The actual verification of devices (h2, ..., hw) performing roles (s2, ..., sw) is done at the
end, when each node in the spanning tree has been evaluated and the root node has all the
required information for the assessment of the distributed vulnerability in the network. In order
to evaluate the performance of the proposed approach, we have performed different experiments
which are presented in the next section.
5.4 Performance evaluation
In this section we present an analytical evaluation and a technical discussion of the proposed
approach. We put forward the specification of two metrics in order to analyze the performance
during the evaluation of a generic distributed vulnerability, namely, (1) the number of messages
sent across the network, and (2) the total time required for the assessment. We also show the
scalability of the proposed approach by modeling different scenarios based on the instantiation
of various parameters within the specified metrics.
Let N be the network under analysis with a set of devices H = {h1, ..., hn} and relationships
R = {(hi, ..., hj)⇤}. Let DV be a distributed vulnerability that requires a set of k roles defined
by PH = {s1, ..., sk} and v relationships defined by the set PR = {r1, ..., rv}. We consider the
following assumptions during the assessment of DV over N :
⇧ a binary spanning tree is built on top of N ,
⇧ each device h has in average q neighbors,
⇧ each predicate ri has in average arity b (we define the variable a = b 1 in order to simplify
the equations),
⇧ the probability for a device to play a role sj (event A) is given by P (A) = ↵,
⇧ the probability for a role sj to occur on a predicate ri (event B) is given by P (B) =  ,
⇧ the evaluation of any role sj over any device h takes in average   units of time,
⇧ the evaluation of any predicate ri takes in average   units of time.
Number of messages. In order to analyze the traffic generated across the network, we consi-
der the number of messages sent during the evaluation of a generic distributed vulnerability DV .
We define the metric M that estimates the amount of messages transmitted as follows:
M = n ⇤ (1 + k ⇤ P (A) ⇤ P (B|A) ⇤ v ⇤Mpred)
where Mpred = PR(q + 1, a) ⇤ a = (q + 1)a ⇤ a
When traversing the spanning tree (n nodes), each node receives one message in order to
start its own evaluation. At each node, k roles must be evaluated. Because not every device will
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play every role, we model this uncertainty as an event A that occur with probability 1 P (A) = ↵.
Given the event A for a role sj , we model the probability of such role to be involved on each
predicate ri by considering the conditional probability P (B|A) =   and the multiplier v. The
final factor Mpred represents an upper bound of the number of messages sent when evaluating
one single predicate among the node under analysis and its neighbors. PR(q + 1, a) denotes
the number of a-permutations with repetition of a set of q neighbors plus the node itself. For
each possible permutation that may fulfill the arguments (roles) required by the predicate under
analysis, a messages must be sent. Mpred represents an upper bound because we consider that
multiple roles can be covered by one single device, which means that for those combinations
assigning for instance the same device to each role, only one instead of a messages will be sent.
Assessment time. We analyze here two distributed approaches that have a direct impact on
the total assessment time for a distributed vulnerability DV . The first one consists on sequentially
assessing the network, analyzing one node at a time. In this case, we define the total assessment
time as:
TS = n ⇤ k ⇤ (  + P (A) ⇤ P (B|A) ⇤ v ⇤ Tpred)
where Tpred =   ⇤ PR(q + 1, a) =   ⇤ (q + 1)a
For each node in the network, k roles are evaluated where each one takes   units of time.
The probability for the node to perform a role is given by P (A) whereas P (B|A) defines the
probability for that role to be involved on each one of the v predicates. Tpred involves the same
permutations among neighbors as Mpred does, but for each possible sequence Tpred considers the
parameter   that models the average time for evaluating a predicate ri.
An alternative to the sequential modality consists on using a parallel computing approach.
Such approach enables the evaluation of every node simultaneously thus reducing the sequential
assessment time. Under this perspective, the total assessment time becomes:
TP = maxnode(k ⇤ (  + P (A) ⇤ P (B|A) ⇤ v ⇤ Tpred))
and the worst case is: TPw = k ⇤ (  + v ⇤ Tpred)
TPw describes the extreme case where a node is able to perform every required role that in turn
is involved in each predicate. Such case maximizes the amount of time among the times required
by the nodes in the spanning tree.
The proposed metrics have several parameters that affect the final result such as the number
of nodes (n) or the probability for an arbitrary node to play a given role (P (A)). Typical scenarios
usually involve predicates conceived as peer to peer properties (binary predicates, a = 1) as well
as a restricted number of roles (small k). Each required predicate in turn usually involves all
roles, thus simplifying conditional probabilities (P (B|A) = 1). Under this perspective, we have
performed several experiments using the example illustrated at Section 5.2.2 as a case study
in order to analyze the behavior of our approach. In this scenario we have k = 2, v = 2,
a = 1 and q = n   1 depicting a full mesh network. We have also simplified the units of
time considering   =   = 1. Networks nature can vary depending on the context and the
purpose they have been built for. Therefore, we use the parameters n and P (A) for analyzing
such situations. The experiment depicted in Figure 5.6 considers a uniform distribution for role
assignment (P (A) = 1n), meaning that only one of n nodes may play a given role sj . These curves
1. This is a simplified measure of the likelihood for the event A to occur since depending on the network nature,
the probability of choosing, for instance, a SIP server within a standard company network will be presumably
lower than picking up a standard workstation running any version of Windows 7.
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Figure 5.6 – Statistics with uniform distribution on role assignment
depict how much grows the number of messages (solid line) as well as the assessment time under
a sequential computing approach (dotted line) and a parallel computing approach (dashed line)
when the number of nodes in the network becomes bigger. We can observe a proportional growth
on every metric (M , TS , TPw) under a constant rate. This is easily verifiable by looking at the
inner graph of Figure 5.6 that shows the first derivatives of each curve.
Considering that only one device can perform a required role may apply just on special cases
so we have analyzed the behavior of our approach when increasing the number of potential
devices able to perform the required roles. This is achieved by modifying the probability for a
device to play a role (P (A)) as shown in Figure 5.7. We observe that even though the assessment
time using a sequential approach is not linear, its growth rate illustrated in the inner graph of
Figure 5.7 remains linear. We get a maximum assessment time when P (A) = 1 (dotted line)
because every node is able to play every role. When P (A) = 12 (solid line), a half of the network
can perform each role and the assessment time is lower though the curve demonstrates similar
behavior as with P (A) = 1. When a parallel approach is used (dashed line), a constant behavior












































Scalability statistics with an increased device participation
Ts with P(A)=1/2
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Figure 5.7 – Statistics with an increased device participation
68
5.5. Synthesis
From a more technical point of view, the proposed approach requires mechanisms for in-
terpreting and assessing descriptions of distributed vulnerabilities. As indicated in the previous
chapter, we have developed Ovalyzer, a tool capable of translating OVAL advisories to Cfengine
policy rules, detailed in Chapter 9. Within our approach, the Cfengine system is the component
to be embedded within target autonomic networks and systems. It is in charge of enforcing
security policies including the assessment of distributed vulnerabilities. To achieve this, policy
rules directly interpretable by Cfengine are needed. In light of this, an extension to Ovalyzer
(not developed yet) would be able to translate DOVAL specifications into Cfengine policy rules
that represent them. Such an extension, that we could call Dovalyzer, could use the functionali-
ties provided by Ovalyzer for translating OVAL definitions and complement the generated code
in order to cover distributed assessment tasks specified by DOVAL definitions. The translator
must take as input the content of DOVAL documents and produce Cfengine code, structured as
Cfengine policy files, that can be later consumed by a Cfengine running instance.
5.5 Synthesis
In this chapter, we have proposed an extension to distributed vulnerabilities which enables
autonomic networks and systems to assess such security advisories. This perspective comple-
ments the approach presented in Chapter 4 for host-based vulnerabilities by considering a holistic
overview of the network. We have mathematically defined the concept of a distributed vulne-
rability and we have developed DOVAL, an OVAL-based language for expressing these formal
constructions. A case study has been presented showing DOVAL’s main constructs. As in OVAL,
DOVAL descriptions can constitute useful security repositories that in turn can be exploited by
self-managed environments in order to ensure safe configurations. We have proposed a framework
based on the Cfengine system for assessing distributed vulnerabilities in autonomic networks as
well as optimized algorithms and collaborative strategies for performing such evaluations. We
have analyzed the proposed algorithms by mathematically defining computation costs that show
the feasibility of the model through a comprehensive set of experiments. We also have presen-
ted a technical discussion about implementation perspectives, where Cfengine policies could be
fed by a translator capable of producing Cfengine policy rules that represent DOVAL security
advisories.
The applicability of the DOVAL language goes beyond the expression of distributed vulne-
rabilities. Indeed, it can be used for describing general distributed scenarios involving different
entities with specific configurations. Semantics can be used for both identifying wrong configura-
tions as well as best practices. In the context of the Univerself project and the UMF framework,
we have proposed a configuration assessment services called CAS that involves both the OVAL
and DOVAL languages. A more detailed explanation of the CAS service can be found in Annex A.
As stated before, vulnerability assessment constitutes the first step within the vulnerability ma-
nagement process. Therefore, remediation activities must be considered as well, for host-based
and distributed vulnerabilities. This topic is discussed in detail in Chapter 8. When considering
vulnerability assessment mechanisms, the extension performed from a host-based perspective,
presented in Chapter 4, to a distributed one, could be considered as a spatial dimensional exten-
sion. However, this is not the only dimension that may contribute to provide better mechanisms
to autonomic security. Indeed, the ability to understand the state of autonomic elements in the
past and potential hidden vulnerabilities, might provide robust support for enhancing security
mechanisms in the present. This perspective is presented in the next chapter.
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6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we have discussed about distributed vulnerabilities, which extends the
concept of regular host-based vulnerabilities towards complete networks as a whole. This spatial
extension constitutes an important improvement in the way autonomic networks can be analyzed
and protected. However, time is also an important dimension that must be considered when
managing vulnerabilities. By the time a piece of software is being constructed, several errors may
be unintentionally introduced providing room for security vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities
can survive within active systems for a long period of time without being detected. During this
period, attackers may perform well-planned and clean attacks (e.g., stealing information) without
being noticed by security entities (e.g., system administrators, intrusion detection systems, self-
protection modules). Indeed, unaware entities do not even think about such a potential breach
due to the very nature of being under-informed, constituting blind and easy targets for attackers.
As a matter of fact, such attacks might never be detected. Changes in the system or even its
normal activity can alter or erase the remaining evidence. This issue makes it clear why it is
so important to increase the awareness of our systems as soon as security information becomes
available. In that context, our approach aims at taking advantage of current security information
for analyzing system security in the past. If unknown security exposures are detected, response
actions can be performed in the present for bringing system states to secure levels.
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The ability to identify past unknown system exposures due to hidden vulnerabilities allows
forensic activities to be performed in order to detect malicious activity [54], [2]. For instance, a
bank that has detected a potential intrusion compromising data about credit cards would be able
to take actions before consequences become out of control. It would be easier for the bank to
block compromised credit cards and make new ones than waiting for notifications of anomalous
activity from its clients. Other scenarios apply as well in general computing systems. Usually,
intruders leave entry points (backdoors) to come back to compromised hosts. Later, if a past
exposure that may allow an attacker to install backdoors is detected, forensic analysis could be
performed in order to reveal such security issue. The consequences of this investigation not only
allow to know if the system has been actually compromised but also to correct a security breach
in the present that could be used for future attacks. The acknowledge of current vulnerabilities is
a critical factor for reducing the exposure of computing systems. Under this perspective, there is
a race for getting security information early. Both security entities and attackers can benefit from
their speed, being for self-defence or for breaking security barriers. Open and mature standards
such as the OVAL language are cornerstones at this point as they provide a strong support for
openly exchanging security information within the community.
Historical vulnerability information as well as security metrics and trends are highly useful as
proposed in [137, 1]. However, these contributions do not take advantage of new security infor-
mation that could have been useful in the past for detecting security exposures. As explained in
the next section, the exploit for a vulnerability can be released long time before the vulnerability
is publicly known. Hence, affected systems can be exposed during this period without actually
knowing it. To the best of our knowledge, no previous contributions have taken advantage of
current security advisories for assessing past hidden vulnerable states. This would enable current
systems to increase their own exposure awareness and to take actions in consequence if unknown
past exposures are detected.
In this chapter we propose a novel approach for increasing the overall security of computing
systems by identifying past hidden vulnerable states. This information can be used for detecting
potential unknown attacks in the past, identifying compromised assets and bringing systems up
to secure states. Taking advantage of the OVAL language for representing system states and
analyzing vulnerabilities, our strategy consists in autonomously generating images of network
devices that represent their current state, building a history of their evolution, and capitali-
zing new security advisories for automatically assessing past system states in order to detect
potential security breaches. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2
presents our approach for mathematically modeling and detecting unknown past security expo-
sures. Section 6.3 details the proposed framework describing its architecture and the strategies
for performing assessment activities. Section 6.4 provides an evaluation of our solution through a
comprehensive set of experiments. Section 6.5 concludes this chapter and discusses further work.
6.2 Modeling past unknown security exposures
Since the construction of a software program, errors are unintentionally introduced pro-
ducing security vulnerabilities. At a certain time, system administrators, security modules or
self-protection components, system security entities from now, may be unaware of these issues
permitting attackers to take advantage of them and to breach the security measures without
being noticed. However, the awareness of such potential attacks later in time provides the ability
to inspect possible security breaches and to take actions to ensure the security of the system. In
this section we present a mathematical model that defines and supports the process for detecting
past unknown security exposures.
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Figure 6.1 – Vulnerability lifecycle events
6.2.1 Understanding past unknown security exposures
Security exposures can inadvertently occur during long periods of time. Unaware of this fact,
systems become victims of unnoticed security incidents that may compromise their information
and functionalities in the long term. Once a vulnerability has been introduced in a software pro-
gram, a sequence of events constitutes what is called the vulnerability lifecycle [72] described in
Figure 6.1. Event 1 indicates the vulnerability creation time denoted by tcreat. Event 2 records
the time where the vulnerability is discovered, specified by tdisco. Event 3 denoted by texplo in-
dicates the first time an exploit becomes available. Its disclosure time specified by tdiscl occurs
in event 4 where the vulnerability information becomes freely available to the public. Since the
vulnerability discovery time until this point, the information about it is considered as private
knowledge denoted by 4private = tdiscl   tdisco. Beyond this point, system security entities may
acknowledge its existence. Event 5 indicates the time where a vulnerability countermeasure be-
comes available, denoted by tcount. Vulnerable states may be partially mitigated by performing
certain actions that do not correct the problem but avoid it to be exploited. Since an exploit
exists until this point, systems are vulnerable to security attacks. This period is denoted by
4vulnerable = tcount   texplo. Event 6 specified by tpatch indicates the time where a patch becomes
available to the public. System security entities can install this patch in order to eradicate the
vulnerability.
It is important to notice that such a sequence of events describes the general lifecycle of a
vulnerability but it can actually differ from one system to another. For instance, system security
entities may acknowledge the existence of a vulnerability later in time after its disclosure. The
same happens with the application of countermeasures and patch installations. In some cases,
such actions may never occur. Because of this, we have modified the original event sequence
proposed in [72]. Within our approach we consider the existence of potential countermeasures
at time tcount. We understand that its application as well as the installation of a patch are
inherent to the environment where the vulnerability lives in and not as a lifecycle component.
In addition, these events usually occur in the order they are listed. However, they also depend
on the context and may vary among different vulnerabilities. For instance, the exploit might be
published after the vulnerability has been disclosed, or a countermeasure may not exist until the
patch is available thus tcount will coincide with tpatch.
Based on the previous definitions, we specify a past unknown security exposure by considering
the following definition.
Definition 5 (Past unknown security exposure). A past unknown security exposure is an ex-
ploitable vulnerable state that exposes a system to security threats during a certain period of time
(4vulnerable) in which neither the system nor its security entities were aware of such security
weakness.
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In order to unveil such security exposures, an infrastructure capable of managing snapshots
of the system across time would be able to analyze past system states by taking advantage of
current security information. In this manner, exposure time gaps of the system can be detected
in order to perform further analysis such as forensic activities over valuable assets. In the next
section we present our model for supporting the proposed infrastructure.
6.2.2 Specifying past unknown security exposures
In order to define a mathematical specification of unknown past security exposures, we first
introduce a set of core definitions that constitute the main building blocks of the model. We
present here three definition groups: (1) domains, (2) predicates and (3) functions, that are used
for defining how a system is evaluated in order to detect past exposures. The universe of discourse
is constituted by the following domains:
⇧ P = {p1, p2, . . . } denotes the set of device properties in the form of unary predicates pi(h)
where h is the device under analysis. Such predicates are used for specifying both required
properties to be observed for a vulnerability to be present as well as properties the device
already possesses.
⇧ S = {s1, s2, . . . } denotes the set of device states where a state si is used for describing in
a compact manner the set of properties required to be observed over the device as well as
for describing existing specific device states. The set S is inductively defined as follows:
i. if pi 2 P , then pi 2 S (i 2 N)
ii. if ↵,  2 S, then (↵ ⇧  ) 2 S ⇧ 2 {^,_}
iii. if ↵ 2 S, then (¬↵) 2 S.
⇧ R = {r1, r2, . . . } denotes the sequence of system revisions (snapshots) through time, where
a revision ri precedes a revision rj only if i < j. R is called the revision repository.
⇧ V = {v1, v2, . . . } denotes the set of known vulnerability definitions and it is also called the
knowledge source.
The predicates applied over individuals of our discourse universe are defined as follows:
⇧ All the defined domains act as membership predicates, e.g., R(r) is true if and only if r is
a system revision.
⇧ isV ulnerable : S ⇥ V ! Boolean denotes a predicate that takes a system state s 2 S and
a vulnerability definition v 2 V as input and returns true if and only if the vulnerability v
is present in the system state s.
⇧ isNew : V ! Boolean denotes a predicate that takes a vulnerability definition v 2 V as
input and returns true if and only if the vulnerability v is new within the current knowledge
source.
The functions used in the approach are the following:
⇧ revision : N ! R denotes a function that takes a revision number n 2 N as input and
returns the associated system revision r 2 R.
⇧ number : R ! N denotes a function that takes a system revision r 2 R as input and
returns the associated number n 2 N .
⇧ state : R! S denotes a function that takes a system revision r 2 R as input and returns
its associated state s 2 S.
⇧ timeR : R! N denotes a function that takes a system revision r 2 R as input and returns
the time elapsed since the revision was created.
⇧ timeV : V ! N denotes a function that takes a vulnerability definition v 2 V as input and
returns texplo if known, otherwise tdiscl is returned.
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Based on the previous core definitions, we define E(R, V ) shown in Equation 6.1 as a predicate
that based on a revision history R and a vulnerability knowledge source V , indicates if the system
under analysis has been unknowingly exposed in the past.
E(R, V ) = 9(r) 9(v) (R(r) ^ V (v) ^ isNew(v)
^timeV (v)  timeR(r) (6.1)
^isV ulnerable(state(r), v))
Equation 6.1 mathematically states the main concept of our approach. If a new vulnerability
is available, and exists at least one system revision made after the exploit was created or the
vulnerability was disclosed, and such revision is found to be vulnerable, then the system has
been unknowingly exposed in the past, even if the vulnerability is not observable in the present
configuration. This warning can be used for performing a deeper analysis within the vulnerable
period in order to detect malicious activity or compromised data. In the next section we present
a framework capable of capitalizing security advisories and analyzing historical revisions in order
to detect and warn about unknown past exposures.
6.3 Detecting past hidden vulnerable states
Detecting past unknown security exposures relies on the ability to see beyond the current
status of a given system. In order to achieve this goal, we propose a distributed autonomous
framework capable of organizing historical information about computing systems and analyzing
them when new security information is available. In this section we present the overall architec-
ture and explain our strategy for detecting past security exposures by taking advantage of new
advisories over past system states.
6.3.1 Extended architecture overview
In order to build a framework capable of identifying security exposures in the past, we consi-
der two independent cyclical processes. One process for imaging systems in an autonomous man-
ner and the second one for actually detecting past security exposures. Figure 6.2 illustrates the
proposed architecture identifying the main components as well as the communication processes
between them. The sequence denoted by Steps I, II and III constitutes the image generation
process. At Step I, the exposure analyzer provides directives for data collection that will be used
for building system images. These directives are specified by means of OVAL documents that are
automatically translated to Cfengine policy rules. The ability to express OVAL objects without
actually expecting any particular state allows us to use OVAL documents as the inventory of
required objects to be collected. At Step II the generated Cfengine policy rules are transmitted
to the autonomic agents distributed in the network. These agents are in charge of controlling
network devices and they will perform data collection activities in order to build their system
images. Finally, these images are automatically stored in the revision repository at Step III. The
image generation process constitutes an autonomic activity and it is performed independently
from the past exposure detection process. The latter is composed of two steps. First at Step 1,
the exposure analyzer monitors the knowledge source on a regular basis checking for new vulne-
rability definitions. When new definitions become available, it analyzes system images stored in
the revision repository at Step 2 in order to detect past unknown security exposures.
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Figure 6.2 – High-level imaging and exposure detection process
This framework in fact can be easily coupled to autonomic frameworks that perform assess-
ment activities such as the one presented in Chapter 4. In this manner, a combined solution
of past and present vulnerability assessment could highly increase the security of autonomic
environments. Moreover, forensic activities could be partially automated by collecting forensic
evidence using machine-readable procedures that may warn administrators about past exposures
and current threats [26]. In addition, the proposed architecture allows to outsource assessment
activities. By analyzing system images, target devices may provide the required data while the
exposure analyzer may perform a security evaluation of it. As we mentioned before there is a
period of time, noted4private, where the information about a vulnerability is not publicly known.
The capability of outsourcing security assessment activities may allow organizations to perform
analysis with their own information without actually violating their disclosure restrictions. At
the same time, clients can be warned about security exposures and be advised about actions
to take without knowing internal mechanisms for detecting such threats. In the next section we
illustrate the proposed strategy for performing assessment activities in the past and detecting
unknown security exposures.
6.3.2 Assessment strategy
Given a new vulnerability definition, the objective of our strategy is to identify affected sys-
tem states across time after its exploit was publicly available. This process provides a period of
time where the system was potentially exposed to the security threat represented by the spe-
cified vulnerability. The steps followed by the proposed strategy are depicted in Algorithm 6.1.
First, the exposure time is set, depending on the available information, between the exploit or
vulnerability disclosure time and the current time (lines 1-2). Then, a sequence of available sys-
tem revisions during this period is gathered, ordered by time starting with the newest revision
first (line 3). For each revision within the sequence (line 4), the system state is analyzed cheking
if the specified vulnerability is present or not (line 5). If the system state is found to be vulne-
rable, the algorithm takes the longest period of potential exposure. If the vulnerable system state





1 e.startT ime  timeV (v);
2 e.endT ime  now();
3 revs  getRevisionsFromTo(e.endT ime, e.startT ime);
4 foreach Revision r 2 revs do
5 if isV ulnerable(state(r), v) then
6 nextRev  revision(number(r) + 1);
7 if nextRev 2 revs then





13 e.endT ime  timeV (v)  1;
14 return e;
Algorithm 6.1: Exposure assessment algorithm
not vulnerable (line 8). If the vulnerable system state is the newest one, the exposure end time
corresponds to the current time. Afterwards, the exposure time is returned (line 10). If none of
the revisions is found to be vulnerable, the time period is set to a negative value and the expo-
sure time is returned (lines 13-14). This strategy has been integrated within our implementation
prototype which is described in detail in Chapter 9. Considering the XML-based nature of the
OVAL language, we have taken advantage of the SVN (Apache Subversion) versioning system
to efficiently store past system states [146]. In the next section, we present a case study where
a comprehensive set of experiments has been made for determining the feasibility and limits of
our solution.
6.4 Experimental results
Past system security exposures can provide unnoticed pathways for performing attacks on
current system states. In this section we present a case study based on the IOS operating system
for Cisco devices. We illustrate the application of the proposed approach for increasing the
present security by analyzing past hidden vulnerable states in an emulated environment. We use
the GNS3 emulator [75] over a regular laptop (2 Ghz Intel Core i7 with 8GB RAM) and present
the results obtained through an extensive set of experiments.
The complexity involved within each vulnerability description usually depends on its very
own nature, meaning that some vulnerability definitions may require a small set of tests to
be evaluated while others may need a higher amount of systems checks. In order to analyze
the performance of the proposed implementation prototype, we have taken the whole set of
IOS vulnerability descriptions available within the official OVAL repository [117] and we have
cyclically tested them as shown in Figure 6.3. The testing strategy consists on increasing the
number of OVAL definitions by one each time and measuring the accumulated assessment time
over one system image. We observe a low time cost at the beginning of the analysis due to
definitions involving a small amount of tests. The inclusion of definitions with more tests clearly
increases the assessment time though its behavior depicted in the inner graph describes a general
stable execution, taking about 5 seconds of assessment time for 138 IOS vulnerability descriptions
over one system image.
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Figure 6.3 – Vulnerability definitions assessment time
In order to avoid the nature-based size discrepancy among different vulnerability descriptions,
we have increased the granularity of our experiments by independently analyzing the involved
OVAL tests. Assessing the whole set of OVAL definitions for the IOS platform requires the eva-
luation of approximately 2400 OVAL tests. Figure 6.4 illustrates the accumulated time required
for assessing each system property involved in the IOS vulnerability descriptions. Within the per-
formed experiments, it takes as expected approximately 5 seconds for evaluating the whole set of
involved OVAL tests. We also observe a linear time growth rate when the number of OVAL tests
is increased as depicted in the inner graph, meaning that the proposed approach scales properly
regarding the size and nature of the IOS vulnerability descriptions.
As we mentioned before, a storage mechanism able to scale with the size of system images is
imperatively required. In order to measure the efficiency of our SVN-based implementation, fully
detailed in Chapter 9, we have performed experiments to analyze both the size of the repository
and the assessment time required for evaluating the history of past system states when new re-
visions are generated. Figure 6.5 shows the behavior of our implementation prototype when the
number of system images is increased, instrumented as a range from 1 to 100 revisions. We have
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Figure 6.5 – Repository scalability statistics
tion becomes available over the proposed image range. As expected, it can be clearly identified a
linear time growth along the number of revisions augments. In addition, the repository size (blue
dashed line) also presents a stable growth rate in terms of storage requirements as shown in
the inner graph. The frequency with which a network device changes its configuration can vary
among platforms and usage. Nonetheless, our experiments performed over the IOS platform show
that the proposed implementation prototype is capable of preserving a history of about 1 year
with system images performed every 4 days in less than 1 MB of storage space. In addition, the
assessment time of the whole year history can be performed in less than 3 minutes. The results
obtained from these experiments confirm the feasibility and scalability of the proposed approach.
6.5 Synthesis
Vulnerability assessment tasks constitute a critical activity that is usually performed only
over running systems. However, even though a known vulnerability may not be present on a
current system, it could have been unknowingly active in the past providing an entry point for
attacks that may still constitute a potential security threat in the present. In this chapter we have
proposed an approach for increasing the overall security of computing systems by identifying past
hidden vulnerable states. We have proposed a mathematical model for describing and detecting
past unknown security exposures. Taking advantage of the OVAL language and the Cfengine-
based approach presented in Chapter 4, we have proposed a framework able to autonomously
build and monitor the evolution of network devices, and also to outsource the assessment of their
exposure in an automatic manner. We have also developed an implementation prototype, which is
described in Chapter 9, that efficiently performs assessment activities over an SVN repository of
IOS system images. Performed experiments confirm the feasibility and scalability of our solution.
The integration of vulnerability management mechanisms into autonomic environments poses
hard challenges. The approach presented in this chapter considers a centralized solution for asses-
sing the security exposure of network devices. However, a mechanism for providing downloadable
exposure analyzers would allow autonomous agents to perform actions on their own in order to
move up to secure states. In that context, automated forensic investigations over past system
states could provide essential information for performing appropriate corrective activities in the
present. During the realization of this work, we have learnt that vulnerability assessment can
be understood as an autonomic function. Indeed, the ability to outsource assessment activities
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provides strong support to achieve autonomic features. With this concept in mind and conside-
ring the diversity of devices involved in current networks and the Internet, a challenging domain
come up, mobile devices. Mobile devices are ubiquitous computers with scarce resources that pro-
vide with applications and services to millions of users world-wide. Mobile computing exhibits
constrained scenarios where autonomic computing gets challenged. Being focused on vulnerability
management and autonomic environments, we decide to investigate to what extent autonomic






7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
7.2 Background and motivations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
7.3 Vulnerability self-assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
7.3.1 Self-assessment process model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
7.3.2 Assessing Android vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
7.3.3 Experimental results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
7.4 Probabilistic vulnerability assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
7.4.1 Probabilistic assessment model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
7.4.2 Ovaldroid, a probabilistic vulnerability assessment extension . . . . 95
7.4.3 Performance evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
7.5 Synthesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
7.1 Introduction
The overwhelming technological advances in the broad sense of mobile computing have made
end users to experience real computers in their pockets. Android 2 [11], a Linux-based operating
system for mobile devices, is nowadays the election of millions of users as the platform for gover-
ning their mobile devices. Only in the second quarter of 2013, worldwide sales of smartphones to
end users reached 225 million units where Android-based devices leaded the market share owning
the 78.9% followed by iOS 3 with 14.2% [74]. However, despite of the many security improvements
that have been done since Android’s creation, the underlying operating system as well as services
and applications have also evolved providing room for new vulnerabilities. Moreover, the open
and barely protected mobile environment facilitates attackers to take advantage of such vulnera-
bilities. Sensitive data handled by mobile users becomes easily exposed. Under this perspective,
lightweight and effective mechanisms for managing vulnerabilities must be provided in order to
ensure safe configurations and to increase the overall security of the system.
Mobile devices are widely used with different purposes such as telephony, Internet browsing,
handling of personal information, messaging and gaming. In addition, background and trans-
parent services are also executed for controlling the overall behavior of each device. All these
2. Android is developed by Open Handset Alliance, led by Google [112]
3. Apple iOS [13]
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activities have a consumption of resources that should be taken to a minimum in order to maxi-
mize the performance and responsiveness of these mobile devices. Sometimes users may prefer
to deactivate security processes such as antivirus software instead of having a short battery life-
time. This is a blocking point that we are trying to tackle. Indeed, the large-scale deployment of
mobile devices combined with present security issues and their limited resources poses hard chal-
lenges that must be addressed. Such scenario makes it clear the need for non-invasive, lightweight
and effective security solutions able to efficiently increase vulnerability detection capabilities in
mobile environments.
In this chapter, we present our approach for increasing the security of the Android platform,
though it could be applied over other mobile platforms as well, using the OVAL language as a
means for describing Android vulnerabilities. We put forward two complementary perspectives
for increasing Android security awareness. First, we present a lightweight autonomous framework
for performing self-assessment activities on mobile devices. Afterwards, we enhance the proposed
approach by considering a probabilistic vulnerability assessment model that efficiently reduces
the resource consumption on the mobile side. The remainder of this chapter is organized as
follows. Section 7.2 describes key concepts of Android security, identifying existing work and their
limits, which motivates in turn the approaches presented in this chapter. Section 7.3 presents
our approach for performing vulnerability self-assessment activities in the Android platform,
as well as several experiments and the obtained results. Section 7.4 describes a probabilistic
assessment framework that efficiently reduces computation costs as illustrated in the presented
results. Section 7.5 concludes this chapter presenting conclusions and further work.
7.2 Background and motivations
Android is an open source operating system that integrates some security features by design.
It uses the Dalvik virtual machine [51] for executing end user applications written in Java [88].
It is not the same standard Java virtual machine used in most popular platforms such as Linux,
Mac OS X or Windows. It has its own API 4 that is almost the same as the standard one.
The Dalvik virtual machine takes the Java application classes and translates them into one or
more .dex (Dalvik Executable) files generating optimized and smaller code. The internal design
of the Android platform provides important security features such as the sandbox execution
approach [155]. Such approach executes Android applications within separate instances of the
Dalvik virtual machine that in turn are represented by different Linux kernel processes. In order
to manage the underlying system resources, Android uses an access control policy based on
unique identifiers for each application to ensure that they can not interfere between each other.
Despite of the many security features provided by the Android platform [62, 141], end users
still face a wide range of security threats such as denial of service and privacy bypass attacks.
These threats are supported by existing vulnerabilities within the system itself, misuse of per-
sonal data performed by applications and malicious third party software [61, 68]. Several ap-
proaches have been proposed for analyzing Android applications and their risks [27, 96]. These
contributions provide a strong support for increasing the security of the Android platform. Ne-
vertheless, vulnerability assessment mechanisms have been barely or not at all discussed. Cur-
rently, dozens of security applications exist for the Android platform developed by different
providers [100, 110, 163]. However, they generally use private knowledge sources as well as their
own assessment techniques, and they do not provide standardized and open means for describing
and exchanging vulnerability descriptions within the community.
4. Application Programming Interface
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Once a vulnerability is discovered in almost any typical software product, its patch cycle
normally describes a time gap until the vulnerability is disclosed, another time span until the
patch is available and yet another time span until the end user applies the patch [72]. It is
usually during this period that attackers activity takes place. Within the Android environment,
this issue gets worse. Android is distributed as open source and device manufacturers and tele-
communications carriers customize it in order to provide specific services as well as added value
to their customers. When a patch is released by Google, an extra time gap will occur until the
manufacturer adapts it to work with its own hardware and another time span will pass until the
patch is released by the carrier [155]. In addition to this problem, several application markets
allow to fast distribute third party applications with only some security checks expecting that
the community identifies and reports malicious software. With thousands of applications in the
market, Android users are very likely to encounter malware 5 on their devices [100].
Such scenario imperatively requires solutions for rapidly identifying new vulnerabilities and
minimizing their impact. Even though no patch might be available for a new vulnerability at a
given time, countermeasures can be taken in order to mitigate the problem until the disclosure
of an official patch. In that context, vulnerability assessment mechanisms are highly required in
order to increase the vulnerability awareness of the system. In addition, mobile devices usually
have limited resources thus optimized lightweight tools should be developed to ensure efficiency
without losing functionality. Moreover, there are no current solutions built over solid foundations
as well as open and mature standards that foster its adoption and speed up general vulnerability
information exchange. Currently, OVAL repositories offer a wide range of vulnerability descrip-
tions though Android is not yet an official supported platform. In this work, we have instrumen-
ted our approach with an experimental OVAL extension for Android within the OVAL Sandbox
project [134]. Such extension enables practitioners and experts within the field to specify known
vulnerabilities for Android in a machine-readable manner and at the same time, it promotes
the exchange and enrichment of Android security information within the community. Our work
aims at defining a solution for increasing the security of Android devices by capitalizing Android
vulnerability descriptions specified with the OVAL language. Indeed, our investigation involves
two perspectives. The first one considers security advisories which are automatically integrated
into an autonomous distributed architecture, where lightweight self-assessment activities are per-
formed in order to ensure safe mobile configurations. Our second approach goes one step further
by considering a probabilistic model able to reduce computation costs and resource allocation.
Both approaches are presented in detail in the following sections.
7.3 Vulnerability self-assessment
The process by which vulnerabilities are assessed is critical for efficiently analyzing a target
system and minimizing computation costs at the same time. In order to increase the security
awareness of mobile devices, our first approach considers a self-assessment perspective where
mobile devices are in charge of assessing their own exposure. In this section we present a ma-
thematical model that defines and efficiently supports the vulnerability assessment process, an
autonomous framework for performing mobile vulnerability self-assessment, and several experi-
ments that show the feasibility of the proposed approach.
5. Malicious software including viruses, worms and spyware among others
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7.3.1 Self-assessment process model
Usually, a vulnerability can be understood as a logical combination of properties that if ob-
served in a target system, the security problem associated with such vulnerability is present on
that system. Properties can vary depending on the nature of the vulnerability being described,
some examples are: a specific process is running (e.g., httpd), a specific port is open (e.g., 80),
the system has a specific version (e.g., 2.6.10.rc). Frequently, one property is required by several
vulnerability descriptions and naturally one vulnerability description may require several pro-
perties. Under this perspective, the set of vulnerability descriptions that constitutes a knowledge
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Each matrix row encodes the properties required to be observed for the vulnerability vi to be
present. Thus, each entry ai,j denotes if the vulnerability vi requires the property pj . Considering
for instance a scenario with three vulnerabilities v1, v2 and v3, a pattern matrix PM can be built
as follows:
v1 = (p1, p3, p5)
v2 = (p2, p4)
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The pattern matrix can also provide useful information for performing statistics. The vflatten
operation aggregates the number of times that each property occurs within the whole set of known
vulnerabilities. The resulting vector provides an indicator that helps to identify most common
properties involved in vulnerabilities. Such indicator provides valuable information that can be











Other useful metric can be extracted from the pattern matrix when the aggregation opera-
tion is performed horizontally, as indicated by hflatten. A column vector is obtained from its
application where each entry j denotes the amount of properties required by each vulnerability
vj . This metric can be utilized, among other uses, for identifying those vulnerabilities that are
most likely affected by changes performed in the environment, thus assessment activities should












The state of a system can be encoded in the same manner as done with vulnerabilities,
indicating for those properties under control, which ones are present and which ones are not.
Thus, a system state is a boolean vector s defined as follows:
s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) si 2 {0, 1}
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Each entry si takes the value 1 if the property pi is present in the system and 0 if it is not.
Considering these constructs, the results of performing the vulnerability assessment process over
a given system is defined by the following equation:
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The resulting assessment vector w = (w1, w2, · · · , wm) denotes the status of each vulnerability




0, if i 6= 0
1, if i = 0
A null entry wi indicates that the vulnerability vi is present in the system while non null
values denotes the absence of the corresponding vulnerability. This fact can be understood as
a distance metric where a positive value indicates a positive distance between the vulnerability
and the target system, and a null distance indicates that the vulnerability is actually in the
system. Computing matrix operations in optimized manners constitutes a field that has been
studied for years [145]. The integration of the proposed model into real computing systems can
take advantage of such expertise providing a compact and efficient representation for performing
vulnerability assessment activities.
7.3.2 Assessing Android vulnerabilities
The previous model establishes a well-founded process for assessing vulnerabilities in an
efficient manner. By taking advantage of OVAL security advisories, such model can be used
for efficiently increasing the security of mobile computing devices. Mobile devices have become
a daily useful resource for connecting people, entertainment, working, managing personal data
and much more. This fact attracted the attention of legitimate users of these pocket-computers
but also from attackers. In only the first semester of 2011, malware for the Android platform
has grown at 250% [100]. It is critical to develop open security frameworks that can speed up
the knowledge exchange among community users and also being able to take advantage of such
information in order to augment their own security. In this section we present our approach for
efficiently increasing the security of Android-based devices by automatically evaluating OVAL-
based vulnerability descriptions and reporting analysis results.
Architecture and main components
We have designed the proposed architecture illustrated in Figure 7.1 as a distributed infra-
structure composed of three main building blocks: (1) a knowledge source that provides existing
security advisories, (2) Android-based devices running a self-assessment service and (3) a repor-
ting system for storing analysis results and performing further analysis. The overall process is
defined as follows. Firstly at step 1, the Android device periodically monitors and queries for
new vulnerability descriptions updates. This is achieved by using a web service provided by the
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Figure 7.1 – OVAL-based vulnerability assessment architecture for the Android platform
security advisory provider. At step 2, the provider examines its database and sends back new
found entries. The updater tool running inside the Android device synchronizes then its security
advisories. When new information is available or configuration changes occur within the system,
a self-assessment service is launched in order to analyze the device at step 3. At step 4, the
report containing the collected data and the results of the analyzed vulnerabilities is sent to a
reporting system by means of a web service request. At step 5, the obtained results are stored in
the external database. This information could be used later for different purposes such as forensic
activities or statistical analysis.
Within the proposed approach, vulnerabilities are described by using OVAL definitions. As
explained before, an OVAL definition is intended to describe a specific machine state using a
logical combination of OVAL tests that must be performed over a host. If such logical combi-
nation is observed, then the specified state is present on that host (e.g. vulnerability, specific
configuration). Under a logical perspective, this combination can be understood as a first order
formula where each OVAL test corresponds to an atomic unary predicate over that system as
presented in Chapter 4. The model presented in Section 7.3.1 denotes these predicates as the
set of properties P = {p1, p2, . . . , pn}. P represents all the predicates (OVAL tests) involved in
the vulnerability descriptions (OVAL definitions) available within our knowledge source. In this
manner, a boolean matrix PM representing each involved OVAL test for each OVAL definition
can be easily built in order to perform assessment activities. The self-assessment component de-
picted in Figure 7.1 constitutes a critical building block because it is in charge of orchestrating
the entire lifecycle of the framework in an automatic manner. Hence, optimized algorithms for
performing self-assessment activities are highly required. In order to achieve this objective, we
have designed and implemented a strategy that uses the model presented in Section 7.3.1 for
minimizing the system components required to be assessed.
Optimized assessment strategy
Due to the limited resources provided usually by mobile devices, it is important to optimize
the use of such elements without losing functionality and performance. The proposed assessment
strategy takes this issue into account and minimizes computation costs by using a boolean pat-
tern matrix PM that represents known vulnerabilities and a system state vector s that holds
the current system properties. The overall assessment is then efficiently performed using both
the pattern matrix and the system vector defined in Section 7.3.1. Within our approach, two
types of events can trigger self-assessment activities: (i) when changes occur in the system and
(ii) when new vulnerability definitions are available. Algorithm 7.1 depicts the overall strategy
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for treating such events and minimizing the number of OVAL tests to be re-evaluated. In or-
der to explain the proposed algorithm, we put forward an illustrative example that considers
both situations and uses the matrix PM3,5 illustrated in Section 7.3.1. Let consider the property
p2 = {Package X has version Y} and the system state s = (1, 0, 0, 0, 1) meaning that only the
properties p1 and p5 are present in the system. Within the OVAL language, p2 is described using
an OVAL test that involves an OVAL package_object with its attribute name = X and an OVAL
package_state with its attribute version = Y .
Input: Event event, PatternMatrix matrix, SystemState state
Output: VulnerabilityList list
1 if event is of type SystemChange then
2 objs  getAffectedObjectsByEvent(e);
3 foreach Property p 2 state do
4 o  getObjectFromProperty(p);
5 if o 2 objs then
6 result  evaluateProperty(p);




11 if event is of type DefinitionUpdate then
12 defs  getDefinitionsFromEvent(e);
13 props  getPropertiesFromDefinitions(defs);
14 foreach Property p 2 props do
15 if p 62 state then
16 addEmptyPropertyColumn(matrix, p);
17 addEmptyPropertyColumn(state, p);
18 result  evaluateProperty(p);
19 updateSystemState(state, p, result);
20 end
21 end




26 w  hSumMatrix(matrix)  (matrix ⇤ state);
27 index  0;
28 foreach Entry v 2 w do
29 if v = 0 then
30 vulnDef  getV ulnDef(index);
31 addToOutputList(list, vulnDef);
32 end
33 index  index+ 1;
34 end
Algorithm 7.1: Efficient event-based vulnerability assessment algorithm
Let suppose now that an event of type package_updated has occurred in the system affecting
the package X (line 1). Usually, a complete evaluation of each OVAL definition involving the
OVAL test that describes the property p2 should be carried out. However, only the truth value
of the involved OVAL test for p2 is required for recomputing the results of all the descriptions
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affected. In order to achieve this, the objects affected by the event are retrieved (line 2) and
compared with the objects related to the system properties (lines 3-4). If the object of one
property is seen to be affected (line 5), the property represented by an OVAL test is re-evaluated
and reflected in the system state (lines 6-7). Within our example, such optimization point will only
assess and change the second entry of the system state s. Due to both events are disjoint (system
changes at line 1 and definition update at line 11), we now explain the end of the algorithm for
the first case and then we discuss the behavior for the second case. Let suppose that the new
value for the package version is Y thus the new system state becomes s = (1, 1, 0, 0, 1). Once the
assessment of the OVAL test for p2 has been done, the overall assessment result is achieved by
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For each entry in the result vector w (line 28), we use the Kronecker delta function (line 29)
in order to detect if the vulnerability represented by that entry is present in the target sys-
tem. If it is the case, the vulnerability definition is added in the output detected vulnerability
list (lines 30-31). Within our example, it can be observed that the change performed in the
system has exposed itself to new security risks due to the presence of the vulnerability v3.
The second situation involves the arrival of new vulnerability descriptions (line 11). In this
case, both the pattern matrix PM and the system state s have to be extended so as to cover
the new properties involved in the OVAL definitions. In order to achieve this, the new defini-
tions are retrieved from the event (line 12), and the properties involved within such definitions
are analyzed (lines 13-14). For each uncovered property (line 15), an extension process must be
applied. The extension process for the pattern matrix PM will include new columns with null en-
tries for the new properties within existing vulnerability definitions (line 16). The system state s
is extended (line 17) and updated as well with the result of the property assessment (lines 18-19).
It is important to notice that the arrival of new vulnerability definitions does not imply changes
on the system and that the assessment results for known properties are already loaded in the
system state, thus there is no need to re-evaluate them again. Finally, for each new vulnerabi-
lity definition (line 22), a new row is added in the pattern matrix PM indicating the required
properties for that vulnerability to be present (line 23). The final assessment procedure is then
performed in the same manner as explained in the first situation (lines 26-34). The proposed
strategy constitutes a critical part of our framework and it has been integrated into an imple-
mentation prototype, which is fully described in Chapter 9. In that context, we have performed
several experiments to measure the performance of the proposed framework. These experiments
are illustrated in the next section.
7.3.3 Experimental results
Devices with limited resources imperatively require well-designed and optimized software
that take care of such elements. In this section we present an analytical evaluation of the pro-
posed mathematical model as well as a technical evaluation that involves a comprehensive set of




In the proposed approach, the vulnerability assessment process is governed by Equation 7.1.
Given n as the number of system properties being monitored and m the number of available
vulnerability definitions, the complexity of computing the result vector w is n⇥m. Considering
the worst case (n = m), the complexity is O(n2). Being hflatten(PM) a known value, the
number of operations performed during the process are n boolean multiplications plus n   1
integer sums for each vulnerability definition. Then, the total number of boolean multiplications
is m ⇥ n and the total number of integer sums is m ⇥ (n   1). Hence, m ⇥ (n + (n   1)) ⇡ n2
arithmetic operations are performed for assessing the entire knowledge repository in the worst
case.
Considering a knowledge repository with 1000 vulnerability definitions involving 1000 dif-
ferent system properties, the size of the pattern matrix PM is 106. This means that the assess-
ment process defined by the model will perform 106 arithmetic operations for assessing the entire
knowledge base. Considering MFLOPS 6 as the performance measure, though boolean and entire
operations are cheaper than floating point operations, the assessment requires 1 MFLOP. Within
our experimental devices Samsung Galaxy Gio running Android 2.3.3, we have measured an ave-
rage of 8.936 MFLOPS. With this information, we can infer that a dedicated application of our
strategy over a 106 size matrix takes less than 1 second in almost any standard Android-based
device.
Moreover, latest models may achieve more than 100 MFLOPS meaning that a knowledge
source of 10000 vulnerability definitions involving 10000 different properties could be mathema-
tically assessed in less than 1 second. Currently, the OVAL repository [117] offers 8747 UNIX
vulnerability definitions including all versions and families after years of contributions made by
the community. Such scenario provides real facts making the proposed approach highly suitable
for efficiently performing vulnerability assessment activities.
Technical experimentation
We have performed several experiments in order to analyze the behavior of our implemen-
tation prototype. The proposed methodology cyclically tests the framework without other ap-
plications running in foreground. The OVAL definitions set is increased by 5 each time until a
set of 100 definitions is evaluated. The used OVAL definitions are similar in size containing on
average two OVAL tests. For instance, the vulnerability with the CVE-2011-3874 id permits
a locally installed application to gain root privileges by causing a buffer overflow within libsy-
sutils. This vulnerability only affects specific Android versions (first OVAL test) and requires
the existence of the library libsysutils (second OVAL test). Figure 7.2 illustrates the behavior of
our implementation prototype over the emulated Android device. Our implementation prototype
is heavily based on XOvaldi4Android. We have developed XOvaldi4Android as an extension to
the XOvaldi OVAL interpreter [26] in order to also support the Android platform. Details of
XOvaldi4Android are presented in Chapter 9. Within our experiments, we analyze three per-
formance dimensions: (1) the CPU utilization when XOvaldi4Android is executed (red solid
line with crossings), (2) the XOvaldi4Android execution time (green dashed line with triangular
points) and (3) the total framework execution time (blue dashed line with rounded points). Du-
ring the XOvaldi4Android execution, we have observed a stable and linear behavior in terms of
CPU utilization, consuming 80% on average. Its execution time is also stable as shown by the
first derivative within the inner graph. While assessing 50 definitions takes about 72 seconds, 100
6. Million Floating Point Operations Per Second
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Figure 7.2 – Scalability statistics in a simulated environment
definitions takes almost twice the time. The overall execution time across the framework, inclu-
ding database updates and reporting results, shows the same behavior though slightly increased
in time due to the sequential execution of its components. It is important to notice that these
experiments consider extreme cases. As a matter of fact, only new definitions or a small set of
definitions affected by system changes will be evaluated in most situations.
In order to analyze the framework behavior using a real device, we have performed the same
experiments using a standard smartphone Samsung Galaxy Gio S5660 (CPU 800 MHz, 278 MB
of RAM, Android 2.3.3). Figure 7.3 illustrates the obtained results. We can observe the same
behavior on each curve as with the emulated device, describing a linear growth for each analysis
dimension as shown in the inner graph. Nevertheless, we have also detected an improvement
in terms of speed and resource usage. The average value for the CPU utilization is now about
65%. In addition, the execution time of XOvaldi4Android is almost half the emulator execution
time, taking 38 seconds for analyzing 50 vulnerabilities and 75 for 100 vulnerabilities. This is
probably due to a slower emulated CPU. The overall execution time is also reduced due to the
faster execution of the vulnerability assessment process. However, its growth rate, though linear,
is faster because the internetwork connections are real in this case.
As a final but not less important dimension to analyze, we have experimented with the
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Figure 7.3 – Scalability statistics in a real device
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Figure 7.4 – Memory load in both emulated and real device
valdi4Android when it is executed. The system classifies the allocated memory in two categories,
native and Dalvik, taking on average 40% for native memory and 60% for Dalvik memory.
Figure 7.4 illustrates the total memory load considering both, the emulator and the smartphone.
We have observed an almost constant utilization of the RAM memory. Within the emulator
(blue solid line with rounded points), XOvaldi4Android requires 12 MB on average (4.8 MB
of native memory, 7.2 MB of Dalvik memory). Within the smartphone (red dashed line with
rhomboid points), XOvaldi4Android requires a little less memory, 11 MB on average (4.4 MB of
native memory, 6.6 MB of Dalvik memory). The results obtained from the performed experiments
show good performance in terms of resource consumption and scalability. However, the ability to
outsource vulnerability assessment activities, as done in Chapter 6 for detecting past unknown
security exposures, can reduce the workload even further. Performing a smart management of
assessment activities in terms of time and type of vulnerabilities, may dramatically reduce the
resource allocation required on the mobile side. This approach is discussed in the next section.
7.4 Probabilistic vulnerability assessment
Delegating vulnerability assessment activities to mobile devices provides higher levels of au-
tonomy. However, when these activities are performed, there is still a resource consuming process
in the mobile side that must control the overall behavior of the analysis. We have realized that
the externalization of this control may still provide autonomicity and decrease the mobile work-
load. In this section, we present an extended approach that centralizes main logistic vulnerability
assessment aspects as a service. Mobile clients only need to provide the server with required data
to analyze known vulnerabilities described with the OVAL language. By configuring the analysis
frequency as well as the percentage of vulnerabilities to evaluate at each security assessment,
the proposed framework permits to bound client resource allocation and also to outsource the
assessment process. Our strategy consists in distributing evaluation activities across time thus
alleviating the workload on mobile devices, and simultaneously ensuring a complete and accu-
rate coverage of the vulnerability dataset. This technique results in a faster assessment process,
typically done in the cloud, and considerably reduces the resource allocation on the client side.
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Figure 7.5 – Regular vs. probabilistic approach
7.4.1 Probabilistic assessment model
When developing mobile solutions, limited resources present on mobile devices must be care-
fully managed in order to increase the performance and responsiveness of such devices. In that
context, our aims at reducing the resource consumption at the target device, e.g. battery, CPU,
and at the same time increasing the vulnerability assessment accuracy.
Regular vs. probabilistic approach
Each time a security analysis is made, vulnerabilities descriptions are analyzed in order to
detect security weaknesses on a target device. As a remainder, the OVAL language represents
vulnerabilities by means of OVAL definitions. Each OVAL definition logically combines OVAL
tests that represent atomic checks or evaluations over the target device. Each OVAL test in turn
can be referenced by different OVAL definitions and contains an OVAL object that describes
the component to be analyzed, and an OVAL state that describes the properties expected to
be observed on the specified component. The test result will be true if the component actually
exhibits the specified state, and false otherwise. Let T = {t1, t2, . . . , tn} be the set of available
OVAL tests. Then, the set of known vulnerability descriptions V = {v1, v2, . . . , vm} constituting
our knowledge source can be built by respecting the following rules:
i. if ti 2 T , then ti 2 V (i 2 N)
ii. if ↵,  2 V , then (↵ ⇧  ) 2 V ⇧ 2 {^,_}
iii. if ↵ 2 V , then (¬↵) 2 V .
Traditional assessment mechanisms usually evaluate these vulnerabilities in a one-step fashion
by analyzing the whole set of vulnerability descriptions at once. Such methodology is highly time
and resource-consuming. Our approach aims at dealing with this problem by probabilistically
distributing vulnerability assessment activities across time and restricting resources affected by
this task. Figure 7.5 exemplifies both regular and probabilistic approaches where a set of vul-
nerabilities involving eight single tests is evaluated during four periods of time. The regular
approach analyzes the whole body of vulnerabilities at each period thus evaluating all tests each
time. This is accurate but constitutes an extremely heavy task. The probabilistic approach on
the other hand selects only a subset of tests to execute in order to cover a subset of vulnerabili-
ties each time. Tests are probabilistically selected according to their utility on the resolution of
vulnerability evaluations as well as the elapsed time since their last analysis. The test selection
process constitutes the heart of this section and it is detailed in the following subsections. By
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following this methodology, the probabilistic approach highly reduces the activity load and re-
source allocation at each security analysis while rapidly converging to a complete assessment of
the vulnerability set.
The probabilistic approach is also depicted in Figure 7.5 where only tests t3 and t4 are eva-
luated and tagged at period 1. At period 2, tests t5 and t6 are evaluated and tagged but also t4,
probably due to a high utility value thus being re-evaluated once again. Test t3 has not been
selected at this period thus becoming one period older in terms of its evaluation, illustrated
with a less intense grey color. At period 3, tests t1 and t2 are evaluated while test t3 becomes
two periods older, and t4, t5 and t6 only one. At period 4, tests t6, t7 and t8 are selected for
evaluation thus completing the whole vulnerability assessment. Notice the re-evaluation of t6,
probably due to a high utility value again. The selection process continues like this across time
thus t3, the oldest evaluated test so far, will have a higher probability of being selected but it will
still compete with other high utility tests during future selection processes. The idea is that high
utility tests are more frequently evaluated but low utility tests are also evaluated as they become
older. Therefore, test starvation is avoided ensuring the convergence towards the analysis of the
complete set of known vulnerabilities.
The proposed model considers different parameters that allow the user to adapt it according
to specific needs, namely, (1) a threshold   that indicates the percentage of vulnerabilities that
must be evaluated at each security analysis, and (2) a time interval   that specifies the amount of
elapsed time between each security analysis. The overall idea is that during each security analysis
made with frequency  , an iterative evaluation process is performed, statistically guided by the
utility that each test has over the current vulnerability database as well as the elapsed time since
their last evaluation. Tests are probabilistically selected until the desired threshold   is achieved.
In order to minimize the load impact over mobile devices, the process by which tests are selected
is critical because of two reasons, firstly it must consider the most useful tests at each security
analysis and secondly, it must ensure that all tests will be eventually executed. These concepts
are presented in the next subsections.
Test utility analysis
Within the proposed model, the utility of a test aims at expressing a metric that combines
the ability of this test to speed up the overall evaluation and its security impact on the target
system. Such concept relies on: (1) how much the body of vulnerability descriptions can be
reduced towards a complete coverage when its value is determined, and (2) the security impact
of the vulnerabilities in which the test is involved in. The concept of reduction refers to the idea
of how much closer we are to determine the truth value of the vulnerabilities under analysis
when a test value is known. For instance, let v be a vulnerability description with the form
v = t1 ^ (t2 _ t3). If the value of t1 is known and it is false, then there is no need to evaluate t2
and t3 as the final value for v will be false no matter what values take t2 and t3. In this case,
the utility of t1 is higher than the utility of t2 and t3 because its evaluation could potentially
eliminate the need to evaluate the remaining tests in the formula. The other way around however
is not true ; if t2 is false then t3 must be evaluated, if it is true then t1 must be evaluated. No
matter what value takes t2, a second test must always be evaluated. The same phenomenon
occurs with t3. Therefore, t1 fits better in this situation and it will have a higher utility value
than t2 and t3. During the reduction process, if the evaluation result of t1 is false then v will
be reduced to v = false thus completing the evaluation. If the result evaluation of t1 is true
instead, then v will be reduced to v = true ^ (t2 _ t3) = t2 _ t3. The process will then continue
over t2 and t3 until obtaining the truth value for v.
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In order to facilitate the quantification of the utility of a test, vulnerabilities are represented
as formulas in conjunctive normal form (CNF). A vulnerability expressed in CNF is a conjunction





(tj |¬tj)) tj 2 T, vi 2 V (7.3)
Accordingly, if the value of a test t is known, its utility over a specific vulnerability database V
is expressed by a fitness function U defined as follows:








t 2 T, val 2 Boolean, vi 2 V
(7.4)
The testRed function represents the number of tests whose truth values do not contribute
to the final resolution of vi when the value of t is val. The totalTests function returns the
number of tests involved in vi. The I function returns a numerical value representing the impact
security factor or criticality of vi, e.g., its CVSS score [47]. Because the function represented by
Equation 7.4 is used for selecting the next test to be executed, the evaluation values for those
tests under selection are not known yet. Therefore, we define a weight function W for determining
the average utility of a test t over a vulnerability database V as follows:
W (t, V ) =
U(t, true, V ) + U(t, false, V )
2
t 2 T (7.5)
In order to select the next test to be evaluated, tests are sorted by descending utility values
producing an ordered list TW = {t1, t2, . . . , tn}. This list provides statistical-based ranking in-
formation for unevaluated tests that combined with a temporal factor supports the probabilist
test selection process.
Probabilistic test selection process
As there is a threshold   that limits the execution of the whole set of tests, not every test
will be executed during a single security analysis. If only best tests were selected at each analysis
and the device state remains the same, there would be tests that would never be evaluated. This
effect is called test starvation meaning that some tests might never come up with the opportunity
to be evaluated because of their low utility values. Therefore, some vulnerabilities might never
be covered either. In order to avoid test starvation, we consider two factors that shape the
overall behavior of our strategy across time. The first factor is a weighted probability ⇢ for each
test that is directly proportional to its utility value. This means that even when a test has the
highest utility value, another test with a lower utility value could be selected in its place for
execution. Such approach is less elitist though still fair as it provides the opportunity for lower
tests to substitute higher tests with probabilities according to their ranking. In order to specify
the probability for a test to be chosen according to its positioning in the weighted list TW , we
define the ⇢ function as follows:
⇢(t, V, TW ) =
W (t, V )
P|TW |
i=1 W (ti, V )
t, ti 2 TW (7.6)
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Figure 7.6 – Test execution distribution
The second factor to avoid test starvation is the elapsed time ⌧ between each security analysis.
The older the last evaluation of a test is, the higher is the chance for this test to be selected.
This increase however must consider their ranking status indicated by the first factor ⇢ in order
to respect the statistical analysis done for each test. In order to combine both factors in the
selection process, we define the selectivity value for a test t in a given time x by the following
equation:
S(t, x, V, TW ) = ⇢(t, V, TW ) ⇤ ⌧(t, x) t 2 TW , x 2 [0..1) (7.7)
The main idea in Equation 7.7 is to prioritize high impact tests given their weighted proba-
bilities but simultaneously promoting lower tests that turn more important as long as their last
evaluations become older. The delta time ⌧ for a test t is considered as the time elapsed between
its last evaluation and a specific time x. ⌧ is defined as follows:
⌧(t, x) = x  lastEvalT ime(t) t 2 TW , x 2 [0..1) (7.8)
The behavior of the selection process is illustrated in Figure 7.6 where five tests constitute
the body of known vulnerabilities V and they are assessed over ten periods of time (  = 1). Tests
have been ordered according to their utility values over V , being the first test the most useful
test. It can be observed how the test with the highest utility has been selected seven times, much
more than the other tests with lower utility values. However, lower utility tests also have been
selected though in a lower rate. It can be also noticed that the fourth test is stronger than the
fifth test in terms of utility, but in this specific experiment however, the latter shows a higher
selection frequency (periods 1 and 9) than the former (period 8). This is an interesting effect
due to the probabilistic nature of the process though in the general case, as illustrated later
in Section 7.4.3, the test execution frequency tends to a coherent distribution according to test
utility values. In the next section we present Ovaldroid, a probabilistic vulnerability assessment
framework that integrates the proposed model in order to increase the overall security of Android
devices.
7.4.2 Ovaldroid, a probabilistic vulnerability assessment extension
Ovaldroid is a probabilistic-based framework designed for assessing configuration vulnerabi-
lities over Android devices. We explain here its architecture as well as the underlying strategy
that has been cautiously designed for outsourcing as much as possible the involved assessment
activities and dealing with issues such as resource usage and ubiquity.
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Figure 7.7 – Ovaldroid global architecture
Architecture overview
The architecture of Ovaldroid, described in Figure 7.7, has been designed as a centralized
service-oriented infrastructure capable of analyzing vulnerabilities over Android-based devices.
It is composed of two main building blocks, namely, a server that manages the whole assessment
process and clients located on the mobile network that use the vulnerability assessment service.
Mobile clients periodically communicate with the Ovaldroid server in order to inform about
their assessment availability. This communication is started by the Ovaldroid client that sends
an identified Hello message using the web-service provided by the server. Based on the historical
evaluation registry, the server decides whether it is necessary to perform a new vulnerability
assessment based on the pre-established assessment frequency ( ). If it does, the vulnerability
manager subsystem located on the server side sends specific directives to the probabilistic-based
test analyzer in charge of orchestrating the overall assessment activity. The probability-based
test analyzer in turn, executes a sequence of OVAL tests until the specified percentage of vulne-
rabilities to be evaluated ( ) is reached.
In order to select which OVAL test must be evaluated at each iteration, the analyzer uses
the services of the statistical-driven test selector (step 1). The latter builds, at the first call,
a local CNF database representing the vulnerability descriptions available in the vulnerability
knowledge source. Then, at each query sent by the analyzer, the statistical-driven test selector
will produce an ordered list of tests suitable to be performed over the target device based on the
impact that each unevaluated test has towards the desired vulnerability coverage. The analyzer
then chooses the test to be executed from this list by considering its ranking combined with the
elapsed time since its last evaluation as the probability to be selected. This means that high
utility tests will be more likely to be selected because of their high ranking values. However, low
utility tests still have the opportunity to be selected though in a minor rate.
Once a test has been selected for execution, the analyzer checks if a previous unexpired result
for this test exists in the cache (step 2a). If it does, it is directly used thus saving computation
resources on the client side. The cache also stores collected objects from previous tests due
to sometimes the same object is used by different tests. Therefore, if no result for this test is
found, the system looks for an unexpired version of the object previously collected from the
device under analysis over which this test applies. If there is a hit, the object is used without
interacting with the target device. Otherwise, the analyzer performs a data collection request
on the target device (step 2b) in order to gather the required data and assess the corresponding
OVAL test on the server side. Cache entries do not affect the test selection process itself because
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the oldness of these tests is already considered in the model. Therefore, the cache and its policy
can be independently set to reduce the load even further on the target device.
Data collection is done on the client side by running a lightweight Android application (step 3).
Once the required object is available, the services of an OVAL interpreter are used in order to
evaluate the selected OVAL test (step 4). Depending on the nature of a vulnerability, different
types of tests might be used when describing it, e.g., file tests, process tests, version tests. In
that context, the OVAL interpreter uses plugins for each type of OVAL test where each plugin
knows how to collect and analyze the information of the type of test it was created for. After the
evaluation, the collected object and the test result are stored in the cache for future use (step 5).
Finally, the test result is also placed in the results storage system on the server side (step 6). The
process continues over steps 1 to 6 until the percentage of vulnerability coverage specified by the
administrator is reached. Final assessment results are also saved in the results storage system.
Assessment strategy
The proposed methodology integrates a probabilistic component for selecting which tests must
be evaluated at each security analysis. However, the spectrum of eligible tests is built following
a statistical strategy. The steps followed by the combined assessment strategy are depicted in
Algorithm 7.2. The general process consists in selecting and evaluating tests in the target device
until the specified coverage threshold is reached (line 2). At each iteration, a test is selected
as described in Section 7.4.1 by considering how much it contributes to achieve the specified
coverage, the impact of the vulnerabilities this test participates in, and the elapsed time since
its last evaluation (line 3). The algorithm looks for a previous unexpired evaluation result of
this test in the cache (line 4). If a result is found, it is directly used (line 5). If it is not, the
object referenced by this test is searched in the cache (line 8). If the object is found (line 9), it is
directly used. If it is not, the data collection process is launched over the target device (line 11).
After a cache hit or the collection process itself, the evaluation process is performed (line 13) and
the cache is updated with the collected object and the result (line 14). Current results are then
updated in the general assessment results (line 16). Considering these results and the remaining
tests to be assessed, the vulnerability list is reduced as explained in Section 7.4.1 by replacing
known test values within the CNF formulas that represent such vulnerabilities (line 17). Finally,
the vulnerability coverage obtained until this point is updated (line 18). The algorithm ends
when the percentage of assessed vulnerabilities satisfies the specified threshold.
The proposed strategy is performed each time the Ovaldroid server considers that a security
analysis needs to be made over a specific device. However, the event that potentially triggers
such analysis is initiated by the client side. Indeed, a periodic Hello message is sent by the Oval-
droid client to the server in order to indicate its assessment availability as shown in Figure 7.8.
Communication messages are always sent by the client that analyses the response of the server.
The responses of the server can be to start a new security analysis, to update the client policy
and parameters, nothing to do at that moment (OK status) or an error such as busy error. If
a new analysis is required based on the established frequency  , the server will respond with
the appropriate message and also the first OVAL object description to collect. The client will
collect the items corresponding to the specified OVAL object and will send a new message to the
server with the collected OVAL items. This mechanism is based on the piggybacking technique
in order to reduce the amount of network messages transmitted during the process. The server
will then respond with a new OVAL object request or a flag indicating the end of the assessment
process. From the client point of view, it enters in a loop while the server keeps responding
ContinueAnalysis(OVAL object) until it receives the assessment results. The collection of objects
97
Chapter 7. Mobile security assessment
Input: CNFVulnList vulnList, Threshold threshold
Output: AssessmentResults results
1 coverage  0;
2 while coverage < threshold do
3 test  computeBestUtilityTest(vulnList);
4 if test in cache then
5 testResult  getResultFromCache(test);
6 else
7 object  getObjectDescription(test);
8 if object in cache then
9 objectData  getFromCache(object);
10 else
11 objectData  collectFromDevice(object);
12 end
13 testResult  evaluate(test, objectData);
14 updateCache(test, objectData, testResult);
15 end
16 updateAssessmentResults(results, testResult);
17 reduceCNFV ulnList(vulnList, test, results);
18 updateCoverage(coverage, vulnList, test, results);
19 end
Algorithm 7.2: Probabilistic assessment algorithm
is quite simple and only uses two HTTP methods invoked from the client side. However, po-
werful network management protocols such as NETCONF [63] already exist and they could be
envisioned in the future as soon as their linkage with OVAL and the Android platform become
more mature. As shown later in Chapter 8, we have successfully used the NETCONF protocol
for performing vulnerability remediation activities over the Cisco IOS platform. In the next sec-
tion, we present the results obtained from an extensive set of experiments performed with our
probabilistic framework.
Figure 7.8 – Ovaldroid client-server interactions
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7.4.3 Performance evaluation
In order to provide a computable infrastructure to the proposed approach, we have developed
an implementation prototype that integrates the building blocks presented in the Ovaldroid
framework. The implementation prototype is described in Chapter 9. We have also performed a
deep behavioral analysis of the proposed framework through a comprehensive set of experiments.
In this section we detail the experiments and the obtained results.
In order to evaluate the behavior and performance of our framework, we have performed our
experiments using a regular laptop (Intel Core i7 2.20 Ghz, 8 GB of RAM, Linux kernel v.3.7.9)
running the Ovaldroid server and a Samsung I9300 Galaxy S III smartphone (Quad-core 1.4
GHz, 4 GB of RAM, Android v.4.1.0) running the Ovaldroid client. The vulnerability database
used within the experiments has been built taking real vulnerability descriptions for Android.
In order to evaluate scalability aspects we have replicated their structure to construct more
vulnerability descriptions involving two tests on average. Under a semantic perspective they
represent the same vulnerability but under a technical perspective, these vulnerabilities and the
involved tests, objects and states are different as they have different identifiers. Based on this
methodology, we have constructed a database involving 500 vulnerability descriptions. Regarding
Ovaldroid’s parameters, we have experimented with several values for the vulnerability coverage  
while considering   = 1. As to the cache replacement policy, we have established an average
of 3 periods before stored objects and results become expired.
We now present three different experiments that provide an insight of Ovaldroid’s performance
and show the feasibility of our solution. The first experiment shows how the proposed approach
converges to a complete coverage of the vulnerability database across time. Indeed, one of the
characteristics of Ovaldroid is the capability of distributing the load among different evaluation
periods. By providing higher priority to those tests with higher utility as explained in Section 7.4.1
but simultaneously avoiding test starvation, the progression behaves as illustrated in Figure 7.9.
We can observe that only covering the 33% of vulnerabilities at each period (solid blue line with
crossings), the whole vulnerability database can be 100% covered at the end of the sixth period.
If the vulnerability database keeps the same, following periods will re-evaluate vulnerabilities
according to their impact and importance, but always providing vulnerabilities with lower utility
to be evaluated as well. If new vulnerabilities become available, they will have higher priority as
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Figure 7.9 – Coverage convergence
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Collected objects (on Android-side data collector) until convergence (Lambda=33%, cache=3 periods)
Probabilistic - periodic
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Regular - periodic
                total
Figure 7.10 – Collected objects
device, produces frequent and more accurate results, and also fits its potential changing nature.
By augmenting the vulnerability coverage  , our experiments have shown a faster convergence
as expected.
In order to analyze the load activity variation on the Android side, we have performed a
second experiment where we analyze the object collection behavior by measuring the standard
approach evaluating all vulnerabilities at once, and Ovaldroid’s approach distributing the assess-
ment activity across time. Figure 7.10 shows the observed behavior where two types of results are
illustrated, namely, the number of collected objects per period (solid lines) and the total amount
of collected objects (dashed lines). We can observe that while the standard approach collects
1000 objects per period (red solid line with circles), Ovaldroid’s approach collects between 200
and 250 objects on average (blue solid line with crossings). This means that our approach only
needs to collect approximately 25% of the objects required by the standard approach in this case,
thus considerably reducing the load factor. Even though the proposed approach is slower than
the standard one in terms of coverage speed, the load reduction achieved by Ovaldroid is really
high and therefore, it positively contributes to the efficiency and responsiveness of the target
device. The curves representing total accumulated objects show more clearly how the standard
approach (dashed red line with circles) highly exceeds the interactions done by Ovaldroid with


























































Vulnerabilities ordered by decreasing Impact Factor
Number of times each vulnerability has been covered until total convergence
Figure 7.11 – Vulnerability evaluation rate
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The experiments previously described consider a vulnerability dataset where each vulnerabi-
lity has the same impact factor. In order to analyze the frequency with which each vulnerability
is evaluated across time regarding their security impact, we have performed a third experiment
depicted in Figure 7.11 involving 14 evaluation time periods. Vulnerabilities identifiers are orde-
red by decreasing impact factor. We can observe as expected that vulnerabilities with a higher
impact factor have been evaluated more frequently than those vulnerabilities with a lower im-
pact factor. However, vulnerabilities with a lower impact factor have been analyzed several times
meaning that the model also solves the starvation problem.
7.5 Synthesis
Witnessing a strong trend to large evolving heterogeneous networks, traditional servers and
personal computers are not the only targets for attackers anymore. Mobile computing has become
a de facto technological standard in the modern society. We have already shown the power of
autonomic computing on the management of core networks. In this chapter, we have also entered
into the field of mobile computing where autonomic solutions have been barely or not at all
discussed. First, we have proposed an approach that outfits mobile devices with the capability
of assessing their own security exposure in an autonomous manner. A mathematical model, a
functional framework, and several experiments have been presented to that end. We also have
observed that outsourcing assessment activities may highly reduce the workload of mobile de-
vices. In that context, we have presented a probabilistic approach for increasing the security
of Android devices in a cost-efficient manner. A detailed mathematical model, smart strategies
over an autonomous framework, and a comprehensive set of experiments support the proposed
approach. As stated in Chapter 2, autonomic computing transcends the barrier of technological
heterogeneity. All along this thesis, we have shown how autonomics contributes to achieve more
affordable ways to manage the security of disparate increasing networks. Particularly, we have
attacked core and mobile networks. However, vulnerability assessment constitutes one part of
the vulnerability management process. Indeed, real autonomy can only be achieved if this pro-
cess can be completed in a loop, permitting network devices to detect and remediate security
exposures by themselves. This is the heart of the next chapter, where we discuss approaches for
remediating host-based and distributed vulnerabilities from an autonomic perspective.
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8.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters we have presented several approaches for dealing with the assess-
ment of configuration vulnerabilities in different dimensions, namely, device-based vulnerabili-
ties, distributed vulnerabilities, past hidden vulnerabilities, and mobile security vulnerabilities.
Autonomously assessing vulnerabilities helps to address the growing complexity of network ma-
nagement by providing awareness mechanisms to these convoluted and heterogeneous networked
environments. However, remediation activities are still required in order to complete the vulne-
rability management control loop. In this chapter, we extend our previous approaches for not
only identifying but also remediating vulnerabilities based on high-level policies. These policies
describe vulnerable machine states as well as potential corrective activities in order to ensure
safe configurations and prevent security attacks.
In order to achieve this goal, we present two complimentary approaches that aim at dea-
ling with remediation activities of device-based and distributed vulnerabilities. First, we tackle
the remediation of device-based vulnerabilities by proposing a SAT-based autonomous strategy.
Using our previous logical model for OVAL vulnerability descriptions, the idea is to formulate
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the repository of known vulnerabilities as a logical boolean expression. Then, we use a SAT sol-
ver to identify which properties must be changed in the target system in order to eradicate all
known vulnerabilities. Our second approach tackles the remediation of distributed vulnerabili-
ties. In that context, we extend our model for specifying distributed vulnerabilities presented in
Chapter 5 in order to cover distributed remediation tasks as well. We propose an infrastructure
for describing distributed treatments as well as a collaborative strategy for performing corrective
actions. For both approaches, we present several experiments that show the feasibility of the
proposed solutions.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 8.2 describes important concepts
related to vulnerability remediation as well as motivational issues to address this activity in the
context of autonomic environments. Section 8.3 presents the proposed approach for dealing with
device-based environment using a SAT-based strategy. Section 8.4 illustrates our approach for
tackling the remediation of distributed vulnerabilities in an autonomous manner. Section 8.5
concludes this chapter and points out further work.
8.2 Background and motivations
The vulnerability remediation activity constitutes itself as a hard and challenging task. From a
proactive perspective, it should be able to decide which potential states could be dangerous for the
security of the system. In the same manner, but under a reactive perspective, effective vulnerable
states should be rapidly eradicated to avoid potential attacks that could compromise the system.
Finding those changes that can ensure the security of the system is also a complex activity. One
single change may impact or activate other vulnerable states that were not present before the
change. The same effect could occur over other system policies, in this work however, we only
deal with security configuration vulnerabilities. In that context, looking for correct changes that
together can provide a safe system configuration becomes an explosive combinatorial activity.
This is indeed a decision problem classified as an NP-complete problem [43].
In order to cope with this problem, we propose to formalize the change decision problem as
a satisfiability or SAT problem [123]. Given a boolean expression, the SAT problem consists of
finding an assignment for variables such that the formula evaluates to true. By specifying our
vulnerability knowledge source as a propositional logical formula, we fix those system properties
that we cannot change and free those variables for which changes are available. We use a SAT
solving engine to determine which changes have to be made to secure the system. In order to
provide proactive and reactive solutions, we propose the concept of a future state. This des-
cribes how a system will look after applying a specific change. These descriptions can be used
for analyzing the security impact of changes without actually changing the system. When this
information is not available, we use the NETCONF protocol [63] and its notion of candidate
state where changes can be applied, analyzed and rolled back if necessary.
NETCONF has been developed by IETF [84] in order to deal with network management
operations and changes. NETCONF is a network configuration protocol that provides mecha-
nisms to install, manipulate and delete the configuration of network devices. Its specification
constitutes a standard, though its deployment, as well as complete vendors implementations,
seem to be still in an early stage. However, very interesting works have already been presented
showing evaluations of its maturity as well as diverse technical aspects [152], [157]. To the best
of our knowledge, the integration of change management techniques into the vulnerability mana-
gement plane constitutes a novel approach that may positively contribute to the overall security
of current and future computer systems.
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Figure 8.1 – Distributed vulnerability scenario with remediation tasks
On the other hand, remediating distributed vulnerabilities in an autonomous manner also re-
mains a challenging problem. We have introduced in Chapter 5 a mechanism for specifying and
assessing distributed vulnerabilities involving several devices simultaneously, and also covering
device-based vulnerabilities as a particular case. Now, the idea is to provide a collaborative stra-
tegy for remediating both distributed and device-based vulnerabilities. The scenario presented
in Figure 8.1 shows the same scenario illustrated in Chapter 5 but now considering remediation
tasks as well. As a remainder, this scenario involves two devices, a SIP server with no flooding
protection and a local DNS server with external unknown name resolution. Together, they consti-
tute a distributed vulnerable state. In this situation, an attacker can perform a denial of service
attack by flooding the SIP server with unresolvable domains that must be solved by a local DNS
server. The local DNS server in turn is configured for solving unknown domains querying exter-
nal servers, thus increasing the number of waiting requests as well as the response time for each
SIP request. If at least one of the servers is not present or is not compliant with the required
specific state, the distributed vulnerability has no place in the environment. In order to correct
such security problem, different remediation tasks could be performed in the SIP server or in the
DNS server. A key challenge is to define a strategy for determining how and by which devices
the distributed vulnerability can be remediated. In the next section, we present our approach for
dealing with device-based vulnerabilities. Subsequently, we describe our autonomous strategy for
collaboratively remediating distributed vulnerabilities found across the network.
8.3 Remediating device-based vulnerabilities
Remediating device-based vulnerabilities constitutes a critical activity for ensuring secure
network configurations. In this section, we put forward a mathematical model for performing
device-based vulnerability assessment as well as remediation activities. We present a SAT-based
autonomous framework able to capture these mathematical concepts and execute vulnerability
management activities. The feasibility of the proposed approach is illustrated by several experi-
ments presented at the end of this section.
8.3.1 Vulnerability remediation modeling
In order to provide sound foundations for performing vulnerability remediation tasks, we
propose here a model that formalizes the main building blocks involved in the process. We also
discuss the exponential nature of finding appropriate changes for securing a vulnerable system
and we propose a SAT-based approach for dealing with this issue.
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Specifying corrective changes
Previously in Section 5.2, we have mathematically described the main concepts involved in
the OVAL language. As a remainder, we retake a few definitions in the following list.
⇧ H = {h1, h2, . . . } denotes the set of devices or systems in the network (e.g. hosts, routers).
⇧ P = {p1, p2, . . . } denotes the set of device properties in the form of unary predicates
pi(h), h 2 H. Such predicates are used for both specifying required properties to be obser-
ved for a vulnerability to be present as well as properties the device already possesses.
⇧ S = {s1, s2, . . . } denotes the set of device states where a state si is used for describing in a
compact manner a set of properties required to be observed over a network device as well
as for describing existing specific network devices states.
⇧ state : H ! S ⌘ function that takes a device h 2 H as input and returns its current state
s 2 S.
In the OVAL language, an OVAL definition representing a vulnerability v is actually a specific
machine state s 2 S where the involved properties pi 2 P are evaluated by OVAL tests. We
therefore consider the set of known vulnerability descriptions constituting our knowledge source
as V = {v1, v2, . . . , vm}. As each vulnerability vi 2 V can be specified as a logical formula, we
can describe the whole vulnerability dataset as a disjunction of formulas as follows:
  = v1 _ v2 . . . _ vm =
_
(vi) vi 2 V (8.1)
Considering this definition, we specify an evaluation function   : S ! Boolean that classifies
a system h 2 H as vulnerable under V if and only if the assessment of   over the state of h is
true, i.e.,  (state(h)) = true. From a logical point of view,   is a logical consequence of those
formulas constituting the state of the device h, i.e., state(h) |=  .
In order to remediate configuration vulnerabilities, corrective changes must be performed on
the target system. However, a change aimed at solving a specific vulnerability may introduce
or activate other vulnerabilities. If this effect is not properly managed, this process would still
expose the system to security threats. A system could be re-assessed after a change is made,
and undo such modification if other vulnerabilities arise. Nevertheless, this approach does not
take the big picture into account. Introduced vulnerabilities may also have potential fixes that
would lead the system into a secure state. In that context, we consider the available information
about known vulnerabilities and corrective tasks, as a whole. This potentially allows us to find a
sequence of changes or fixes such that the final machine state is secure. Even though intermediate
states in the sequence are vulnerable.
During the search of such sequence, changes could be applied on the target system and
immediately assessed in a backtracking fashion. However, the ability to project the consequences
of a vulnerability fix or change, i.e., how the affected part of the system will look after applying
such change, allows us to analyze change sequences without actually changing the target system.
This is one of the cornerstones of our approach. In order to formalize this concept, our remediation
model involves the following definitions:
⇧ C = {c1, c2, . . . } denotes the set of changes or corrective actions applicable over network
devices.
⇧ change : H ⇥C ! H ⌘ function that takes a device h 2 H as input and returns the same
device h after performing a change c 2 C that produces an observable change on its state.
The following property holds in the considered model: state(h) 6= state(change(h, c)),
8h 2 H, 8c 2 C.
⇧ future : C ! S ⌘ function that takes a change c 2 C as input and returns a state s 2 S
that projects the affected characteristics of a system after applying the change c.
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⇧ ⇧ : S⇥S ! S ⌘ function that takes a projected system state s1 2 S and a machine system
state s2 2 S as input and returns s2 updated with the properties of s1.
In order to analyze the impact of a change ci over a system h, the future and projection ⇧
functions are combined with the   formula to check present vulnerabilities as follows:
 (⇧(future(ci), state(h)) ci 2 C, h 2 H (8.2)
From a technical point of view, the future function can be intuitively understood as observing the
resulting state of a change over a rollback-capable system. However, this can be also achieved by
considering a specification mechanism for describing those system properties that will be modified
once the change is applied. Our approach considers both techniques, which are discussed in the
following sections. In light of these definitions, we define a sequence of changes ! as follows:
! = c1   c2   . . .   cn ci 2 C (8.3)
We say that ! constitutes a secure sequence of changes for a system h 2 H if and only if
 (!(h)) = false. Finding such a sequence for different system states and contexts constitutes
an NP-complete problem as explained in the following section.
Addressing complexity of change sequence analysis
Each time a single change is made to fix a specific vulnerability, some system properties
are naturally modified and therefore, the state for the next corrective change in the sequence is
modified. In that context, the order and the combination of distinct changes for each vulnerability
induce several different possible combinations. This issue falls into a family of problems called
NP-complete where no solution in polynomial time is known. In this section, we first present an
illustrative example that shows the exponential nature of finding a suitable change sequence !
and then we formalize our approach as a satisfiability (SAT) problem.
Let h 2 H be a target device where s 2 S constitutes its current state as follows: s =
state(h) = {p1, p2, p3, p4}, meaning that properties p1, p2, p3 and p4 are present on the system.
Let us also consider a vulnerability database V and a vulnerability fix database CV as follows:
V ⌘ {v1 = p1 ^ p2 ^ p3, v2 = (¬p1 _ ¬p2) ^ p4, v3 = ¬p1 ^ p3 ^ ¬p4} pi 2 P, vi 2 V (8.4)
CV ⌘ {c1a 7! ¬p1, c1b 7! ¬p2, c2 7! ¬p4} pi 2 P, ci 2 C (8.5)
This example is based on three real Cisco IOS vulnerabilities identified by CVE-2008-3812,
CVE-2008-3798 and CVE-2008-3821 respectively [111]. Within our model, properties are map-
ped to the following propositions:
⇧ p1 ⌘ IOS firewall is enabled.
⇧ p2 ⌘ Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) is enabled.
⇧ p3 ⌘ HTTP server is enabled.
⇧ p4 ⌘ SSL/TLS is enabled.
As explained before, vulnerabilities are represented as specific machine states that are specified
by logical formulas. For instance, vulnerability v1 requires p1, p2 and p3 to be active for the
vulnerability to be present. Within the set of available changes CV , c1a and c1b are alternatives
changes for fixing vulnerability v1 while c2 constitutes the only remediation action for vulnera-
bility v2. No fix action is available for vulnerability v3. In this scenario, it can be observed that
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Figure 8.2 – Change sequence search example
the vulnerability v1 is a semantic consequence of the properties present in the system, which are
compactly represented as s. This means that v1 is logically true under these hypothesis. This
fact is represented by a node labeled v1 in the graph illustrated in Figure 8.2. Beginning at this
node, a search for a secure change sequence is launched. Two alternative changes are available
for fixing the vulnerability v1. Change c1a deactivates the property p1, changing the system state
to s = {¬p1, p2, p3, p4}. Under these conditions, v2 becomes present in the system. However, a
fix for v2 exists so the change c2 is applied. Such modification brings the state of the system
to s = {¬p1, p2, p3,¬p4} activating the vulnerability v3. As no remediation action is available
for v3, this change sequence is considered as invalid. Backtracking to the beginning, fix c1b is
applied activating again the vulnerability v2. Once again, change c2 is applied but this time,
the combination of remediation actions leaves the system as s = {p1,¬p2, p3,¬p4} successfully
eradicating all vulnerabilities. It can be noticed from this example that a naive approach for
assessing all possible combinations cannot provide solutions in polynomial time.
This problem constitutes a decision problem that relies on changes being applied to ensure a
secure system state. In our model, we have a boolean expression   that indicates the vulnerable
nature of a system when it is evaluated as true. Considering  = ¬ , we can say that a target
system h is secure, or not vulnerable, when  is true. Our problem therefore consists of finding
such a propositional assignment that makes the  formula true. In computational complexity
theory, this is known as a satisfiability or SAT problem. Given the current state of a target
system,  can be instantiated and evaluated, and changes can be understood as actions that
can assign a specific value to the properties involved in the formula. Considering the proposed
example, the  formula states that none of the known vulnerabilities in V can occur:
 = ¬(p1 ^ p2 ^ p3) ^ ¬((¬p1 _ ¬p2) ^ p4) ^ ¬(¬p1 ^ p3 ^ ¬p4) (8.6)
Because we usually only know a small set of actions to remediate vulnerabilities, not every
property is likely to be changed. In that context, we need to find solutions for  respecting those
property values that are not changeable, i.e., there are no available actions for modifying their
states. This in turn reduces the search space. Within our example, property p3 is not changeable,
and therefore, it must take its current system value, true, giving the following expression:
 = p1 ^ ¬p2 ^ ¬p4 (8.7)
The solution in this case is trivial. It states that our target system can be classified as secure
only if those properties not matching the current state are changed, i.e., p2 and p4. Therefore,
changes c1b and c2 must be applied, deactivating or updating the DPI engine as well as the
SSL/TLS service. In the worst case, these changes could consist in deactivating or uninstalling
108
8.3. Remediating device-based vulnerabilities
the services themselves, nevertheless, the idea is that changes might generally patch or update
to newer versions that do not present the characteristics involved in the vulnerabilities. The
proposed example constitutes a simple scenario aimed at showing the insight of our general
approach. However, versions can also be modeled as properties, thus enriching the expressiveness
of our vulnerability descriptions and the accuracy of our solutions.
8.3.2 The X2CCDF specification language
We have designed the X2CCDF language, built on top of the XCCDF language [167], in order
to express the future state of target systems after applying vulnerability remediation actions. In
this section we present the core building blocks of X2CCDF and explain its use in the context
of change analysis.
Specifying corrective changes for remediating known vulnerabilities in such a way machines
can interpret them is crucial to achieve higher levels of security automation. The XCCDF lan-
guage provides great support for this point by allowing referenced vulnerability descriptions
expressed with the OVAL language and linking them to rules that can be applied to correct the
specified security weaknesses. Nevertheless, applying changes blindly, without actually analyzing
the impact of such changes, does not ensure a secure corrective process. In that context, we
introduce the idea of future or post-action states. Future states are intended to describe how the
system will look like after applying a specific change. They do not describe the entire system
but only the components affected by changes. In light of this and being designed for describing
computer machine states, the OVAL language suitably fits for representing future machine states.
Its interpretation however changes, i.e., in the general case, data is usually collected and compa-
red against OVAL vulnerability descriptions. Within our approach, collected data is mixed with
OVAL-based future states descriptions and compared against OVAL vulnerability descriptions.
The ability to express this concept in a machine-readable manner provides new capabilities
for analyzing different ways of modifying and correcting computer systems without actually
changing them. The main objective in describing future states within X2CCDF is to complement
management protocols such as NETCONF [63] by allowing the projection of changes using the
current system state combined with future states of known remediation actions. While XCCDF
provides means for specifying remediation actions when specific states are detected, X2CCDF
extends its capabilities by specifying also the consequences of such actions when performed by
means of the OVAL language.
Listing 8.1 presents an illustrative example where X2CCDF is used for specifying the two
alternative actions for vulnerability v1 as described in Section 8.3.1. For the sake of clarity, we
have omitted some XCCDF components that should be present in valid instances. Within this
example, only one XCCDF group of management rules is defined (lines 3-5). The only referenced
rule v1-treatment is declared below (lines 6-14). X2CCDF extends XCCDF by considering a new
building block named complex-Rule under the x2ccdf namespace. This extension, permits the
specification of a boolean expression involving alternative actions (lines 10-13) that can change
different properties of a specific vulnerability (lines 7-9). Corrective changes from the model,
c1a (lines 15-20) and c1b (lines 21-26), are described using standard XCCDF rules. However,
the semantics of these rules express the future or post-action state of each change. While the
particular actions to perform are specified inside the fix tag (lines 16 and 22 respectively), the
check tag under the x2ccdf namespace serves as a semantic indicator for automated interpreters.
It is a common practice to use scripts in XCCDF. It should be noticed that the example in
Section 8.3.1 only deals with atomic changes and that is why the OR operator appears in Lis-
ting 8.1. However, the logical composition of changes constitutes an important issue to address
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1 . <cdf:Benchmark id="X2CCDF test 1" xmlns :x2ccdf=" . . . " xmlns :cd f=" . . . " . . .>
2 . <c d f : t i t l e> X2CCDF example </ c d f : t i t l e>
3 . <cdf:Group id="vulnerability treatment with future state" s e l e c t e d="1">
4. <c d f : r e q u i r e s i d r e f="v1 treatment"/>
5 . </ cdf:Group>
6 . <x2ccdf :complex Rule id="v1 treatment" s e l e c t e d="1" check="1">
7. <x2ccd f : check system="http://oval .mitre . org/XMLSchema/oval">
8. <x2ccdf : check content r e f h r e f="iosDefns .xml" name="oval:mitre:def:5302"/>
9 . </ x2ccd f : check>
10 . <x 2 c c d f : c r i t e r i a operator="OR">
11 . <x 2 c c d f : c r i t e r i o n i d r e f="v1 f ix 1a" check="1"/>
12 . <x 2 c c d f : c r i t e r i o n i d r e f="v1 f ix 1b" check="1"/>
13 . </ x 2 c c d f : c r i t e r i a>
14 . </x2ccdf :complex Rule>
15 . <cd f :Ru l e id="v1 f ix 1a" s e l e c t e d="1">
16 . <c d f : f i x> ./ d i s a b l eF i r ewa l l . sh </ c d f : f i x>
17 . <x2ccd f : check system="http://oval .mitre . org/XMLSchema/oval">
18 . <x2ccd f : f u tu r e content r e f h r e f="iosFuture .xml" name="x2ccdf : inr ia :def :1"/>
19 . </ x2ccd f : check>
20 . </ cd f :Ru l e>
21 . <cd f :Ru l e id="v1 f ix 1b" s e l e c t e d="1">
22 . <c d f : f i x> ./ disableDPIEngine . sh </ c d f : f i x>
23 . <x2ccd f : check system="http://oval .mitre . org/XMLSchema/oval">
24 . <x2ccd f : f u tu r e content r e f h r e f="iosFuture .xml" name="x2ccdf : inr ia :def :2"/>
25 . </ x2ccd f : check>
26 . </ cd f :Ru l e>
27 . </cdf:Benchmark>
Listing 8.1 – X2CCDF example
that X2CCDF already supports using the AND, OR and NOT operators. This point has been
already scheduled for future work.
In order to describe future or post-action states, we also use the OVAL language. However,
its interpretation is different since we are comparing OVAL states against OVAL states, and
not specific collected information (OVAL system characteristics) against OVAL states. The main
idea is as follows. Each change is represented as a pair of OVAL object and OVAL state. The
OVAL object represents the component over which the specific change is applied. The OVAL
state represents the characteristics the object will present after applying this specific change.
Finally, the impact of a change can be analyzed by looking for vulnerabilities which involve
OVAL tests using the same OVAL object as the specified change. Affected OVAL tests are
evaluated by comparing their OVAL states against the future OVAL-based state involved in the
change. Other OVAL tests involved in the affected vulnerabilities are evaluated following the
standard process, i.e., OVAL system characteristics against OVAL states.
While specifying the modifications that a change will have on a target system, the attributes
inside an OVAL state are used to express the characteristics that the OVAL object will present.
For instance, if a change is designed to change the version of a Cisco IOS system, the OVAL
object will be the version_object while the version_state will contain the new version value, e.g.,
12.4. Comparing instances of OVAL simple datatypes, such as integers and booleans, does not
present difficulties. This can be done in the same way OVAL characteristics are compared against
OVAL states. However, in future states, regular expressions can be utilized for specifying certain
values inside information blocks that are a priori unknown. An example of this could be to look
for a particular configuration line inside the running configuration file of a Cisco device. In that
case, we need to potentially compare a regular expression against another regular expressions
within OVAL states. According to the principles established in automata theory, the intersection
of two regular languages e1 and e2 is a regular language e3 [78]. Therefore, we can compute
whether e1 ✓ e2 by verifying if e1 = e1 \ e2. By operating over these regular expressions, we can
say if a projected state might match the expressions present in the vulnerability descriptions.
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Within our experiments, we have used the Greenery tool to support these operations on regular
expressions [76].
8.3.3 Extended framework for remediating device-based vulnerabilities
In order to assess and remediate device-based vulnerabilities over computer systems, we pro-
pose an autonomous framework called VMANS which is presented in this section. We explain its
architecture as well as the underlying strategy in charge of orchestrating the overall vulnerability
management process.
Architecture overview
The proposed architecture, illustrated in Figure 8.3, comprises two independent processes,
namely, one process for maintaining logical representations of OVAL vulnerabilities descriptions
up-to-date, and a second process for performing vulnerability management activities. The first
process is in charge of monitoring the OVAL vulnerability descriptions database (step I) and
converting new vulnerability descriptions into equivalent boolean expressions when they become
available (step II). Independently, a second process is in charge of dealing with vulnerabilities,
which is orchestrated by the vulnerability manager component. At step 1, it communicates with
the OVAL analyzer in order to launch the assessment process. The analyzer consumes OVAL
vulnerability descriptions from the repository at step 2 and collects the required data from those
devices under control at step 3. Once the assessment is performed, the analyzer sends the results
back to the vulnerability manager. If the system is found to be vulnerable, the vulnerability
manager analyzes the available remediation descriptions at step 4 and correlates them with the
properties that can be changed in the target system. Considering the current system state and
the available changeable properties, the SAT solver engine is used at step 5 to decide which
changes must be applied in order to secure the system. At step 6, the SAT solver uses a logical
Figure 8.3 – VMANS high-level architecture
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representation  , such as the one illustrated in Eq. 8.7, specifying that none of the vulnerabilities
can occur. A solution provided by the SAT solver indicates which properties must be changed
in the system to present a secure state. The vulnerability manager interprets this information
and sends specific directives to the NETCONF-based change manager subsystem at step 7 in
order to effectuate these changes. At step 8, the NETCONF protocol is used to communicate
and perform the specified changes on the target system. Finally, the obtained results are sent to
the reporting system at step 9.
Vulnerability management strategy
In order to autonomously deal with vulnerabilities, the proposed strategy illustrated in
Figure 8.4 is a closed control loop where three classes of events may potentially trigger vul-
nerability management activities. These activities can happen when new vulnerability or reme-
diation descriptions become available and when the system presents changes that may com-
promise its security. In that context, an event monitoring component is in charge of observing
these events and triggering the vulnerability management process when required. Once this pro-
cess has been launched, vulnerabilities affected by the event that has triggered the process are
computed (step 1). Depending on the case, these vulnerabilities can be recently added vulne-
rability descriptions, or vulnerabilities referenced by new remediation descriptions, or known
vulnerabilities involving components that have been changed on the target system. Afterwards,
Figure 8.4 – VMANS control loop
112
8.3. Remediating device-based vulnerabilities
these vulnerability descriptions are evaluated on the system (steps 2-4). If the system is not
found to be vulnerable, the process ends and returns to the initial monitoring state. If it is
vulnerable, then available remediation descriptions are consumed (step 5). If no remediation is
available for treating the security issues, then a system warning is produced (step 6) and an
analysis report is created and stored (step 7) ending the process and returning to the initial
state. Otherwise, remediation descriptions are analyzed (step 8). In the case every remediation
description provides a specification of the future state after applying the involved changes, the
process continues with the change selection process (step 9). Considering the current properties
present in the target system and the properties that can potentially change by applying the
available vulnerability treatments, a SAT solver is used to provide a logical assignment of every
property related to any vulnerability to ensure a secure system state. Once the changes have
been identified, they are applied within a NETCONF session (steps 10-13) and an analysis re-
port is generated (step 7) going back to the initial state. When a remediation description does
not specify a future state, its impact is empirically evaluated by applying the involved changes
on a candidate state of the target system (steps 14-19). To do so, the candidate state feature
included in the NETCONF specification is considered. For each remediation description under
these circumstances, involved changes are applied (step 17), modified properties are collected and
stored (step 18) and finally modifications are rolled back (step 19). When the loop is finished,
the NETCONF session is closed (step 20) and the process continues normally with the change
selection stage (step 9) as described before.
8.3.4 Performance evaluation
In order to evaluate the proposed approach, we have developed an implementation prototype
able to perform the main activities shown in the VMANS framework. We have also performed a
deep behavioral analysis using the Cisco IOS platform as a case study. In this section we illustrate
the performed experiments and the obtained results. The model of Cisco routers used is c3725
with IOS version 12.4. This model implements a subset of NETCONF operations that permits the
execution of basic configuration management activities. Cisco routers have been emulated using
GNS3 [75] over a regular laptop (2 Ghz Intel Core i7 with 8GB RAM). The OVAL analyzer is an
extension of XOvaldi [26] for Cisco IOS. OVAL vulnerability descriptions have been taken from
the public OVAL repository [117]. We have used the SAT solver engine provided by the Aima
project [6]. Operations between regular expressions for analyzing future states are performed with
the Greenery tool [76]. We have used and slightly modified the Netconf4J project library [107]
to communicate with Cisco routers via NETCONF.
In order to analyze the scalability of our framework, we have performed several experiments
involving vulnerability representations as boolean expressions, SAT solving analysis time and
behavioral aspects of the NETCONF protocol over Cisco. Our first experiment, illustrated in
Figure 8.5, shows the behavior of VMANS while dealing with vulnerability logical represen-
tations. In the general case, SAT solvers consume boolean expressions in conjunctive normal
form (CNF). If the input formula is not in CNF, SAT solvers transform it internally. In that
context, we have measured the time required to load standard logical representations into me-
mory (red solid line) as well as their transformation to CNF (blue dashed line). We have repeated
this measurement while varying the amount of vulnerability descriptions. When all the OVAL
descriptions for IOS are considered (around 140), their representations are loaded in 53 millise-
conds while their transformation to CNF takes 7.5 seconds approximately. We have observed a
stable behavior for both activities in the general case as shown by the first derivatives depicted
in the inner graph of the figure.
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Figure 8.5 – Vulnerability conversion statistics
One of the critical points in the vulnerability remediation process is the change selection
activity. We have analyzed the SAT solving time for different scenarios as shown in Figure 8.6.
We have evaluated the same system with one, three, five and ten active vulnerabilities each
time, while varying the amount of vulnerability descriptions in the database. In addition, a set
of available changes has been provided to the framework to detect which corrective actions must
be performed. In all cases, we have observed a linear behavior as illustrated in the inner graph
of the figure, taking around 2 seconds in average to provide the answers for the whole dataset.
Often, the SAT solving time depends on the nature of the equations being solved. The observed
behavior is partially supported by the fact that the sets of properties (OVAL tests) involved in
the IOS vulnerability descriptions are mostly disjoint. Thus, the SAT process is faster because
each part of the formula does not impact on the other clauses. In addition, we have observed
two interesting phenomena. The first one is that the SAT solving time (around 2 seconds), which
includes a CNF transformation process, is faster than the CNF transformation time depicted in
Figure 8.5 (around 7.5 seconds). After investigating this behavior, we have realized that only
changeable properties participate actively in the SAT solving process. The remaining properties
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Figure 8.6 – SAT solving analysis time for change detection
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Figure 8.7 – NETCONF-Cisco statistics
transformation faster. The second phenomenon is that the curve depicting the system with ten
present vulnerabilities (violet dashed lines with rounded points) has lower values that the one
with five vulnerabilities (red dashed line with square points). Sometimes, more available changes
facilitates the search of the SAT solver though this fact also leaves more free assignable variables
increasing the search space. Even though this depends on the mechanisms used by the SAT
solver, the general behavior for remediating IOS vulnerabilities has been observed to be linearly
stable.
Finally, we also have measured the time required to query and perform atomic changes over
Cisco IOS via NETCONF. A complete NETCONF session for getting the current configuration
in our scenario, including network delays, takes around 2 seconds in average (blue dashed line).
NETCONF also allows us to perform a set of various changes in one single session. We have varied
the size of this change set from 1 to 300 as shown in Figure 8.7 (red bars). We have observed
that the time grows linearly, as shown in the inner graph, and that it only requires about 2.5
seconds for performing 300 changes. Considering the overall behavior, these sets of experiments
have shown the scalability of the proposed strategy in our context, in terms of representation
conversion time, SAT solving time and NETCONF performance.
8.4 Towards the remediation of distributed vulnerabilities
In the previous section we have presented an approach for individually remediating vulnera-
bilities in network devices. However, there also exist situations in which security issues become
visible when an upper view of the network is taken. This global perspective may show network
weaknesses that otherwise could not be detected. In that context, the purpose of describing
and detecting distributed vulnerabilities is to provide support for increasing network security
awareness as a whole. In Chapter 5 we have presented the conceptualization of distributed vul-
nerabilities as well as a mathematical modeling and a framework for detecting them. In this
section, we present an approach for supporting the remediation of distributed vulnerabilities.
We put forward a mathematical model that formally supports the remediation activity, as well
as a language for expressing remediation tasks. Finally, we propose an extension to the frame-
work presented in Chapter 5 for remediating distributed vulnerabilities, and perform different
experiments to analyze the feasibility of our solution.
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8.4.1 Modeling vulnerability treatments
In this section we formalize configuration vulnerability treatments by extending and enhan-
cing our previous mathematical presented in Chapter 5. A distributed vulnerability is defined as
a set of conditions over two or more network devices that if observed simultaneously, a potential
threat is present on that network. It is important to remark that the required conditions to be ob-
served over a specific device do not necessarily constitutes a complete device-based vulnerability
description.
Specifying distributed treatments
As explained in Chapter 5, a distributed vulnerability is mathematically defined as a com-
pliant projection of the pattern (PH , PR) over the network (H,R) that makes true the predicate
defined in Equation 5.1. As a reminder, the predicate is defined as follows:
DV (H,R) ⌘ 9(h1, ..., hn) (s1(h1) ^ ... ^ sn(hn) ^ r1(hi, ..., hj) ^ ... ^ rv(hk, ..., hl))
We recall that this predicate expresses the evaluation of a distributed vulnerability DV based
on the pattern (PH , PR) over a generic network (H,R). Based on this modeling, we consider
a distributed treatment DT as a body of tasks performed over a set of network devices that
introduces configuration changes in order to eliminate the security weakness described by a
specific distributed vulnerability DV . In order to formally define what a distributed treatment
is, we extend the description model explained in Chapter 5 by defining the following domains:
⇧ A = {a1, a2, . . . } denotes the set of actions applicable over network devices.
⇧ T = {t1, t2, . . . } denotes the set of tasks applicable over network devices. A task ti is a
logical combination of actions and its logical value is computed based on the successful
application of each action. The set T is inductively defined as follows:
i if ai 2 A, then ai 2 T (i 2 N)
ii if ↵,  2 T , then (↵ ⇧  ) 2 T ⇧ 2 {^,_}
In order to define the application of remediation tasks over the network, we specify the
following set of core functions:
⇧ stateH : H ! S ⌘ function that takes a device h 2 H as input and returns its current
state s 2 S.
⇧ stateR : R! 2S ⌘ function that takes a network relationship r 2 R as input and returns a
set with the current state si 2 S of each involved network device hi 2 H in the relationship.
⇧ action : H ⇥ A! H ⌘ function that takes a device h 2 H as input and returns the same
device h after performing an action a 2 A.
⇧ taskH : H ⇥ T ! H ⌘ function that takes a device h 2 H as input and returns the same
device h after performing a task t 2 T that produces an observable change on its state.
This means that at least one action ai 2 A must introduce a change that cannot be rolled
back by any other action in the task nor a combination of them. The following property
holds in the considered model: stateH(h) 6= stateH(taskH(h, t)), 8t 2 T, 8h 2 H.
⇧ taskR : R ⇥ T ! R ⌘ function that takes a network relationship r 2 R as input and
returns the same network relationship r after performing a task t 2 T over its member
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devices. Based on the definition of T, is can be noticed that the task t will produce an
observable change on its state and that the following property also holds: stateR(r) 6=
stateR(taskR(r, t)), 8t 2 T, 8r 2 R.
⇧ TH = {tH1 , ..., THn } denotes the body of available tasks for performing over network devices
where each task tHi is semantically related to a specific state si. Usually, the following
equation can hold |TH | < |PH |, meaning that treatment tasks are not always available for
correcting certain device states.
⇧ TR = {tR1 , ..., tRv } denotes the body of available tasks for performing over network rela-
tionships where each task tRi is semantically related to a specific relationship ri. Usually,
the following equation can hold |TR| < |PR|, meaning that treatment tasks are not always
available for correcting certain network relationships.
We therefore define a distributed treatment DT as the compliant application of (TH , TR) over
the network (H,R) that eliminates every possible matching projection of the pattern (PH , PR)
over (H,R). Under a logical perspective, DT (H,R) is defined as the disjunction of task applica-
tions ⇧(TH , TR) over each potential combination of devices and network relationships (H 0, R0)
performing the roles required by the distributed vulnerability DV as follows:
DT (H,R) = taskH(h1, t
H
1 ) _ . . . _ taskH(hn, tHn ) _ taskR(r1, tR1 ) _ . . . _ taskR(rv, tRv )
8H 0 = {h1, ..., hn} ✓ H,R0 = {r1, ..., rv} ✓ R, such that DV (H 0, R0) holds.
(8.8)
Changes done for correcting different instances (H 0, R0) of the distributed vulnerability must
not shadow those remediation actions performed for any other observed vulnerable instances of
DV . Therefore, ¬DV (H,R) must hold after the DT application. In the next section, we present
an XML-based language able to capture these mathematical constructions.
8.4.2 DXCCDF, a distributed vulnerability remediation language
We have conceived the DXCCDF language, built on top of XCCDF, as a means for ex-
pressing vulnerability treatments in a machine-readable manner. XCCDF rules allow to specify
remediation information that can be used by automated systems to perform corrective actions
when specific states are detected. These states can be specified by languages such as OVAL and
DOVAL. DXCCDF extends XCCDF by considering a new building block named complex-Rule
under the dxccdf namespace. This extension provides the ability to specify a boolean expression
involving all the potential tasks that can be performed for remediating a specific machine state.
Figure 8.8 depicts the mapping between the main components involved in the mathematical
model and their representatives constructs within the DXCCDF language. An action ai can be
The model and the DXCCDF language
Model block Insight Applies to Expressed with
Action ai chmod 644 Property pi XCCDF rule
passwd
Task ti a1 _ State si DXCCDF complex
(a2 ^ a3) rule
Distributed t1 _ t2 _ . . . Distributed DXCCDF complex
treatment DT _ tk _ . . . vulnerability rule
Distributed {DT1, DT2, {DV1, DV2, XCCDF group of
treatments . . . } . . . } complex rules
Figure 8.8 – Mapping the model into the DXCCDF language
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understood as a simple operation, i.e. a shell command, that is performed for changing a system
property pi. This property can be checked and remediated using an XCCDF rule. A task ti is a
combination of actions in the form of a boolean expression intended to correct a specific state
si. Tasks are represented by means of DXCCDF complex rules. A distributed treatment DT is
also represented using DXCCDF complex rules and they are finally put together into XCCDF
groups.
We now put forward an illustrative DXCCDF example illustrated in Listing 8.2 where a
distributed treatment is specified in order to provide directives for remediating the distribu-
ted vulnerability previously depicted in Figure 8.1. For the sake of clarity, we have omitted
some XCCDF components that should be present in valid instances. Within this document, the
group for vulnerability treatments is selected for evaluation containing only one treatment. The
construct DXCCDF complex rule represents the distributed treatment itself. A DXCCDF com-
plex rule allows to refer a check system for assessing the distributed vulnerability under analysis
by means of a DOVAL reference, and also to specify a logical criterion involving both XCCDF
rules and DXCCDF complex rules. In the proposed scenario there exist two involved roles, the
SIP server and the DNS server. Within the DXCCDF example, one remediation task has been
defined for each role, namely, TSIP and TDNS . The task TSIP is in turn a non-atomic task since
two corrective tasks, namely, TSIPyum and TSIPweb , can be alternatively performed. Thus, the distri-
buted treatment expressed by the DXCCDF complex rule corresponds to the logical expression
(TSIPyum _TSIPweb _TDNS) where each one of the referenced standard XCCDF rules are defined in the
<cdf:Benchmark id="sip dos test 1" xmlns :dxccdf=" . . . " xmlns :cd f=" . . . " . . .>
<c d f : t i t l e> DXCCDF example </ c d f : t i t l e>
<cdf:Group id="vulnerability treatments" s e l e c t e d="1">
<cd f : r e q u i r e s i d r e f="dv1 treatment"/>
</cdf:Group>
<dxccdf :complex Rule id="dv1 treatment" s e l e c t e d="1" check="1">
<dxccd f : check system="http://doval . inria . fr/XMLSchema/doval">
<dxccdf :check content r e f h r e f="dvDefns .xml" name="doval : inr ia :def :1"/>
</ dxccd f : check>
<d x c c d f : c r i t e r i a operator="OR">
<d x c c d f : c r i t e r i a operator="OR">
<dx c c d f : c r i t e r i o n i d r e f="flooding protection yum" check="0"/>
<dx c c d f : c r i t e r i o n i d r e f="flooding protection custom" check="0"/>
</ d x c c d f : c r i t e r i a>
<dx c c d f : c r i t e r i o n i d r e f="stop bind daemon" check="0"/>
</ d x c c d f : c r i t e r i a>
</dxccdf :complex Rule>
<cd f :Ru l e id="flooding protection yum" s e l e c t e d="1">
<c d f : f i x> yum i n s t a l l a s t e r i s k  s ip dos patch </ c d f : f i x>
<cd f : che ck system="http://oval .mitre . org/XMLSchema/oval">
<cdf : check content r e f h r e f="sipDefns .xml" name="oval:mitre:def:1002"/>
</ cd f : che ck>
</ cd f :Ru l e>
<cd f :Ru l e id="flooding protection custom" s e l e c t e d="1">
<c d f : f i x>
wget h t tp : // doval . i n r i a . f r / f i x e s / s i p / a s t e r i s k  s ip dos patch r0 . 2 . rpm
rpm  Uvh a s t e r i s k  s ip dos patch r0 . 2 . rpm
</ c d f : f i x>
<cd f : che ck system="http://oval .mitre . org/XMLSchema/oval">
<cdf : check content r e f h r e f="sipDefns .xml" name="oval:mitre:def:1002"/>
</ cd f : che ck>
</ cd f :Ru l e>
<cd f :Ru l e id="stop bind daemon" s e l e c t e d="1">
<c d f : f i x> s e r v i c e named stop </ c d f : f i x>
<cd f : che ck system="http://oval .mitre . org/XMLSchema/oval">
<cdf : check content r e f h r e f="unixDefns .xml" name="oval:mitre:def:2000"/>
</ cd f : che ck>
</ cd f :Ru l e>
</cdf:Benchmark>
Listing 8.2 – DXCCDF vulnerability treatment
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final part of the document. These XCCDF rules define the actual corrective actions to perform
over the involved devices and they are orchestrated by the DXCCDF complex rule in order to
remediate the specific distributed vulnerability.
8.4.3 A strategy for collaboratively treating distributed vulnerabilities
The DXCCDF language provides the capability of describing remediation activities that can
be consumed by autonomic entities in order to secure the environment. In this section we propose
a framework for supporting collaborative treatments specified in DXCCDF considering the main
building blocks of our previous DOVAL-based assessment framework presented in Chapter 5.
Architecture overview
In order to remediate a distributed vulnerability several tasks may be performed on different
devices. At the moment of the analysis however, some of the involved devices may present par-
ticular states that do not allow them or make it more expensive to perform specific corrective
actions than other involved devices. Factors such as availability, capability, or even policy consis-
tency must be considered during the remediation process. We refer to this spectrum of factors as
Figure 8.9 – Collaborative treatment - High level operation
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the cost of the node for performing a corrective task. Potential mechanisms for actually compu-
ting task costs are beyond the scope of this work and they may involve several activities such as
risk assessment and change management techniques. The main process for detecting and reme-
diating distributed vulnerabilities considers these costs as illustrated in Figure 8.9. Repositories
of vulnerability descriptions as well as treatments specifications are available constituting the
knowledge source of the network. At Step 1, a vulnerability description is consumed and assessed
over the network as explained in Section 5.3. If there is one or more pattern matching instances
over the network, a treatment analysis is launched at Step 2.1 and its corresponding distributed
treatment is consumed from the treatments repository at Step 2.2. Based on the available tasks
for correcting the security vulnerability, devices are analyzed across the network in order to find
a node for performing a remediation task. Once the treatment execution has been done and the
network has been secured at Step 3, a treatment report is generated at Step 4 involving the vul-
nerability description, the treatment description used for remediating the vulnerability as well as
the information gathered from the network in order to perform the corrective activity. Generated
reports are stored in a historical database providing the ability to consider past experiences in
future treatments.
Assessment and treatment strategies
We consider in our approach that treatment descriptions may be available later in time after
vulnerabilities have been discovered. In light of this, we put forward a treatment strategy that
can be applied after performing assessment activities and that can also be integrated to the
assessment process if treatments are available at that time.
In order to present the proposed treatment strategy, we introduce a situation where the dis-
Figure 8.10 – Vulnerability treatment scenario
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tributed vulnerability described in Figure 8.1 is present in the form of many instances. Within
the example illustrated in Figure 8.10, a network with a Cfengine server and five devices is
considered. Devices h1, h2 and h3 are involved in the instances of the distributed vulnerability
described by a DOVAL document. Once the assessment has been performed at Step 1, a DO-
VAL report identifying detected vulnerability instances is generated. In order to collect required
information, a spanning tree is generated at Step 2 by means of Cfengine’s functionalities [30]
as shown in Section 5.3. The Cfengine server traverses the network starting at the root of the
spanning tree where each node will inform on how it can collaborate in the corrective tasks and
at what cost, as depicted in Algorithm 8.1 that we explain later. At Step 3, a report is generated
including the cost of each node for correcting the roles that each one is performing. Based on
this information, the Cfengine server selects a node for applying corrective actions at Step 4 and
a report indicating the results of the remediation activity is generated.
Input: TreeNode h, DOVAL document dv, DXCCDF document dt, CostTable ct.
Output: Table with costs for each node on each role.
1 if currentNode h is alive then
2 roleList  findRolesForDevice(h, dv);
3 foreach role s 2 roleList do
4 taskList  findTasksForRole(s, dt);
5 foreach task t 2 taskList do
6 cost  queryNodeForTaskCost(h, t);
7 updateCostTable(ct, h, s, cost);
8 end
9 end
10 gatherTasksCosts(leftTreeNode(h), dv, dt, ct);
11 gatherTasksCosts(rigthTreeNode(h), dv, dt, ct);
12 end
Algorithm 8.1: gatherTasksCosts (recursive)
In the proposed approach, a spanning tree is built in order to explore the network. Algo-
rithm 8.1 presents the activity performed at each active node of the tree (line 1) for gathering
and analyzing devices information. Each node h reads the list of roles involved in the vulne-
rability instances given in the DOVAL document dv, identifies itself in the list (lines 2-3), and
for each task t found in the DXCCDF document dt applicable on each specific role s that h
plays (lines 4-5), the task cost is computed by the node itself and attached to the general cost
table ct (lines 6-7). The traversal continues on the left and right sub-trees (lines 10-11) until
the whole spanning tree has been explored. This strategy can be easily integrated if treatments
are available during the assessment process. By computing task costs at the same time network
devices are evaluated looking for specific states, the Cfengine server will have all the required
information for deciding which nodes will execute remediation tasks. Already scheduled as future
work, a decentralized distributed strategy would allow any agent to start a vulnerability treat-
ment though distributed algorithms such as leader election algorithms [73], [34], are necessary
for deciding which node will execute corrective tasks.
8.4.4 Performance evaluation
Within the proposed framework, the complexity of the process is dominated by the number
of nodes in the network and Algorithm 8.1 is O(n). This means that the treatment process can be
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coupled with the assessment process without increasing its growth rate. Given a distributed vul-
nerability, the total assessment time under both a sequential (TAS ) and a parallel (TAP ) approach
has been mathematically defined in Section 5.4. In order to evaluate the whole time process
involving assessment and treatment activities (A + T ), we have extended these definitions by
considering two additional parameters, namely,   that denotes the average number of available
tasks for each role sj , and w denoting the average time for computing the cost of a single task.
The new equations are defined as follows:
TA+TS = T
A
S + (n ⇤ k ⇤ P (A) ⇤   ⇤ w) (8.9)
TA+TPw = T
A
Pw + (k ⇤   ⇤ w) (8.10)
Using a sequential approach (TA+TS ), the total time is given by the time required for assessing
the distributed vulnerability plus the time needed for each node (n nodes in the network) to assess
its k potential roles. The probability for a node to play a certain role sj is expressed by P (A).
For those roles present in the node, the number of tasks   multiplied by the average time each
task takes w is considered. Under a parallel approach (TA+TPw ) and considering the worst case,
the total time is given by the time required for assessing the distributed vulnerability in the
worst case plus the time needed for a node to compute the cost of every available task (  tasks)
for every role sj considering an average time w for each task. In order to prove the scalability
of the proposed approach, we have performed several analytical experiments that combine the
assessment and treatment processes at the same time as shown in Figure 8.11. Both solid blue
lines with rounded and triangular points represent the time growth when the number of network
devices is increased and only the assessment process is performed under a sequential (TS(A)) and
a parallel (TPw(A)) approach. Dashed red lines show the time behavior when assessment and
treatment activities are performed at the same time (A+T ). TS(A+T ) illustrated by the dashed
red line with rounded points shows the same growth rate than TS(A). The same phenomenon can
be observed when a parallel approach is taken as depicted by TPw(A) and TPw(A+ T ). Within
our experiments we have overvalued the parameter w in order to obtain a visible distance between
curves and be able to notice the same growth behavior. First derivatives drawn in the inner graph
confirms the same growth rates for both sequential (green solid line) and parallel (green dashed
line) approaches, considering only the assessment (A), and both the assessment plus treatment
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Figure 8.11 – Time statistics for vulnerability assessment and treatment activities
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In order to perform treatment activities for distributed vulnerabilities, a technical and de-
ployable infrastructure is required. Indeed, a system capable of interpreting OVAL and DOVAL
vulnerability descriptions would be necessary for assessing vulnerabilities, while an interpreter
of XCCDF and DXCCDF treatment descriptions would be required to perform corrective ac-
tions. We have already developed Ovalyzer, an OVAL to Cfengine translator. Although this
has not been done yet, Ovalyzer could be extended so as to cover DOVAL documents as well.
XCCDF and DXCCDF are XML-based languages, so the approach used for prototyping XML-
based interpreters could be reused for these languages too. In particular, we have used the JAXB
framework [89] for managing XML related issues as explained in detail in Part III. JAXB enables
our system to seamlessly evolve with new versions of vulnerability and remediation description
languages by automatically regenerating its internal data model. In that context, we would be
able to develop new extended tools for consuming XCCDF and DXCCDF treatment descriptions
and producing the appropriate assessment and corrective Cfengine policy rules.
8.5 Synthesis
The constant evolution of computer and network systems dramatically increases the ma-
nagement of these infrastructures and the services they offer. The vulnerability management
process constitutes a key activity in that context for ensuring safe configurations and preventing
security attacks. In this chapter, we have presented two complimentary approaches for comple-
ting the vulnerability management lifecycle in both device-based and distributed scenarios. To
do so, we leverage the use and integration of standard description languages into self-governed
environments. In order to tackle device-based vulnerabilities, we have proposed a SAT-based au-
tonomous strategy which is able to successfully identify, and apply by means of the NETCONF
protocol, required changes to eradicate known vulnerabilities. We have also gone one step further
and proposed a collaborative approach for integrating distributed remediation descriptions into
the autonomic management plane. Our approach involves a mathematical model and a novel
description language for specifying distributed vulnerability treatments. In addition, we have
proposed a Cfengine-based framework that provides a robust foundation for its technical implan-
tation. For both approaches, we have conducted several experiments whose results validate the
feasibility and scalability of our solutions.
Overall speaking, treating and remediating vulnerabilities opens a wide spectrum of challenges
that must be addressed in order to fully integrate the vulnerability management process into au-
tonomic networks and systems. Our SAT-based approach only considers remediation actions as
atomic changes that can be embedded within a SAT problem. However, some corrective activities
may consider several changes at once. Therefore, SAT solving techniques and sophisticated me-
chanisms for considering interactions, coherence and consistency, must be further investigated.
These solutions should be also integrated in distributed scenarios. In addition, protocols able
to manage changes in a try-rollback manner such as NETCONF are not yet widely deployed
and standardized. Even though some equipments implement NETCONF agents such as some
versions of Cisco IOS, most of them do not cover the complete specification. Cisco IOS and other
platforms must be investigated deeper to further validate our approach. In the context of distri-
buted vulnerabilities, our approach still requires metrics for quantifying the costs of corrective
remediation tasks with respect to device capacities, service dependencies and policy consistency.
Finally, centralized approaches may generate bottleneck issues, implying poor performance in
certain situations. Therefore, decentralized management strategies able to balance the work-
load in the network must be investigated as well. In the next section, we describe in detail our
implementation prototypes where these and other technical issues are deeply discussed.
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9.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, we have presented several approaches for addressing autonomic vul-
nerability management in different contexts. In order to evaluate the viability and feasibility of
these approaches, we have developed various implementation prototypes that allowed us to expe-
riment our concepts. In this chapter, we present three prototypes with which we have conducted
our experiments in different themes, namely, autonomous vulnerability awareness, detection of
past security exposures, and mobile security assessment.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 9.2 details Ovalyzer, an OVAL
to Cfengine translator, able to integrate OVAL vulnerability descriptions into the autonomic ma-
nagement plane, by automatically generating Cfengine policies that represent them. Section 9.3
presents an extension to device-based vulnerability assessment by also considering past hidden
vulnerable states. Section 9.4 describes the internals of Ovaldroid, a vulnerability assessment
framework for mobile environments, particularly focused on the Android platform. Section 9.5
concludes this chapter and discusses further work.
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9.2 Autonomic vulnerability assessment with Ovalyzer
In Chapter 4 we have presented an approach for increasing the vulnerability awareness of
autonomic networks and systems. Our approach aims at analyzing and integrating OVAL vulne-
rability descriptions into the management plane of self-governing environments. To that end, we
have developed Ovalyzer, an OVAL to Cfengine translator, capable of automatically generating
Cfengine policies that represent OVAL security advisories about known vulnerabilities. In that
manner, Cfengine agents can autonomously assess their own security exposure. Ovalyzer takes
up the role of the translation module depicted in Figure 4.3 within Section 4.3.1. In this section,
we present the implementation details of Ovalyzer and put forward an insightful example which
shows how the translation between OVAL and Cfengine is made, and the obtained results.
9.2.1 Implementation prototype
The main objective of Ovalyzer is to support the translation of OVAL documents to Cfengine
policy rules that represent them. The translator takes as input the content of OVAL documents
and produces Cfengine code that is structured as Cfengine policy files. These policies can be later
consumed by a Cfengine running instance. Figure 9.1 describes Ovalyzer’s main components and
the high-level interaction between them.
At step 1, an OVAL document is consumed as the input of the translator. An OVAL pre-
processor is in charge of parsing the content of the specification, adjusting configuration aspects,
and feeding the OVAL analyzer module with a memory representation of the specified input at
step 2. The OVAL analyzer module is the component that orchestrates the translation flow and
provides the required directives for generating Cfengine code at step 3.i. Several calls are made
by the OVAL analyzer module to the Cfengine policy writer depending on the content of the
OVAL document. The Cfengine policy writer is in charge of generating the main Cfengine policy
entries at step 4.1. In addition, it delegates at step 4.2, the generation of specific platform rules
to plugins specifically designed for this type of Cfengine code. Plugins will produce the required
platform-dependent Cfengine code that will be included at step 5 inside the generated Cfengine
policy files.
Figure 9.1 – Ovalyzer’s high-level operation
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Ovalyzer has been purely written in Java 1.6 [88]. Within Ovalyzer, the translator core is in
charge of managing every high-level aspect of the OVAL documents it processes. The required
functionality for generating specific platform-dependent Cfengine code is provided by plugins.
This functional separation makes of Ovalyzer an extensible translation tool. In addition, the
OVAL data model used by Ovalyzer is automatically generated. In order to do this, we use the
JAXB (Java Architecture for XML Binding) technology [89]. JAXB provides means not only
for modeling XML documents within a Java application data model, but also for automatically
reading and writing them. Such feature provides to Ovalyzer with the ability to evolve with new
OVAL versions with almost no developing cost. While declarative extensibility of the translator
is achieved by automatic code generation using the JAXB technology, functional extensibility
is supported by its plugin-based architecture. These two aspects are explained in detail in the
following sections.
OVAL memory model
XML OVAL documents conform the main input for Ovalyzer and their treatment requires
special attention. In particular, three main points must be attended when the source input is
based on XML documents which follow a well-defined structure (XML Schemas). These key
points are indicated in the following list.
⇧ Memory representation of types defined within XML Schemas.
⇧ Parsing process of instances (XML documents) of these XML Schemas.
⇧ Writing process of results that are also XML instances of XML Schemas.
When a change is performed over one of these XML Schemas, it affects the three points
mentioned before. This is because the types defined within the schemas may be changed and
consequently, their memory representation. With a different structure and memory represen-
tation, the process of reading and writing XML documents according to these schemas also
changes. In order to provide scalability and development fastness, a mechanism for automate
these changes and reduce the code impact is required. In light of this, we use JAXB, a Java
technology provided by Sun Microsystems that provides three powerful features directly related
to the previous three points.
⇧ Schema binding. It generates a set of Java classes that represent an XML Schema.
⇧ Unmarshalling. It creates a tree of content objects that represent the content and organi-
zation of an XML document.
⇧ Marshalling. It is the opposite of unmarshalling. It creates an XML document from a
content tree.
Figure 9.2 – JAXB process [89]
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These three features provided by JAXB solve the issues mentioned before, which must be
taken into account when dealing with XML documents and changing XML Schemas. The diagram
illustrated in Figure 9.2 shows the working process of the JAXB technology. This technology
allows Ovalyzer to easily evolve with new versions of the OVAL language. In order to provide
specific translation capabilities, Ovalyzer uses a plugin-based mechanism which is explained in
the next section.
Plugins model
Plugins can be added on the plugin repository providing new translation capabilities. Each
plugin knows how to translate a specific type of OVAL test to the appropriate Cfengine rules.
This approach provides extensibility features, enabling a seamless functional evolution with the
OVAL language. Moreover, plugin developers have access to the same data model built as a JAR
library, simplifying eventual OVAL evolution impacts. When an OVAL document is processed
by Ovalyzer, the required plugins are loaded at runtime from the plugins repository and the
operations available in the plugins API are executed.
Plugins discovery. Within the OVAL language, an OVAL definition can be seen as a lo-
gical formula compounded by OVAL tests. Because each type of test has it associated plugin,
an OVAL definition can be translated only if the required plugins are present in the repository.
Ovalyzer implements a plugin search mechanism based on name patterns. For example, if the
name of the test belonging to the IOS platform is line_test, its associated plugin will be Cfengi-
neIosLine.jar. On the other hand, if the name of the test is version55_test, its associated plugin
will be CfengineIosVersion55.jar. During the translation, Ovalyzer relies on the functionality
of plugins for generating Cfengine code, thus an API has been specified in order to define the
required methods for achieving a successful translation. Such methods have been specified based
on how the Cfengine language structures its content. The current version of Ovalyzer provides
an API with only five methods that plugins must implement.
Plugins API. We have previously shown in Figure 4.5 how OVAL components are mapped
to Cfengine building blocks. In order to achieve a successful translation, we follow this approach
and define the following set of methods which plugins must implement.
⇧ public void setPluginConfiguration(PluginConfiguration config);
Sets plugin configuration from plugin configuration file.
⇧ public void generateMethodForTest(TestType test, ObjectType object,
ArrayList<StateType> states, TestStatesManager statesManager,
String testMethodName, String destination);
Generates Cfengine code for the method that represents the specified test.
⇧ public String getPreparationModuleSentence(ObjectType object);
Generates Cfengine code for collecting the specified object from the system.
⇧ public ArrayList<String> getCallMethodArguments(TestType test,
ObjectType object, ArrayList<StateType> states);
Returns the required arguments used on method invocation.
⇧ public StateController pupulateStateController(StateType state);
Loads state attributes for code generation.
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1 . <?xml ve r s i on="1.0" encoding="UTF 8"?>
2 . <ova l_de f i n i t i on s >
3 . <d e f i n i t i o n s >
4 . <d e f i n i t i o n id="oval : org .mitre . oval : def :15">
5. <c r i t e r i a operator="AND">
6. <c r i t e r i o n comment="IOS vulnerable version" t e s t_re f="oval : org .mitre . oval : tst :1"/>
7 . <c r i t e r i o n comment="IP finger service test . " t e s t_re f="oval : org .mitre . oval : tst :2"/>
8 . </c r i t e r i a >
9 . </d e f i n i t i o n >
10 . </d e f i n i t i o n s >
11 . <te s t s >
12 . <vers ion55_tes t id="oval : org .mitre . oval : tst :1" >
13 . <ob j e c t ob j ec t_re f="oval : org .mitre . oval : obj :100"/>
14 . <s t a t e s ta t e_re f="oval : org .mitre . oval : ste :200"/>
15 . </vers ion55_test>
16 . <l i n e_t e s t id="oval : org .mitre . oval : tst :2" >
17 . <ob j e c t ob j ec t_re f="oval : org .mitre . oval : obj :101"/>
18 . <s t a t e s ta t e_re f="oval : org .mitre . oval : ste :201"/>
19 . </l ine_tes t >
20 . </t e s t s >
21 . <objec t s >
22 . <vers ion55_object id="oval : org .mitre . oval : obj :100"/>
23 . <l ine_ob j e c t id="oval : org .mitre . oval : obj :101">
24 . <show_subcommand> show running c on f i g </show_subcommand>
25 . </l ine_object>
26 . </objec t s >
27 . <s ta t e s >
28 . <vers ion55_state id="oval : org .mitre . oval : ste :200" >
29 . <ver s i on_st r ing operat ion="pattern match"> 12\ . 4 .⇤ </vers ion_str ing>
30 . </vers ion55_state>
31 . <l i n e_s ta t e id="oval : org .mitre . oval : ste :201">
32 . <show_subcommand> show running c on f i g </show_subcommand>
33 . <con f i g_ l in e operat ion="pattern match"> ^ip \ f i n g e r </con f ig_l ine >
34 . </l ine_state >
35 . </s ta t e s >
36 . </ova l_de f i n i t i on s >
Figure 9.3 – OVAL vulnerability description for Cisco IOS
Available plugins. Ovalyzer has been developed as a proof of concept, particularly focu-
sed on the Cisco IOS platform. However, it can be easily extended in order to support other
platforms as well. At the moment of writing this document, the official OVAL repository has
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of test, namely, line_test, version55_test and version_test. As we mentioned before, writing a
plugin for each type of used test enables the translation of OVAL definitions that use these type
of OVAL tests. Therefore, we have written three plugins, namely, CfengineIosLine.jar, Cfengi-
neIosVersion.jar and CfengineIosVersion55.jar, which provide a coverage of 100% considering
the OVAL definitions for the Cisco IOS platform.
It is important to observe that the approach presented in Chapter 4, involving Ovalyzer, is
mainly focused on integrating vulnerability descriptions in the management plane of autonomic
networks and systems. Cfengine has been taken as the autonomic part of the approach, while
the OVAL language is the resource that provides support for vulnerability descriptions. In that
context, Ovalyzer is in charge of interconnecting both worlds. In the next section, we present
an example of Ovalyzer in action, showing how the generated Cfengine code looks like and its
execution by a Cfengine agent.
9.2.2 OVAL to Cfengine generation example with Ovalyzer
In this section, we illustrate with an example, the mechanism used for integrating vulnerability
descriptions in the management plane of autonomic environments. To do so, we refer to the
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scenario shown in Section 4.2 where a vulnerability for the Cisco IOS platform is considered. As
a reminder, the vulnerability involves to conditions that must hold simultaneously: the version
of the platform must be 12.4 and the service ip finger must be enabled. This security weakness
is specified with the OVAL language as illustrated in Figure 9.3.
The OVAL document shown in Figure 9.3 contains one OVAL definition that represents our
vulnerability description. The OVAL definition, with id oval:org.mitre.oval:def:15 (lines 4-9),
states that this vulnerability is present on a target system if both following conditions hold:
(i) the IOS version belongs to a set of affected IOS versions (line 6), and (ii) the IP finger service
is enabled (line 7). These conditions are specified by means of OVAL tests, which are specified
below, inside the <tests> tag (lines 11-20). The first condition is analyzed by the first test with
id oval:org.mitre.oval:tst:1 (lines 12-15). This version test refers to one OVAL object (line 22)
and one OVAL state (lines 28-30). It will be true if and only if the specified object match the
specified state. The pattern match expression allows to specify a family of IOS versions using
a regular expression (line 29). The second condition is analyzed by the second test with id
oval:org.mitre.oval:tst:2 (lines 16-19). This line test refers to one OVAL object (lines 23-25) and
one OVAL state (lines 31-34). It will be true if and only if the sub-command show running-config
result contains a configuration line starting with the string ip finger (line 33).
The execution of Ovalyzer, illustrated in Figure 9.4, produces the corresponding Cfengine
code required to be executed by a Cfengine agent. Considering the translation algorithm depicted
in Algorithm 4.1, we outline the output obtained from Ovalyzer once the translation is done. First,
the main Cfengine configuration file is generated, which in this case involves only one vulnerability
definition, as shown in Figure 9.5. The import directive indicates that the vulnerability definition
Figure 9.4 – Ovalyzer execution
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import :
any : :
ova l : org . mitre . ova l : de f : 15
Figure 9.5 – Cfengine code (main)
with id oval:org.mitre.oval:def:15 must be evaluated.
The OVAL definition in turn, has its own generated Cfengine configuration file, as depicted in
Figure 9.6. Two OVAL tests are referenced by this OVAL definition, and each one of these tests
references one object and one state respectively. At the control section, it can be observed the
directives for collecting the required objects from the system. The objects are collected by means
of Cfengine prepared modules. These prepared modules are in fact scripts. In the case of Cisco
IOS, we use the Expect language for the communication between Cfengine agents and routers.
The control section also includes the definition of the OVAL expected states, which are expressed
by means of Cfengine variables. In order to perform the evaluation of the involved OVAL tests,
the methods section defines the required calls to execute each required method representing one
specific test. These methods are in charge of comparing the collected objects with the specified
states. Indeed, for each OVAL test referenced in the OVAL definition, a Cfengine method is
automatically generated, and its Cfengine implementation is materialized as one single file as
explained later. In the example, two Cfengine methods with names EvalTest1 and EvalTest2 are
generated. The truth or falsehood of these methods are represented by means of Cfengine classes.
It can be observed that for each method, there is a class named ResultTest which is created as
the return class when the method is executed. Therefore, once the evaluation is done for each
# Cfengine po l i c y f i l e f o r OVAL d e f i n i t i o n oval : org . mitre . ova l : de f : 1 5 .
# Class : VULNERABILITY
# Desc r ip t i on : . . .
c on t r o l :
. . .
d e f i n i t i o n I d = ( "oval : org .mitre . oval : def :15" )
ob ject100 = ( PrepModule (module : r e t r i eveObje c t , "\"show version\" \"out/obj :100\"" ) )
ob ject101 = ( PrepModule (module : r e t r i eveObje c t , "\"show running config\" \"out/obj :101\"" ) )
act ionsequence = ( shellcommands methods )
. . .
s te_200_vers ionst r ing = ( "12\.4.⇤" )




EvalTest1 ("out/obj :100" , ${ s te_200_vers ionst r ing })
ac t i on=oval : org . mitre . ova l : t s t : 1
r e t u r n c l a s s e s=ResultTest
. . .
EvalTest2 ("out/obj :101" , ${ s te_201_conf ig l ine })
ac t i on=oval : org . mitre . ova l : t s t : 2
r e t u r n c l a s s e s=ResultTest
. . .
a l e r t s :
every : :
( EvalTest1_ResultTest . EvalTest2_ResultTest ) : :
"${definitionId}   Result : TRUE"
! ( EvalTest1_ResultTest . EvalTest2_ResultTest ) : :
"${definitionId}   Result : FALSE"
Figure 9.6 – Cfengine code (main)
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method, the final result is computed in the alerts section, according to the classification obtained
from the existing classes.
For each OVAL test referenced in the OVAL definition, one Cfengine method implemented
in a separated file is automatically generated. Figure 9.7 shows the main structure for the first
method, which corresponds to the OVAL version test. The second method is similar to the
first one so we omit it here. At the control section, several Cfengine variables which define
the behavior of the method are declared. The variable MethodName contains the name of this
method, which is invoked from the vulnerability definition configuration file. Because several
vulnerability definitions may reference the same OVAL tests, this approach avoids redundancy
in the code generation process. The variable MethodParameters specifies the accepted arguments
for this method, which are the path to the collected object and the expected state. The variable
object contains the information corresponding to the collected object. For each attribute specified
in the expected OVAL state, a variable is generated which will contain the real value extracted
from the collected object. The variable obj_ste_200_versionstring contains the real version of
the target system.
As explained before, all this code is generated automatically by Ovalyzer. However, it must
be noticed that the generated code can be executed on Cfengine agents running over the Linux
platform. When all this information is gathered in the control section, the classes section will
evaluate the final method result. In this example, the gathered version is compared with the
expected version, and a Cfengine class called ResultTest will be generated depending on the
truth value obtained from the comparison. The existence of the class ResultTest indicates true
as the method result and false otherwise. This class will be used by the caller, which in this
con t r o l :
. . .
MethodName = ( EvalTest1 )
MethodParameters = ( arg1 ste_200_vers ionst r ing )
t e s t I d = ( "oval : org .mitre . oval : tst :1" )
act ionsequence = ( shellcommands )
f i l ename = ( "${arg1}" )
var1 = ( "Filename : ${filename}" )
ob j e c t = ( ExecShe l lResu l t (/ bin / cat ${ arg1 }) )
obj_ste_200_vers ionstr ing = ( ExecShe l lResu l t ("/bin/cat ${arg1} | grep \ ’Cisco\ IOS\ Software\ ’ |
grep  o  E \ ’Version .⇤ ,\ ’
| grep  o  E \ ’[0 9]{1 ,2}\.[0 9]{1 ,2}(\([0 9]{1 ,2}(\.[0 9]{1 ,2})?\) ) ?(( [A Z ] | [ a z ] ) {0 ,2}) ( ( [A Z
] | [ a z ] ) {0 ,1}) (([0 9]) {0 ,2}) ( ( [A K] | [ a k ] ) {0 ,1})\ ’" ) )
shellcommands :
. . .
c l a s s e s : # Class r equ i r ed by a l e r t s
every = ( any )
ResultTest_ste_200_vers ionstr ing = ( Regcmp( ${ ste_200_vers ionst r ing } , ${ obj_ste_200_vers ionstr ing })
)
ResultTest_ste_200 = ( ( ResultTest_ste_200_vers ionstr ing ) )
ResultTest = ( ( ResultTest_ste_200 ) )
a l e r t s :
every : :
ReturnVar iables ("${var1}" )
ReturnClasses ( ResultTest )
ResultTest : :
"> Test ${testId} Method: Result i s true . "
! ResultTest : :
"> Test ${testId} Method: Result i s fa l se . "
Figure 9.7 – Cfengine code (method)
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case is the Cfengine input file for the vulnerability, in order to assess the entire vulnerability
definition.
Figure 9.8 illustrates a partial log generated by a Cfengine agent while executing the code
produced by Ovalyzer. It can be observed information about the running configuration on the top,
and the obtained results at the end of the execution. Within the example, we have emulated our
router using Dynamips/Dynagen, a Cisco router emulator system [58]. In this case, the version
of the running operating system is 12.4, in which we have enabled the ip finger service, and
therefore, the vulnerability under analysis is present on the target system.
Figure 9.8 – Cfengine execution
In the next section, we extend the concept of autonomous vulnerability assessment by also
considering past hidden vulnerable states. This extension opens a new temporal dimension that
allows to increase the security of present computer systems by observing into their past.
9.3 Extension to past hidden vulnerable states
In Chapter 6 we have presented an approach for detecting past hidden vulnerable states.
These past vulnerabilities might have given access to security breaches that may still be active
in the present, even though the vulnerabilities that originated such violation have been already
eliminated. In order to implement such an approach, we have proposed a framework which is
described in Section 6.3. The actual implementation of the framework requires several challenges
to be addressed. First, a mechanism for describing and automatically generating and deploying
system images or snapshots is required. Second, an efficient representation and storage approach
able to scale with the size of the system needs to be incorporated. Third, tools and techniques for
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Figure 9.9 – SVN-based assessment
actually assessing system images must be provided. In this section we present our implementation
prototype as well as the main artifacts that constitute the proposed solution.
In the previous sections, we have presented Ovalyzer, capable of integrating OVAL advisories
into the autonomic management plane by means of automatic policy generation that represents
such security information. Within the detection of past unknown security exposures, we consider
a similar approach for generating data collection policy rules that will be used for automatically
building system images. Under this perspective, autonomic agents can decide given high-level
objectives, when to perform new system revisions based on different factors such as system
changes and programmed tasks. While data collection policies are specified as OVAL definitions
that indicate what to collect, an OVAL system characteristics document [117] includes all the
information required for outsourcing vulnerability assessment activities.
Computing systems are usually constituted by large sets of configuration files and data,
making it hard to build historical repositories of system images. Considering the XML-based
representation used within the OVAL language, we take advantage of versioning systems such
as SVN (Apache Subversion) [146] in order to efficiently represent past system states. Within
the proposed approach, each system image is composed of system properties that are used for
assessing vulnerabilities. Indeed, such system properties are specified as OVAL tests that indicate
which OVAL objects must be collected. Figure 9.9 shows how system properties are efficiently
stored by means of an SVN repository.
The main idea is that after a baseline representing the system has been made (time T1), the
SVN repository will only register those changes that differ from the previous version minimizing
the required storage space for each system image. If a system change modifies system properties,
a new system image will be generated (time T2) but only the information associated to the
modified properties (2 and N) will be actually stored in the new SVN revision. These changed
properties are now represented as 2.1 and N.1 following the dashed lines from T1 to T2. At
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time T3, properties 1, 3 and N are changed and a new revision is created. Within this scenario,
the latest system image can be built by taking the latest modifications of each property following
the solid line (1.1, 2.1, 3.1, N.2). The same idea can be applied over any revision to analyze system
images in the past. Our prototype uses the SVNKit [147] technology for performing activities
over the SVN repository.
When new vulnerability definitions become available, represented in Figure 9.9 as the transi-
tion between the vulnerability repository v1 and v2, the exposure analyzer described in the pro-
posed architecture (see Figure 6.2) will assess those devices under control traversing the history
of system images as explained in Algorithm 6.1. Within the proposed scenario, the vulnerability
repository v1 exists during times T1 and T2. The assessment over the baseline detects one vulne-
rability and corrective changes performed in the system makes the transition to the snapshot at
time T2. When the repository is updated (v2), the exposure analyzer uses this new information
for assessing past system states. In the example, seven vulnerabilities are detected in snapshot
T1 while three are identified in snapshot T2. It can be inferred that four vulnerabilities have
been removed by the changes made between T1 and T2. Corrective modifications for eliminating
those three vulnerabilities in snapshot T2 produces a new snapshot at time T3 where no more
known vulnerabilities are detected by the exposure analyzer with the repository v2.
In order to analyze the exposure of past system states, we have extended XOvaldi [26] for
assessing system images represented by means of OVAL system characteristics files. As explained
before, XOvaldi is a live forensic, multi-platform and extensible OVAL-based system analyzer.
It uses the JAXB technology for automatically generating its internal OVAL-based data model,
in the same way Ovalyzer does. In addition, XOvaldi also presents a plugin-based architecture
that permits to evaluate new types of OVAL tests without actually rebuilding the tool. The
XOvaldi extension we have developed allows to outsource vulnerability assessment activities.
By consuming OVAL system characteristics files, XOvaldi is not required to be executed on
each device under control. Instead, system images are generated independently, by means of
collection policies generated by Cfengine rules, and preserved in an optimized storage system
using the SVN technology. By using XOvaldi services, the exposure analyzer is able to evaluate
and detect past system exposures due to unknown vulnerabilities in an independent manner. In
the next section, we present a different technological scenario where vulnerability assessment gets
challenged. Mobile environments are dynamic and involve ubiquitous and resourceless devices.
Therefore, novel approaches are required to obtain accurate and performant solutions.
9.4 Mobile security assessment with Ovaldroid
In Chapter 7 we have presented an approach for analyzing and detecting security vulnerabi-
lities in mobile environments, with a particular focus on the Android platform. In this section
we present the implementation prototype developed to this end. First, we illustrate a lightweight
mechanism for performing self-assessment activities on mobile clients. Finally, we present a pro-
babilistic extension which orchestrates and outsources the assessment of vulnerabilities, thus
reducing the workload on the mobile side.
9.4.1 Implementation prototype
In order to provide a computable infrastructure to the proposed approach, a running software
component inside Android capable of performing self-assessment activities is required. By the
time of writing this document, 60.3% of Android users operate their devices using Gingerbread
(versions 2.3.3 to 2.3.7, API level 10) and a total of 79.3% operate versions starting at 2.3.3 until
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Figure 9.10 – Self-assessment service high-level operation
its last release Jelly Bean (version 4.1, API level 16) [12]. Our implementation prototype has
been developed to be compliant with Android platforms starting at version 2.3.3, thus covering
almost 80% of the Android market share. In this section, we describe the prototyping of our
solution as well as the high-level operation performed during the assessment activity.
The implementation prototype has been purely written in Java [88] and is composed of four
main components: (1) an update system that keeps the internal database up-to-date, (2) a vulne-
rability management system in charge of orchestrating the assessment activities when required,
(3) an OVAL interpreter for the Android platform and (4) a reporting system that stores the
analysis results internally and sends them to an external reporting system. Figure 9.10 depicts
Figure 9.11 – Ovaldroid agent
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the main operational steps performed during the self-assessment activity and the connection with
the mentioned four main components. The prototype is executed as a lightweight service that
is running on background and that can be awakened by two potential reasons. The first one is
that the update system in charge of monitoring external knowledge sources has obtained new
vulnerability definitions ; the second one is that changes in the system have occurred hence it is
highly possible that some vulnerability definitions need to be re-evaluated. The prototype is still
in an early development phase so we only cover some system events such as when a package has
been installed. Figure 9.11 shows the mains screen of the Ovaldroid client running on an emula-
ted Android-based device, which allows to control the service and configure different parameters
such as the IP address of the Ovaldroid server.
In order to be aware of the two aforementioned self-assessment triggers, two listeners remain
active as shown at step 1 in Figure 9.10. The updater listener listens the vulnerability database
updater component and will be notified when new vulnerability definitions become available.
The event bus listener uses the Android broadcast bus to capture notifications about system
changes. If new vulnerability definitions are available or system changes have been detected,
a vulnerability definition selection process is launched at step 2. This process is in charge of
analyzing the cause that has triggered the self-assessment activity and deciding which assessment
tasks must be performed by actually implementing the Algorithm 7.1. At step 3, the vulnerability
manager component uses the services of XOvaldi4Android in order to perform the corresponding
Figure 9.12 – Ovaldroid provider
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assessment activity. At step 4, the results of the assessment are stored in the internal results
database and sent to the external reporting system by performing a web service request. Finally,
a local notification is displayed to the user if new vulnerabilities have been found in the system.
Figure 9.12 depicts the web-based front-end of the Ovaldroid provider system, where the
Ovaldroid client has been already registered. Only one vulnerability definition is available in the
database, and there are three plugins for analyzing three different types of OVAL tests. The status
for the client indicates up-to-date, which means that the client has performed self-assessment
activities according to the latest vulnerability descriptions available in the server. In this case,
the target device has detected a vulnerability on the system, which has been reported to the
Ovaldroid reporting system. Figure 9.13 shows the main screen of the reporting system, indicating
that one analysis has been performed by the client. Last results are shown in a new window after
clicking the see link. There, the reporting system indicates that the device is vulnerable according
to the security advisory described in the OVAL definition with ID oval:fr.inria.madynes:def:2.
During the assessment activity, XOvaldi4Android plays a fundamental role within the propo-
sed framework because it is in charge of actually assessing the Android system. XOvaldi4Android
is an extension of XOvaldi [26]. We have ported the XOvaldi system to the Android platform
obtaining a 94 KB size library. We have used the Eclipse development environment [59] and the
ADT plugin [12] for Eclipse to easily manage development projects for Android. As explained
before, the JAXB technology allows us to easily extend the data model of a Java application. In
that context, we have extended XOvaldi by regenerating its internal data model to also support
the Android platform. In order to specify OVAL vulnerability descriptions for this platform, we
have used the experimental OVAL sandbox for Android [134]. In addition, we have developed
some plugins in order to support the involved OVAL tests. As shown in Figure 9.10, the high-
level operation performed by XOvaldi4Android follows the same assessment process proposed by
OVAL. In order to provide extensibility features, the interpreter decouples the analysis of the
OVAL structure from the actual collection and evaluation activities by using a plugin repository.
While the former is implemented as the core of the interpreter, each plugin provides injectable
functionality (collection and evaluation) for the specific type of OVAL test it was built for.
Figure 9.13 – Ovaldroid reporter
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Figure 9.14 – Ovaldroid reporter details
9.4.2 A probabilistic extension
As explained in Chapter 7, a probabilistic approach for analyzing vulnerabilities can dramati-
cally decrease the workload on mobile clients. Considering that current mobile devices have very
scarce resources, this advantage cannot be underestimated. In order to evaluate the feasibility of
the proposed approach, we have developed an extension to the previous prototype by considering
a client-server architecture. On the server side, a RESTful web service [69] enables mobile clients
to communicate with the server and start new vulnerability evaluations. All the architectural
components described in Figure 7.7 have been purely implemented in Java 1.6 SE. Databases
have been implemented using MySQL 5.1. OVAL-based vulnerabilities for the Android platform
are described, as before, using the OVAL Sandbox project [134]. Within this extension, CNF
representations of these vulnerability descriptions are required. To that end, we have used the
CNF transformer provided by the Aima project [6]. XOvaldi in its full version has been used
as the OVAL interpreter on the server side. On the client side, the XOvaldi4Android library
has been used as the data collector subsystem. XOvaldi4Android is executed by the VMANS
client, implemented as a small Android service in charge of communicating the server according
to its preconfigured frequency. The prototype has been developed to be compliant with Android
versions starting at 2.3.3 thus supporting almost 80% of current operating versions.
Both mechanisms, following the self-assessment and the probabilistic approach, have been
exhaustively evaluated. Indeed, several experiments have been conducted using these imple-
mentation prototypes. The results indicate so far good and reasonable performance in terms of
scalability, speed, and workload on the client side.
9.5 Synthesis
In autonomic computing, self-governed networks and systems are responsible for their own
management. In that context, the ability to analyze their own exposure in order to prevent
security attacks becomes essential. In this chapter, we have presented three implementation
prototypes which provide a computable infrastructure for performing vulnerability assessment
activities. In the first place, we have described Ovalyzer, an OVAL to Cfengine translation sys-
tem. Ovalyzer makes possible the integration of OVAL security advisories into the autonomic
management plane, by automatically generating Cfengine policies that represent them. Cfen-
gine constitutes the autonomic part of our approach, where Cfengine agents become capable of
autonomously analyzing security weaknesses over the devices they control.
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These weaknesses are security issues that are analyzed only over current running systems.
However, we have shown in Chapter 6 that past hidden vulnerable states may still affect current
systems in the present, even though such vulnerabilities are not present anymore. This extension
within a temporal dimension allows to increase the security of autonomic entities even more. To
that end, we have developed a prototype able to autonomously generate images of the systems
under control, and analyze their history when new security advisories become available. Our pro-
totype can identify periods of security exposure due to unknown vulnerabilities at that moment.
This approach provides a connection for system administrators to carry out forensic activities in
the present in order to detect if these vulnerabilities have been exploited, and identify what are
consequences of such unknown past security exposures.
Finally, we have also experimented with a different technological scenario. All along this the-
sis, we have argued that autonomic computing transcends the frontiers of technological diversity.
In that context, we have conducted research work within mobile environments. In this chapter,
we have also presented a prototype for increasing the vulnerability awareness of Android-based
devices. Our prototype aims at providing to the Android platform, the ability to assess their
own exposure, i.e., self-assessment capabilities. In other words, we have experimented with the
integration of autonomic solutions within mobile systems. In addition, due to the scarce resources
present in this kind of devices, we have extended our approach to outsource assessment activi-
ties, thus decreasing the workload on the client side even more. By using a probabilistic approach
over a client-server architecture, our prototype is able to highly reduce the resource allocation
on mobile devices due to vulnerability assessment activities.
A comprehensive set of experiments has been performed using these prototypes in their
respective scenarios. Even though these prototypes are in an early development stage, and they
can be clearly enhanced and further extended, they have provided a strong support to prove the
scientific approaches presented in the previous chapters. Indeed, the obtained results are very
promising. Therefore, we believe that it is worth to further investigate in the research axes we
have presented in this chapter, as well as autonomic solutions for distributed vulnerabilities and
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10.1 Contributions summary
The large-scale deployment of disparate computing devices over evolving dynamic networks
has profusely augmented the complexity of network management. Indeed, computing technologies
spread fast, the number of end-users increases rapidly, and there is a constant demand for more
and better services. Underneath, computer networks constitute the platform of this convoluted
digital world. This accelerated evolution has tested the boundaries of traditional network ma-
nagement approaches, which do not scale properly with today’s network requirements. In other
words, network management tasks have become so intensive and diversified, that the model, one
administrator per n computers, is not effective anymore. Therefore, a need for new management
approaches became evident. In light of this, the autonomic computing paradigm has emerged
in order to cope with this new and challenging landscape. By specifying high-level objectives,
autonomic computing aims at delegating management activities to the networks themselves. In
this manner, human administrators avoid the execution of heavy and error-prone tasks, beco-
ming able to focus on higher levels of management issues, with a simpler and cleaner view of the
network.
Autonomic computing has become a very important research field within the scientific com-
munity, featuring strong foundations and promising perspectives. However, two main points
require special attention. First, security issues have been poorly discussed in autonomic environ-
ments, particularly, vulnerability management mechanisms. Second, the expertise obtained from
autonomic approaches has been barely experimented in non-autonomic environments. In this
thesis, we have pursued both goals ; to investigate and develop novel vulnerability management
approaches for autonomic environments, and to transfer autonomic principles to non-autonomic
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scenarios. In this chapter, we provide general conclusions about our research work as well as our
technical implementations. Finally, we present research perspectives and further work.
10.1.1 Autonomic vulnerability management
Our contributions can be classified in two main categories according to the vulnerability ma-
nagement process, namely, vulnerability assessment and vulnerability remediation. We describe
both in the following subsections.
Autonomic vulnerability assessment
Vulnerability assessment constitutes the first step within the vulnerability management pro-
cess. It is a critical activity that enables computer systems to increase their awareness about
security threats. In this thesis, we have presented several approaches for autonomously assessing
vulnerabilities in different scenarios. First, we have proposed an approach that integrates OVAL
vulnerability descriptions into the autonomic management plane. By translating these security
advisories into Cfengine policy rules, autonomic agents deployed across the network become
able to analyze their own security exposure. This approach targets the autonomic assessment of
device-based vulnerabilities, with a particular focus on the Cisco IOS platform. However, there
exist other scenarios where vulnerability assessment techniques are required as well. In that
context, we have proposed three dimensional research axes which involves distributed vulnerabi-
lities (spatial dimension), past hidden vulnerable states (temporal dimension), and mobile
security assessment (technological dimension).
Our first research axis involves distributed vulnerabilities, which constitute an extension to
the concept of device-based vulnerabilities within the spatial dimension. The concept of distri-
buted vulnerabilities considers situations where two or more devices under specific conditions
may present safe states, but when combined across the network, a vulnerable state arises. These
scenarios are real and must be taken into account by vulnerability assessment approaches. Our
second research axis involves the time dimension, where we have presented an approach for
autonomously increasing the security of present computer systems by analyzing past hidden vul-
nerable states. Security advisories may be available late in time, but the vulnerabilities expressed
by them can have been unknowingly active in the past. By autonomously building an historical
image repository of the systems under surveillance, our approach is able to identify periods of se-
curity exposure due to unknown vulnerabilities at that time, where malicious activities may have
taken place. This feature may allow forensic activities to be performed in order to identify current
security breaches. Our third and final research axis in the context of vulnerability assessment
involves the technological dimension, where we have presented an approach for autonomously
assessing vulnerabilities in mobile environments. Indeed, we have proposed two complimentary
approaches that deal with the assessment activity over resource-constrained devices. First, we
have introduced a lightweight autonomous vulnerability assessment service that permits Android
devices to assess their own exposure. Then, we have extended this approach by considering a
probabilistic framework where assessment activities are outsourced to an external server which
controls the overall assessment process, thus decreasing the workload of mobile clients even more.
Autonomic vulnerability remediation
In order to close the vulnerability management control loop, vulnerability remediation mecha-
nisms are required. In that context, we have proposed two autonomic vulnerability remediation
approaches focused on device-based and distributed vulnerabilities respectively. These activities
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however, are particularly challenging because they should not generate new vulnerable states
when perform their operations. In order to remediate device-based vulnerabilities, we have mo-
deled the set of all known vulnerability descriptions as a conjunction of propositional logical
formulas. A vulnerable device will therefore make this formula evaluate to true. Because we look
for safe configurations, we need to find which properties must be modified to make this formula
evaluate to false, or which amounts to the same, make its negation evaluate to true. To this end,
we have encoded our problem as a SAT problem, where properties that cannot be changed are
fixed, and those for which correction actions exist are freed. A solution provided by a SAT solver
describes a safe configuration. Within our experiments, we have used the NETCONF protocol
for performing effective management operations over the Cisco IOS platform. The obtained re-
sults confirm the feasibility of our approach. Within our second approach, we have proposed a
collaborative mechanism for describing and performing treatments of distributed vulnerabilities
in autonomic networks and systems. This approach also considers correction advisories that are
taken into account by our framework, which is able to remediate vulnerable states found across
the network. To do this, a distributed algorithm is executed over the Cfengine system. There,
each Cfengine agent involved in the vulnerability under analysis will report the activities it can
perform to eradicate the threat as well as the cost to do this. This information is collected from
all the involved nodes and analyzed at the Cfengine server. The Cfengine server then selects a
node to apply corrective actions based on the reported costs. Even though there is not a complete
prototype implementation of our second approach, we have performed an analytical evaluation
of its performance, obtaining successful linear costs when it is integrated into the vulnerability
management process.
10.1.2 Implementation prototypes
With the objective of technically proving the feasibility of our previous contributions, we
have developed three implementation prototypes which correspond to three different vulnerabi-
lity assessment scenarios. First, we have developed Ovalyzer, an OVAL to Cfengine translation
system. Ovalyzer enables the generation of Cfengine policy rules that represent OVAL vulnerabi-
lity descriptions. In this manner, these policies are deployed to autonomic agents which become
able to perform self-assessment activities. Second, we have implemented a prototype for iden-
tifying past unknown security exposures. We have reused the idea behind Ovalyzer, but this
time for autonomously generating XML-based images of the states of the systems being monito-
red. These images are stored in a cost-efficient manner by using an SVN repository. When new
vulnerability descriptions become available, our prototype is able to analyze the history of sys-
tem images looking for vulnerable periods according to this new information. Therefore, forensic
activities can be performed over those identified exposure periods in order to analyze security
breaches that may still compromise the security policies in the present. Finally, we have deve-
loped Ovaldroid, an OVAL-based vulnerability assessment framework for Android. Indeed, our
first approach considers a lightweight self-assessment service running inside the mobile device.
In order to further reduce the load on the mobile side, we have implemented our probabilistic
approach that free mobile devices from performing assessment activities themselves. Instead, mo-
bile devices periodically notify their availability for being analyzed, and receive directives from
the server indicating which data must be collected and reported. Vulnerability assessment acti-
vities are outsourced in the server and then notified to the mobile client. In addition, the server
conducts special algorithms that allows to decrease the communication with mobile devices even
more. All these prototypes have served as a computational infrastructure to prove the feasibility
and scalability of our autonomic approaches.
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10.2 Perspectives
10.2.1 Proactive autonomic defense by anticipating future vulnerable states
During our research work, we have analyzed different research dimensions for vulnerability
management. In particular, we have proposed approaches for analyzing vulnerabilities in the
present and the past, which in turn are complemented with vulnerability remediation approaches.
However, what if we could anticipate the trajectory of a system, considering its dynamic state,
and avoid changes that will lead the system to known vulnerable spaces ? In other words, we have
shown in this thesis how system states can be characterized by the properties they present. We
also know how to model vulnerabilities by characterizing the properties expected to be observed
on a target system. Considering that we have n properties we can model, a target system could
be graphically located on a single point of an n-dimensional space. In the same manner, known
vulnerabilities would have their corresponding points in such space. Similar vulnerabilities would
probably conform clusters or vulnerable subspaces. Our idea is that observing the movement of
a target system, its trend could be monitored and determined on this space. If such a trajectory
indicates high closeness levels to vulnerable states, it could be deviated by averting changes that
may get the system closer or even fall into these vulnerable subspaces. This approach could
provide autonomic systems with a continuous metric of vulnerability awareness that can be
taken into account when management operations are performed, and therefore enabling systems
to anticipate and avoid vulnerable configuration states.
10.2.2 Unified autonomic management platform
In this thesis we have presented several approaches for tackling different needs of vulnerability
management in the context of autonomic environments. However, these approaches need to be
unified, over a common and consistent platform, able to provide all these features in a seamless
manner. Changes that can lead a system to secure states may contradict existing operational
requirements. This issue poses a hard problem that should be addressed. Therefore, a main
challenge is to provide mechanisms able to coexist with other policy-based systems, maintaining
coherency at all levels, including operational and security perspectives. The approaches proposed
in this work reinforce the security of a network from different perspectives, making it more reliable
and stronger. However, our models should be extended and unified so as to cover these activities
as a whole. In particular, our approach for managing distributed vulnerabilities requires more
technical work, as well as further investigation on the metrics required to collaboratively perform
forensic and remediation tasks. Therefore, the construction of a standard model and a system
able to contemplate all these aspects under a single view, would be extremely useful for the
community of autonomic computing, as a basis for autonomously managing vulnerabilities.
10.2.3 Autonomic security for current and emerging technologies
The security enhancement of current paradigms such as cloud computing, and emerging
models like software-defined networks (SDN) and Internet of Things (IoT), is also extremely
challenging. Briefly, cloud computing tackles availability and processing power by decoupling ser-
vices from the underlying hardware. More recently, SDNs also separate the management (control
plane) from the hardware that actually implement network functionalities (data plane). Both
approaches aim at providing reliable and scalable services while decreasing the complexity of
their management and accomplishment. This is where the autonomic perspective can be extre-
mely helpful. By providing self-configuration and self-protection mechanisms, these operational
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management models can also become scalable and resilient in the security plane, which is es-
sential to achieve reliability. IoT on the other hand, gives rise to a tremendous and vertiginous
growth of disparate interconnected devices. This trend clearly states a need for scalable and
adaptive management mechanisms, where their security must be also as much autonomous as
these mechanisms will be. In that context, autonomic security solutions might be a key element
in the evolution of this new challenging landscape.
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A.1 Introduction and problem statement
The UMF framework has been created with the purpose of providing a single and simple
platform where autonomic elements (NEMs) can be deployed and activated in order to perform
the actions and achieve the objectives the were built for [154]. However, each NEM has particular
requirements and specific configurations in order to work properly. In addition, the interconnec-
tions between hundreds of NEMs and the services provided by them increase the complexity of
their configuration. In that context, management problems such as configuration errors, conflicts
between services and inconsistencies can occur leading to severe operational problems as well as
security issues within the framework itself. Even though operating systems where NEMs are de-
ployed and also the NEMs themselves may have security solutions to be protected, such fact does
not ensure the security of the whole framework. Unexpected behaviour, failures, service unavai-
lability and many other problems may occur if the UMF framework is not configured properly. In
light of this, we propose in this document a configuration assessment service (CAS) for the UMF
framework that provides the ability to both identify configuration errors and inconstancies, and
at the same time, it can be used for evaluating whether recommendations and best practices are
being considered as well. We propose the use of the OVAL [117] and DOVAL [25] languages for
expressing expected or wrong configurations within standalone and distributed scenarios respec-
tively. In this document we show how these languages can be used in the context of UMF and
we also present an architecture that illustrates how the configuration assessment service can be
integrated into the UMF framework.
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A.2 Background
The OVAL language has been developed mostly thinking about describing vulnerabilities.
However, its potential goes beyond such objective, it allows to describe machine states that de-
pending on the context, these states can be understood as a bad thing (vulnerabilities) or a
good thing (best practices). At the end, machine configurations and states are what OVAL is all
about, and this adequately fits to the UMF requirements for analysing potential configuration
problems such as service dependency inconsistencies, combinations of wrong NEM versions, in-
correct values within configuration parameters and also known vulnerable NEMS. It also can be
used for controlling the application of best practices. The usual or intuitive way to think about a
vulnerability is to consider it as a combination of conditions or properties that if hold on a target
system, the potential exploitable security problem described by such vulnerability is present on
that system. Each condition in turn can be understood as the state that should be observed on
a specific object. When the object under analysis exhibits the specified state, the condition is
said to be true on that system. In the OVAL language, a specific vulnerability is described using
an OVAL definition. An OVAL definition specifies criteria that logically combine a set of OVAL
tests. Each OVAL test in turn represents the process by which a specific condition or property is
assessed on the target system. Each OVAL test examines an OVAL object looking for a specific
state, thus an OVAL test will be true if the referred OVAL object matches the specified OVAL
state. The overall result for the criteria specified in the OVAL definition will be built using the
results of each referenced OVAL test. The OVAL language provides a powerful basis for expres-
sing configuration conditions of NEMs loaded in the framework that can be used for increasing
their control and ensuring secure configurations. However, under a logical perspective, the OVAL
language only allows to predicate over one component at a time, i.e., only unary predicates are
possible [24]. Being NEMs the individuals of the universe over we are predicating on, such issue
restricts the ability to define a predicate between two or more NEMs, i.e., n-ary predicates. In
light of this, the DOVAL language has been proposed for covering distributed scenarios where the
involvement of two or more devices is necessary to describe a distributed vulnerability. As explai-
ned before, the OVAL and DOVAL approach can be used not only for vulnerabilities but also for
describing general configurations and states. The DOVAL language extends OVAL by permitting
to express relationships between identified objects thus providing the ability to simultaneously
predicate over a set of network devices more than standalone machines or systems.
A.3 Configuration modeling for UMF
In order to explain the proposed approach, we put forward three different scenarios using
OVAL and DOVAL in the context of the UMF framework. Within these examples, we show
features and limitations that need to be addressed in order to capture the characteristics of these
scenarios. The first scenario uses the OVAL language and it is depicted in Figure A.1. Within
such scenario, we aim at describing the configuration of two NEMs where one of them requires
the other to be active. The first NEM acts as a SIP management NEM where audio calls can be
performed through it. The second NEM provides load-balancing services including the ability to
guarantee a minimum bandwidth for specific clients. In order to ensure quality in audio calls,
the SIP management NEM requires the load-balancing service provided by the second NEM to
be active. In that context, we need to specify two OVAL objects representing the NEMs (lines
21-28), on which two OVAL tests will be applied (lines 11-20), one test for each object (lines
12-15 and 16-19). In order to identify the required NEMs we use the entry <nem_name> to
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specify the NEM name, sip_management for the first NEM (line 23) and load_balancing for
the second one (line 26). Within the tests, the conditions we expect to see over the objects are
represented by OVAL states (lines 29-44). It is important to notice that the connection between
one object and one state is defined by the test structure and the references used in it (lines 11-20).
The first OVAL state (lines 30-36) applies over the first NEM, the SIP management service. In
the proposed state, it is being declared that the SIP management NEM must have any version
in the family 1.4. In addition, it is specified that the property active of this NEM must have
the value 1. Usually, state’s attributes used in the OVAL language are atomic. The structured
attribute called nem_property with children nem_property_key and nem_property_value is
an extension in terms of its normal use. With this OVAL state specifying a specific version
and that the NEM must be active, we are expressing one of the two conditions (line 6) for our
OVAL definition representing a configuration error (line 4). The second condition follows the
same idea where the load_balancing NEM must be inactive no matter what the version is. If
both conditions hold (line 5), the specified configuration error is present in the UMF framework.
<?xml ve r s i on="1.0" encoding="UTF 8"?>
<ova l_de f i n i t i on s . . . >
<de f i n i t i o n s >
<d e f i n i t i o n id="oval :umf: def :1" c l a s s="configuration error">
<c r i t e r i a operator="AND">
<c r i t e r i o n t e s t_re f="oval :umf: tst :1"/>
<c r i t e r i o n t e s t_re f="oval :umf: tst :2"/>
</c r i t e r i a >
</de f i n i t i o n >
</d e f i n i t i o n s >
<te s t s >
<umf_nem_test id="oval :umf: tst :1">
<obje c t ob j ec t_re f="oval :umf: obj :101"/>
<s ta t e s ta t e_re f="oval :umf: ste :201"/>
</umf_nem_test>
<umf_nem_test id="oval :umf: tst :2">
<obje c t ob j ec t_re f="oval :umf: obj :102"/>
<s ta t e s ta t e_re f="oval :umf: ste :202"/>
</umf_nem_test>
</te s t s >
<objec t s >
<umf_nem_object id="oval :umf: obj :101">
<nem_name>sip_server </nem_name>
</umf_nem_object>
<umf_nem_object id="oval :umf: obj :102">
<nem_name>load_balancer </nem_name >
</umf_nem_object>
</objec t s >
<sta t e s >
<umf_nem_state id="oval :umf: ste :201">
<nem_version operat ion="pattern match"> 1\ .4\ .⇤ </nem_version>
<nem_property operat ion="map">




<umf_nem_state id="oval :umf: ste :202">
<nem_version operat ion="pattern match"> .⇤ </nem_version>
<nem_property operat ion="map">




</sta t e s >
</ova l_de f in i t i on s >
Figure A.1 – UMF configuration error description with OVAL
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Even though the OVAL language can be very useful for describing NEM configurations as
shown in the previous example, the relationship between them cannot be formally represented.
In that context, we now present the same scenario using the DOVAL language, depicted in
Figure A.2. The proposed DOVAL specification reuses existing OVAL tests and objects (NEMs)
and provides the ability to describe relationships between those NEMs. The structure of a DOVAL
document follows the same philosophy as an OVAL document, i.e., tests over objects expecting
specific states. The main difference is that DOVAL allows referring more than one object within
the DOVAL test section thus permitting to analyse states over such objects simultaneously. Wi-
thin this scenario, only one test is defined (line 11) involving the two NEMs with their specific
characteristics previously defined in the OVAL document. NEMs are referenced by using their
OVAL ids (lines 12-13) so there is no need to redefine these objects in the DOVAL document. The
expected state between these two objects is referenced in the test section (line 14) and specified
in the state section (lines 26-30). The service state specifies that the service with name band-
width_assurance (line 27) is set between the SIP management NEM as its consumer (line 28)
and the load-balancing NEM as its provider (line 29). Such DOVAL document specifies the same
situation shown in the first scenario but now the relationship between both NEMs is formally
declared.
<?xml ve r s i on="1.0" encoding="UTF 8"?>
<doval_document>
<dova l_de f in i t i ons >
<dova l_de f in i t i on id="doval : f r . inria . doval : def :1" c l a s s="distributed_configuration_error">
<c r i t e r i a >
<c r i t e r i o n t e s t_re f="doval : f r . inria . doval : tst :4141"/>
</c r i t e r i a >
</dova l_de f in i t i on >
</dova l_de f in i t i ons >
<te s t s >
<doval_test id="doval : f r . inria . doval : tst :4141" comment="DOVAL test specifying service
provisioning between 2 NEMs." check_existence="at_least_one_exists" check="at least one">
<obje c t dev ice_re f="doval : f r . inria . doval : dev:222"/>
<ob j e c t dev ice_re f="doval : f r . inria . doval : dev:256"/>
<s ta t e s ta t e_re f="doval : f r . inria . doval : ste :7777"/>
</doval_test>
</te s t s >
<objec t s > <!   dev i c e s   >
<device_object id="doval : f r . inria . doval : dev:222">
<prop ova l t e s t_r e f="oval :umf: tst :1"/> <!  SIP s e rv e r NEM running  >
</device_object>
<device_object id="doval : f r . inria . doval : dev:256">
<prop ova l t e s t_r e f="oval :umf: tst :2"/> <!  Load ba lancer NEM inac t i v e  >
</device_object>
</objec t s >
<sta t e s > <!   r e l a t i o n s h i p s   >
<se rv i c e_s ta t e id="doval : f r . inria . doval : ste :7777"> <!  Se rv i c e con f ig  >
<name operat ion="equals"> bandwidth_assurance </name>
<consumer dev ice_re f="doval : f r . inria . doval : dev:222"/>
<prov ider dev ice_re f="doval : f r . inria . doval : dev:256"/>
</se rv i c e_sta te >
</sta t e s >
</dova l_de f in i t i ons >
Figure A.2 – UMF distributed configuration error description with DOVAL
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Both OVAL and DOVAL can be used for specifying best practices as well. We now present
a more complex scenario illustrated in Figure A.3 using the DOVAL language and involving
the same two NEMs, the SIP management service and the load balancer linked by a consumer-
provider relationship, but now both of them are active. In addition, we want to express a condition
between attributes of both NEMs that should always hold. Let us suppose that the SIP mana-
gement service uses G.711 for encoding its phone calls, i.e., 64 Kb/s for each call. In addition,
let us assume that the maximum number of clients while assuring certain quality threshold is set
to 100. In its limit, the SIP management NEM would require at least 64*100=6400Kb=800KB
assured bandwidth for effectively ensuring the expected quality. This means that the NEM in
charge of ensuring the minimum bandwidth level, the load balancer NEM in this case, should
be configured to provide at least this capacity. In order to specify this context, we use the same
test reference for the SIP management NEM (line 20) though the test for the load-balancing
NEM has been changed because it has to be active now (line 23). If these two NEMs are active
and related (lines 27-31), we need to ensure that the capacity provided by the load-balancing
NEM is sufficient enough for the SIP management NEM to ensure its quality service. To do so, a
configuration state is defined (lines 32-40) stating that the bit rate used by the SIP service (line
35) multiplied by its maximum number of clients (line 36) should be less than or equals to the
minimum assured bandwidth by the load-balancing NEM (line 38). Such description provides a
formal specification of a configuration that should be taken into account (best practices) in order
to avoid unexpected behaviour.
<?xml ve r s i on="1.0" encoding="UTF 8"?>
<doval_document>
<dova l_de f in i t i ons >
<dova l_de f in i t i on id="doval : f r . inria . doval : def :2" c l a s s="distributed_configuration_best_practices
">
<c r i t e r i a >
<c r i t e r i o n t e s t_re f="doval : f r . inria . doval : tst :6262"/>
</c r i t e r i a >
</dova l_de f in i t i on >
</dova l_de f in i t i ons >
<te s t s >
<doval_test id="doval : f r . inria . doval : tst :6262" comment="DOVAL test specifying best practices
between 2 NEMS. " check_existence="at_least_one_exists" check="at least one">
<obje c t dev ice_re f="doval : f r . inria . doval : dev:222"/>
<ob j e c t dev ice_re f="doval : f r . inria . doval : dev:300"/>
<s ta t e s ta t e_re f="doval : f r . inria . doval : ste :4444"/>
</doval_test>
</te s t s >
<objec t s > <!   dev i c e s   >
<device_object id="doval : f r . inria . doval : dev:222">
<prop ova l t e s t_r e f="oval :umf: tst :1"/> <!  SIP s e rv e r NEM running  >
</device_object>
<device_object id="doval : f r . inria . doval : dev:300">
<prop ova l t e s t_r e f="oval :umf: tst :3"/> <!  Load ba lancer NEM act ive  >
</device_object>
</objec t s >
<sta t e s > <!   r e l a t i o n s h i p s   >
<con f i g_sta te id="doval : f r . inria . doval : ste :4444"> <!  Config . requirements  >
<operat ion type="comparison" name="greater_than">
<operat ion type="arithmetic" name="multiplication">
<at t r i bu t e name="bit_rate" dev ice_re f="doval : f r . inria . doval : dev:222"/>
<at t r i bu t e name="number_of_clients" dev ice_re f="doval : f r . inria . doval : dev:222"/>
</operat ion>
<at t r i bu t e name="min_assured_bandwidth" dev ice_re f="doval : f r . inria . doval : dev:300"/>
</operat ion>
</conf ig_state>
</sta t e s >
</dova l_de f in i t i ons >
Figure A.3 – DOVAL scenario for best practices
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A.4 Configuration assessment service architecture
The ability to automatically assess configuration errors, vulnerabilities and also best prac-
tices provides a strong support for increasing the security awareness of the UMF framework. By
consuming security advisories and configuration descriptions from a database, the CAS service
gathers the required information from the UMF framework and analyses the configuration of
components (typically NEMs) loaded in the framework in order to detect configuration inconsis-
tencies that may lead to operational and security problems. The assessment results become then
available for the UMF framework thus corrective actions can be performed if necessary.
Figure A.4 – Configuration assessment service architecture
The positioning of the configuration assessment service is illustrated in Figure A.4. Within
this architecture, the CAS service provides the UMF framework with the ability to analyse
the configuration of NEMs loaded in the framework and to identify potential configuration and
security problems. In order to do this, the UMF framework should provide through a web service
for instance, information about the NEMs under control while the CAS service is in charge of
correlating such information with security advisories and configuration descriptions present in the
configuration database. These descriptions are specified with the OVAL and DOVAL languages
for capturing standalone and distributed scenarios respectively. The integration of CAS within
the UMF framework leverages the latter by providing self-assessment capabilities and increasing
its overall security as well.
A.5 UMF, conclusions and perspectives
The UMF framework provides a unified platform for embedding autonomic solutions targeted
on specific objectives called NEMs that together can provide autonomic management solutions for
different needs and contexts. The integration of a configuration assessment service into the UMF
framework can highly increase its security and stability by ensuring safe configurations among
NEMs loaded in the platform. In this proposal, we have presented an approach for integrating
such a service that provides the UMF framework with the ability to assess its own internal
configuration. Our approach relies on the use of the OVAL and DOVAL languages for specifying
configuration errors or situations that should not happen as well as best practices that should
be integrated into the NEM management plane. Both OVAL and DOVAL require extensions
to be integrated into the UMF framework so as interpreters, though it is feasible. The DOVAL
language is currently under development though its applicability has already been shown in [25].
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A.5. UMF, conclusions and perspectives
In order to integrate our solution into UMF it is also required to define interfaces, web services for
instance, for exchanging required information between the UMF framework and the configuration
assessment service. The formalization of the data required to analyse NEMs configurations has
to be performed in order to extend the DOVAL language as to cover such requirements. In this
document we have proposed some scenarios that exemplify and illustrate how our approach can
be used for expressing configuration problems and best practices in the context of UMF. The
integration of such service may highly enhance the overall stability of the UMF framework itself
by increasing its configuration and security awareness.
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Résumé / Abstract
Le déploiement d’équipements informatiques à large échelle, sur les multiples infrastructures
interconnectées de l’Internet, a eu un impact considérable sur la complexité de la tâche de gestion.
L’informatique autonome permet de faire face à cet enjeu en spécifiant des objectifs de haut
niveau et en déléguant autant que possible les activités de gestion aux réseaux et systèmes eux-
mêmes. Cependant, lorsque des changements sont opérés par les administrateurs ou directement
par les équipements autonomes, des configurations vulnérables peuvent être involontairement
introduites, même si celles-ci sont correctes d’un point de vue opérationnel. Ces vulnérabilités
offrent un point d’entrée pour des attaques de sécurité. Les environnements autonomes doivent
être capables de se protéger pour éviter leur compromission et la perte de leur autonomie. À cet
égard, les mécanismes de gestion des vulnérabilités sont essentiels pour assurer une configuration
sûre de ces environnements.
Cette thèse porte sur la conception et le développement de nouvelles méthodes et techniques
pour la gestion des vulnérabilités dans les réseaux et systèmes autonomes, afin de leur permettre
de détecter, d’évaluer et de corriger leurs propres expositions aux failles de sécurité. Nous présen-
terons tout d’abord un état de l’art sur l’informatique autonome et la gestion de vulnérabilités, en
mettant en relief les défis importants qui doivent être relevés dans ce cadre. Nous décrirons ensuite
notre approche d’intégration du processus de gestion des vulnérabilités dans ces environnements,
et en détaillerons les différentes facettes, notamment : extension de l’approche dans le cas de
vulnérabilités distribuées, prise en compte du facteur temps en considérant une historisation des
paramètres de configuration, et application en environnements contraints en utilisant des tech-
niques probabilistes. Nous présenterons également les prototypes et les résultats expérimentaux
qui ont permis d’évaluer ces différentes contributions.
Mots clés: sécurité, gestion de réseaux, informatique autonome, gestion de vulnérabilités.
Over the last years, the massive deployment of computing devices over disparate intercon-
nected infrastructures has dramatically increased the complexity of network management. Au-
tonomic computing has emerged as a novel paradigm to cope with this challenging reality. By
specifying high-level objectives, autonomic computing aims at delegating management activi-
ties to the networks themselves. However, when changes are performed by administrators and
self-governed entities, vulnerable configurations may be unknowingly introduced. Vulnerabili-
ties constitute the main entry point for security attacks. Hence, self-governed entities unable to
protect themselves will eventually get compromised and consequently, they will lose their own
autonomic nature. In that context, vulnerability management mechanisms are vital to ensure
safe configurations, and with them, the survivability of any autonomic environment.
This thesis targets the design and development of novel autonomous mechanisms for dealing
with vulnerabilities, in order to increase the security of autonomic networks and systems. We
first present a comprehensive state of the art in autonomic computing and vulnerability mana-
gement, and point out important challenges that should be faced in order to fully integrate the
vulnerability management process into the autonomic management plane. Afterwards, we present
our contributions which include autonomic assessment strategies for device-based vulnerabilities
and extensions in several dimensions, namely, distributed vulnerabilities (spatial), past hidden
vulnerable states (temporal), and mobile security assessment (technological). In addition, we
present vulnerability remediation approaches able to autonomously bring networks and systems
into secure states. The scientific approaches presented in this thesis have been largely validated
by an extensive set of experiments which are also discussed in this manuscript.
Keywords: security, network management, autonomic computing, vulnerability management.
